Fulop v. Sea Gate Ass'n

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Fulop v. Sea Gate Ass'n

214 A.D.2d 536, 625 N.Y.S.2d 917, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3519

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 3, 1995

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 214 A.D.2d 536 (Fulop v. Sea Gate Ass'n) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Fulop v. Sea Gate Ass'n, 214 A.D.2d 536, 625 N.Y.S.2d 917, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3519 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action, inter alia, for injunctive relief, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Kramer, J.), dated July 14, 1993, as granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The decision to grant a preliminary injunction is a matter ordinarily committed to the sound discretion of the court hearing the motion (see, Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748). To obtain a preliminary injunction a movant must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm unless the injunction is granted, and (3) that the equities are balanced in its favor (see, Doe v Axelrod, supra, at 750; Betesh v Jemal, 209 AD2d 568; Jurlique, Inc. v Austral Biolab Pty., 187 AD2d 637). Viewed in this framework, the record supports the Supreme Court’s decision to grant the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant from barring vehicular entry to the community by the plaintiffs once valid identification is shown. Sullivan, J. P., Balletta, Rosenblatt and Miller, JJ., concur.

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In an action, inter alia, for injunctive relief, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Kramer, J.), dated July 14, 1993, as granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The decision to grant a preliminary injunction is a matter ordinarily committed to the sound discretion of the court hearing the motion (see, Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748). To obtain a preliminary injunction a movant must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm unless the injunction is granted, and (3) that the equities are balanced in its favor (see, Doe v Axelrod, supra, at 750; Betesh v Jemal, 209 AD2d 568; Jurlique, Inc. v Austral Biolab Pty., 187 AD2d 637). Viewed in this framework, the record supports the Supreme Court’s decision to grant the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant from barring vehicular entry to the community by the plaintiffs once valid identification is shown. Sullivan, J. P., Balletta, Rosenblatt and Miller, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

214 A.D.2d 536, 625 N.Y.S.2d 917, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3519, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fulop-v-sea-gate-assn-nyappdiv-1995.

Opinion

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