Fuller v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided September 24, 2019·No. 15-1470·Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS Filed: August 26, 2019

* * * * * * * * * * * * * ANDREA FULLER, on behalf of her * Minor Child, B.F., * UNPUBLISHED * Petitioner, * No. 15-1470V * v. * Chief Special Master Dorsey * SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Curtis R. Webb, Twin Falls, ID, for petitioner. Adriana R. Teitel, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

DECISION AWARDING INTERIM ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

On December 4, 2015, Andrea Fuller (“petitioner”) filed a petition in the National Vaccine Injury Program2 on behalf of her minor child, B.F., alleging that the DTaP, Hepatitis B, Hib, PCV, and IPV vaccines B.F. received on March 12, 2014, caused her to suffer from epilepsy, seizures, and various developmental problems. Petition at 1, 3.

An entitlement hearing was held in this matter on October 16-17, 2018. Subsequently, on July 18, 2019, petitioner filed a motion for interim attorneys’ fees and costs, requesting

1 Because this unpublished decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the undersigned is required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the decision will be available to anyone with access to the Internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access. 2 The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program is set forth in Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755, codified as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2012) (“Vaccine Act” or “the Act”). All citations in this decision to individual sections of the Vaccine Act are to 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa. 1 compensation for the attorney and paralegal who worked on her case.3 Petitioner’s Motion (“Pet. Mot.”) dated July 18, 2019 (ECF No. 133). Petitioner’s request can be summarized as follows:

Attorneys’ Fees – $200,790.30 Attorneys’ Costs – $54,891.87 Petitioner’s Costs – $759.74

Petitioner thus requests a total of $256,441.91. Respondent filed his response on August 1, 2019, stating that he “defers to the Chief Special Master as to whether to exercise her discretion to award interim attorneys’ fees and costs at this time.” Respondent’s Response dated Aug. 1, 2019 (ECF No. 134) at 4.

This matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned GRANTS petitioner’s motion in part and awards $256,010.27 in attorneys’ fees and costs.

I. Discussion

Under the Vaccine Act, the special master shall award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for any petition that results in an award of compensation. § 15(e)(1). When compensation is not awarded, the special master “may” award reasonable fees and costs “if the special master or court determines that the petition was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.” Id. If a special master has not yet determined entitlement, she may still award attorneys’ fees and costs on an interim basis. Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Such awards “are particularly appropriate in cases where proceedings are protracted and costly experts must be retained.” Id. Similarly, it is proper for a special master to award interim fees and costs “[w]here the claimant establishes that the cost of litigation has imposed an undue hardship and that there exists a good faith basis for the claim.” Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 609 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

Over the past three years, petitioner’s counsel has expended significant time and resources to advance this claim. The requested costs alone, which include expert fees and travel expenses for the entitlement hearing, total over $50,000.00. Moreover, the claim appears at this point to have been brought in good faith and built on a reasonable basis. The undersigned thus finds that an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs is appropriate here.

A. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees

The Federal Circuit has approved use of the lodestar approach to determine reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the Vaccine Act. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1349. Using the lodestar approach, a court first determines “an initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys’ fee by ‘multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable

3 This is petitioner’s second motion for interim fees and costs. On July 5, 2016, the undersigned awarded petitioner $11,341.56 in fees and costs for her former counsel, Mr. Andrew Downing. Decision dated July 5, 2016 (ECF No. 23). 2 hourly rate.’” Id. at 1347-48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). Then, the court may make an upward or downward departure from the initial calculation of the fee award based on other specific findings. Id. at 1348.

Counsel must submit fee requests that include contemporaneous and specific billing records indicating the service performed, the number of hours expended on the service, and the name of the person performing the service. See Savin v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 85 Fed. Cl. 313, 316-18 (2008). Counsel should not include in their fee requests hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). It is “well within the special master’s discretion to reduce the hours to a number that, in [her] experience and judgment, [is] reasonable for the work done.” Id. at 1522. Furthermore, the special master may reduce a fee request sua sponte, apart from objections raised by respondent and without providing the petitioner notice and opportunity to respond. See Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 209 (2009).

A special master need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner’s fee application when reducing fees. Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (Fed. Cl. 2011). Special masters may rely on their experience with the Vaccine Act and its attorneys to determine the reasonable number of hours expended. Wasson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 484 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 19, 1991), rev’d on other grounds and aff’d in relevant part, 988 F.2d 131 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Just as “[t]rial courts routinely use their prior experience to reduce hourly rates and the number of hours claimed in attorney fee requests . . . [v]accine program special masters are also entitled to use their prior experience in reviewing fee applications.” Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1521.

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