Fuller v. State

473 So. 2d 1159, 1985 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 5246
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Alabama
DecidedApril 23, 1985
Docket6 Div. 577
StatusPublished

This text of 473 So. 2d 1159 (Fuller v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fuller v. State, 473 So. 2d 1159, 1985 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 5246 (Ala. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinion

LEIGH M. CLARK, Retired Circuit Judge.

Mark Steven Fuller was tried under a two-count indictment, the first count charging him with the crime of burglary in the third degree in knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully in a building with the intent “to commit a crime therein, to-wit: Theft, in violation of Section 13A-7-7 of the Alabama Criminal Code,” which by subsection (b) thereof is classified as a Class C felony. In the second count, it was charged that he “did intentionally receive, retain, or dispose of stolen property, to-wit: one sofa, one chair, and two end tables of the total value of Twelve Hundred Dollars, the property of Mary Walters knowing that it was stolen or having reasonable grounds to believe it had been stolen and not having the intent to restore it to its owner, in violation of Section 13A-8-17 of the Alabama Criminal Code.” After all the evidence had been taken and the attorneys had completed their arguments to the jury, the court charged the jury, correctly, we think, and neither party on appeal contends otherwise, that as the same personal property was involved in both counts of the indictment, the jury could find defendant guilty under one of the counts only. The jury found him guilty under the second count, but in doing so, it stated in its verdict that it found him guilty of receiving stolen property in the second degree, a lesser included offense to that of § 13A-8-17 and one distinguishable materially as applied to the evidence in the instant case by part of its definition of the crime as “Receiving stolen property ... Which, exceeds $100.00 in value but does not exceed $1,000.00 in value,” while receiving stolen property in the first degree as proscribed by § 13A-8-17 provides in pertinent part that the property involved shall be in excess of $1,000.00 in value.

After the judgment of conviction, defendant was given due notice that he would be proceeded against under the Habitual Felony Offenders Act. Upon the sentence hearing, it was shown that defendant had been previously convicted of two previously committed felonies. The court sentenced him to imprisonment for ten years, the maximum provided for the Class C felony of which he was adjudged guilty, according to § 13A-5-6(a)(3), and the minimum punishment when the criminal defendant had been previously convicted of any two felonies, according to § 13A-5-9(b)(1) when considered with § 13A-5-6(a)(l).

Although only one issue is presented in the brief of counsel for appellant, namely, that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence an inculpatory statement made by the defendant to a police officer, we deem it necessary to a correct understanding and discussion of such issue to give the following resume of the material evidence in the case. In doing so, we follow substantially the “Statement of the Facts” set forth in brief of counsel for appellant, which appropriately contains testimony heard by the trial judge out of the presence of the jury in connection with defendant’s motion to suppress or the like, as well as testimony given in the presence of the jury.

Mrs. Mary Walters was the first witness in the case. She testified that on September 21, 1983, the defendant, with two other persons, assisted her in moving her living room suite from where it had been to the house that Mrs. Walters was to occupy as her residence, which house had been previously occupied by defendant and' other [1161]*1161members of defendant’s family. We quote from her testimony:

“Q. All right. Now, when you left your house on the 21st, was there anybody inside that house?
“A. No.
“Q. And was your living room suite inside that house?
“A. Yes.
“Q. When you left that house, did you lock it?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Did you at any point return to that house?
“A. No, not that night.
“Q. Okay. Did you return to that house any time the next day?
“A. Yes.
“Q. All right. Approximately what time?
“A. Ten-thirty or eleven.
“Q. Did you see anything unusual when you got to your house?
“A. Yes. The window was broke, the back door opened.
“Q. The window was open?
“A. Uh-huh.
“Q. And the back door was opened?
“A. Uh-huh.
“Q. And did you go inside your house?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Did you see anything unusual then?
“A. Yes.
“Q. What did you see?
“A. I didn’t have a living room suite and I didn’t have six or eight boxes of my merchandise.
“Q. Now, this living room suite, what was the value of this sofa and this chair and two end tables?
“A. Twelve Hundred Dollars.
“Q. Now, at any point did you register a complaint with anyone?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Who did you call?
“A. Fultondale Police.”
The witness further testified on direct examination that Detective Mancel Sharp of the Fultondale Police came to her house on the afternoon of September 22, 1983, that she registered a complaint with Detective Sharp, and that sometime thereafter she went with Detective Sharp to Adamsville “with a search warrant and got my living room suite back.” On cross-examination, Mrs. Walters testified in part as follows:
“Q. The furniture that you got back that you testified to on direct examination, where did that come from?
“A. It came from Gene McAnnally’s house in Adamsville.
“Q. And how long after the 21st was that?
“A. I don’t remember. A month or two.
“Q. Do you have a judgment? You say a month or two is your best judgment?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And where was the furniture at Gene McAnnally’s house?
“A. His den.
“Q. It was being used as furniture for him and his family, I guess?
“A. Yes.”

Mr. Gene McAnnally testified as a witness for the State. According to his testimony, he paid the defendant four hundred dollars for the particular furniture. The following is a part of his testimony:

“Q. Did Mr. Fuller help you put this furniture in your house?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. How did he deliver the furniture? “A. Well, he helped me load it on the truck.
“Q. Did he help you load it on your truck?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And then you transported it to your house; is that right?
“A.

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Bluebook (online)
473 So. 2d 1159, 1985 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 5246, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fuller-v-state-alacrimapp-1985.