Fuller v. United Electric Co.

273 P.2d 136, 70 Nev. 448, 1954 Nev. LEXIS 72
CourtNevada Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 15, 1954
Docket3784
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 273 P.2d 136 (Fuller v. United Electric Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fuller v. United Electric Co., 273 P.2d 136, 70 Nev. 448, 1954 Nev. LEXIS 72 (Neb. 1954).

Opinion

*449 OPINION

By the Court,

Merrill, J.:

This appeal challenges the measure by which damages were awarded plaintiff below for breach of a construction contract.

The defendant (appellant here), proposing to construct a new home in Las Vegas, entered into a contract with the plaintiff company for installation of electric wiring. The agreed price was $1,410 and the terms of payment were expressly stated as follows: “80% of contract price payable on completion of rough-in and inspection thereof; balance payable on final completion and inspection.” Work proceeded under the contract to completion of rough-in. Inspection was made by the municipal building inspector and the work was approved. The defendant, after paying $500 on account, became *450 dissatisfied with the plaintiff’s work and refused to permit the plaintiff to continue. The job was completed by a different electrical contractor at considerable additional expense to the defendant.

Plaintiff, contending that defendant was guilty of breach of contract, seeks damages under three causes of action: first, for the sum of $1,128, being 80 percent of the contract price, claimed as due under the contract since rough-in had been completed; second, for extras furnished; third, for loss of profits which would have been realized had plaintiff been permitted to complete the contract. The defendant, contending that she was justified in terminating the contract, counterclaimed for damages suffered by virtue of plaintiff’s allegedly faulty workmanship and the necessity for employing others to complete the contract.

The trial court, sitting without a jury, dismissed defendant’s counterclaim and gave judgment to plaintiff in the sum of $1,048.60. In its decision it states: “The amount due the plaintiff is determined to be $1410.00 according to the contract; 80% of said sum is $1128.00; 20% profit thereon is $225.60. In conclusion the court finds that there is due and owing to plaintiff by defendant the following:

“On contract 1128.00
“On extras 195.00
“Profit 225.60
“1548.60
“Less $500.00 paid 500.00
“Balance 1048.60”

From that judgment defendant has taken this appeal.

She first assigns as error the court’s dismissal of her counterclaim. The court found that she was not justified in termination of the contract; that plaintiff had not been guilty of breach; that if there was fault in construction it was on the part of the architect and not the *451 plaintiff. While in some respects the facts are in dispute, support for this determination is found in the record and we shall not disturb it.

Defendant next assigns as error the court’s allowance of $195 for extras. In this respect the court’s decision states: “As to the extras, the proof was that on Aug. 9, 1951 an invoice was made showing extras furnished in the sum of $314.00. The testimony of Mr. Mays, one of the employees of plaintiff, showed that all of the extras listed in said invoice except the last four items thereof, were furnished and installed. These items amounted to $119.00. No other satisfactory proof being furnished the court can only find the amount of extras to be $195.00.” The record demonstrates that the last four items of extras amounted to $129, rather than $119 and that, accepting the testimony upon which the court relied, judgment upon this cause of action should have been for $185 rather than $195. With this minor correction the record supports the court’s finding and, save for such correction, it will not be disturbed.

Defendant next challenges the allowance of damages for 80 percent of the contract price plus 20 percent profit. Upon this point we agree that her contentions have merit.

It is to be noted that plaintiff proceeded not in quantum meruit but for contract damages. The generally accepted rule as to measure of damages in such a case as this is stated as follows in Bradley v. Nevada-California-Oregon Railway, 42 Nev. 411, 420, 178 P. 906, 908: “If the breach consists in preventing the performance of the contract without fault of the other party, who is willing and able to perform, the damage of the latter consists in two distinct items, namely: First, what he has already expended toward performance (less materials in hand); and, second, the profits that he would realize by performing the whole contract.” Stated in another way, the rule is that “a contractor who is not *452 in default should recover the total price promised less the cost of performing, in case no work has been done, or of completing performance of the work, where there has been partial performance.” 5 Williston on Contracts, 3824, sec. 1363. To the same effect see 1 Restatement of the Law, Contracts, 578, sec. 346, Comment! g, h; 5 Corbin on Contracts, sec. 1094. “The purpose of money damages is to put the injured party in as good a position as that in which full performance would have put him.” Restatement of the Law, supra, page 574, Comment b.

The trial court’s measure of damages cannot be said to meet the requirements of the rule.

As to profits the court found, “The amount claimed by plaintiff, to-wit 20%, appears reasonable.” This might well be regarded as reasonable profit. The measure of contract damages, however, does not ensure a reasonable profit, or, indeed, any profit beyond that provided by the contract itself. What is allowed is the profit, if any, which would have been realized had the contract proceeded to completion.

Under the contract’s provision that 80 percent of the contract price should become payable upon completion of rough-in, the court has allowed $1,128. It is to be noted that the breach by defendant was not a partial breach with the contract continuing in effect notwithstanding, in which event an installment or progress payment due under the contract might be claimed in full. The breach was a total breach and was so treated by plaintiff. The contract was thereby terminated.

A similar situation confronted the court in New Era Homes Corporation v. Forster, 299 N.Y. 303, 86 N.E.2d 757, 758, 22 A.L.R.2d 1338. There the contract provided a total price of $3,075 payable in varying amounts at various stages of completion. The court stated the question to be whether the contract was “an entire contract, with one consideration for the doing of the whole work, *453 and payments on account at fixed points in the progress of the job, or was * * * a severable or divisible one in the sense that, of the total consideration, $1,150 was to be the full and fixed payment for delivery of materials and starting of work, $1,500 the full and fixed payment for work done up to and including ‘completion of rough carpentry and rough plumbing,’ and $425 for the rest.” The court then proceeded to its determination.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
273 P.2d 136, 70 Nev. 448, 1954 Nev. LEXIS 72, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fuller-v-united-electric-co-nev-1954.