Fuller v. Hubbard

6 Cow. 13
New York Supreme Court·Decided August 15, 1826·Published·Cited by 30 cases

Opinion

Curia, per

Woodworth, J.

The plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the general counts. The special contract is still subsisting; and the remedy of the plaintiff is on the contract. (Clark v. Smith, 14 John. 326.) That the plaintiff had no right to rescind, follows from the conclusion. (which we have come to on another point in the cause,) that the outstanding judgment admitted by the pleadings, was no obstacle in the way of performing the promise to convey according to its terms. The payments were made by the plaintiff upon the foot of the special contract. Every thing has gone on, for a series of years, upon the supposition that the agreement was valid and subsisting.

It is unnecessary to consider the question of damages ; as we think the action cannot be sustained on the contract, the purchaser not having put the vendor or his heirs in default.

in this case, it was necessary for the plaintiff to show, at least, that he had demanded a conveyance from the heirs of Smith, the intestate ; and that then, after waiting a reasonable time for making out and executing it, he had offered to receive it. The English law is peculiarly strict. By this, it seems, the vendee, who sues for a breach of the contract to convey, is required, not merely to shew payment of the purchase money ; he must also prove the preparation and tender of a conveyance ready for execution. Till this is done, the vendor is not put in default. In Baxter v. Lewis, (Forrest’s Exch Rep. 61-2,) on a bill filed by the vendor of land against the purchaser, for a specific performance, the defendant was decreed to pay the purchase money. He neglected to do so, and was attached. A motion being made to set aside [18] the attachment, on the ground that, as the vendor had not prepare(j arid tendered a conveyance, the defendant was not bound to pay ; and the attachment was, therefore, premature; Pemberton, for the plaintiff, said, “ It is the duty of the purchaser to make and tender a conveyance. The vendor is never called upon to do so.” The court denied the motion, thinking it was incumbent on the defendant, “ to prepare and tender the conveyance, and pay the purchase money.” In Knight v. Crockford, (1 Esp. N. P. Rep. 190,) on an objection by Adair, sergeant, that the plaintiff, a purchaser, could not recover on the contract in question, (which consisted of a promise by the plaintiff to pay for, and of the defendant to convey real estate,) because he had not shewn the preparation and tender of a conveyance to the defendant; Eyre, C. J. did not question that the objection was according to the general rule ; but distinguished the case, saying the defendant had incapacitated himself to convey by selling to another, which rendered a strict performance on the part of the plaintiff unnecessary.

Mr. Sugden declares the rule of Baxter v. Lewis to be the settled rule of the profession in England; and notwithstanding some dicta which he mentions to the contrary, he still infers that the purchaser, and not the vendor, ought to prepare and tender the conveyance. (Sugd. L. V. 181-2, Am. ed. 1820.) Sugden agrees that the contrary was the general rule when the simplicity of the common law reigned, and possession was the best evidence of title ; but upon the modifications of estates, unknown to the common law, which resulted in the difficulties surrounding modern titles, the more convenient rule which he mentions had growii up among the conveyancers, (b) This doctrine [19] tff Sugden is mentioned with approbation by the late chief justice Spencer, in Hudson v. Swift, (20 John Rep. 27;) and the court decide in that case, that, to put the vendor in default, and entitle the vendee to recover back part of the [20] purchase money, which he had paid in advance, he must tender the residue, and demand a conveyance. There is, then, something more to be done than the simple payment, or ^1C tender of the purchase money. A conveyance must [21] be demanded. Nor would this alone appear to satisfy the principle of the rule. A reasonable time should be allowed to the vendor to prepare the conveyance. The purchaser not having himself prepared it, (which he may do) [22] he shall not be allowed to retire immediately, and bring his action; but should present himself to receive the con* veyance, which he has thus required to be furnished. Deliberation and advice of counsel may be necessary in settling its terms. The framing and execution of modern conveyances, even with us, where the titles to real estate are much less complicated than in England, are not like the payment of money, or the delivery of a chattel. I admit the general rule to be, as contended by the counsel for the plaintiff; that where a party engages to do any act, and a demand is not a part of the contract, the bringing of the action is, in itself, a sufficient demand. Such an important transaction, however, as the assuring of a title to real estate, under the modern system of conveyancing, is an exception to that rule.

Clearly, the judgment recovered against Smith is no ground, in a court of law, for rescinding the contract. The agreement was to convey in fee simple. A conveyance is good and perfect, without warranty or personal covenants. Such a conveyance will satisfy the terms of this contract. The judgment is, of itself, no transfer of title. It does not destroy the seisin of Smith, or his heirs, nor take away the capacity to convey. (5 John. 58. 7 id. 380. 13 id. 363. 20 id. 133. 12 id. 443. 9 id. 126.)

A new trial must be granted, with costs to abide the event.

New trial granted.

Footnotes

[19] " When land, or other property, which does not pass by mere delivery, but is held by a title, depending on documental evidence, is sold, it is the duty of the solicitor for the vendor to prepare an abstract of the title ; and of the solicitor for the purchaser to compare the abstract with the deeds, wills, &e. and to call for evidence of the facts which are stated as relevant to the title ; and to take care that the abstract contains a correct and faith* ful statement of all the circumstances disclosed by the deeds, wills, &c., or depending on extraneous facts, as marriages burials, baptisms, possession, descents, disseisins, and the like, and which are material to the title.

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