Fuller v. Unknown Officials from Justice Department Crime Division

D.C. Circuit

Fuller v. Unknown Officials from Justice Department Crime Division

387 F. App'x 3

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedJuly 22, 2010

DocketNo. 10-5112

StatusPublished

Cited by16 cases

This text of 387 F. App'x 3 (Fuller v. Unknown Officials from Justice Department Crime Division) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Fuller v. Unknown Officials from Justice Department Crime Division, 387 F. App'x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

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Opinion

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the brief and appendix filed by the appellant. See Fed. RApp. P. 34(a)(2); D.C.Cir. Rule 340). It is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s order filed March 16, 2010, be affirmed. The district court properly denied appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus and dismissed the action, because appellant has not shown a “clear and indisputable right” to mandamus relief. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayaca-mas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988). The Executive Branch has absolute discretion to de[4]*4cide whether to prosecute a case. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); see also Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234 (D.C.Cir.1965) (the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General may not be controlled through mandamus). Moreover, appellant has not demonstrated that the appellees owed him a duty to prosecute particular individuals. To the extent appellant attempted to raise causes of actions based on criminal statutes, there is no private cause of action for perjury, 18 U.S.C. § 1621; subornation of perjury, 18 U.S.C. § 1622; false declarations before a grand jury or court, 18 U.S.C. § 1623; or false statements, 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 190, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) (refusing to infer a private right of action from a “bare criminal statute”); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Widnall, 57 F.3d 1162, 1164 (D.C.Cir.1995).

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.

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JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the brief and appendix filed by the appellant. See Fed. RApp. P. 34(a)(2); D.C.Cir. Rule 340). It is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s order filed March 16, 2010, be affirmed. The district court properly denied appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus and dismissed the action, because appellant has not shown a “clear and indisputable right” to mandamus relief. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayaca-mas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988). The Executive Branch has absolute discretion to de[4]*4cide whether to prosecute a case. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); see also Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234 (D.C.Cir.1965) (the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General may not be controlled through mandamus). Moreover, appellant has not demonstrated that the appellees owed him a duty to prosecute particular individuals. To the extent appellant attempted to raise causes of actions based on criminal statutes, there is no private cause of action for perjury, 18 U.S.C. § 1621; subornation of perjury, 18 U.S.C. § 1622; false declarations before a grand jury or court, 18 U.S.C. § 1623; or false statements, 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 190, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) (refusing to infer a private right of action from a “bare criminal statute”); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Widnall, 57 F.3d 1162, 1164 (D.C.Cir.1995).

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.

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387 F. App'x 3, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fuller-v-unknown-officials-from-justice-department-crime-division-cadc-2010.

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