Fuhr v. Hazel Park

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: March 24, 2004
• Docket: 02-1367
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0084P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0084p.06 Granzotto, LAW OFFICE OF MARK GRANZOTTO, Royal Oak, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Timothy J. Mullins, COX, HODGMAN & GIARMARCO, Troy, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Michigan, for Appellant. Mark Granzotto, LAW OFFICE OF MARK GRANZOTTO, Royal Oak, Michigan, Deborah L. FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Gordon, LAW OFFICES OF DEBORAH L. GORDON, _________________ Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellee.

GERALDINE FUHR, X _________________ Plaintiff-Appellee/ - OPINION Cross-Appellant, - _________________ - Nos. 01-2215/ - 2606; 02-1367 v. > ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Defendant- , appellant School District of the City of Hazel Park (“Hazel - Park”) appeals from a jury award in favor of plaintiff-appellee SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE - Geraldine Fuhr, in Fuhr’s sexual discrimination suit brought CITY OF HAZEL PARK , - under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq., and the Elliott- Defendant-Appellant/ - Larsen Civil Rights Act of Michigan, MCL § 37.2101 et. seq. Cross-Appellee. - Hazel Park also appeals the district court’s subsequent - injunctive order requiring the school district to hire Fuhr as N head coach of the school’s varsity male basketball team, as Appeal from the United States District Court well as the award of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff. Plaintiff- for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. appellee Fuhr cross-appeals the district court’s order striking No. 99-76360—George C. Steeh, District Judge. the jury’s award of future damages following her installment as the boys’ varsity basketball head coach. For the reasons Argued: September 16, 2003 set forth below, we will AFFIRM the judgment of the district court in all respects. Decided and Filed: March 24, 2004 I. Before: SILER, BATCHELDER, and COOK, Circuit Judges. This suit arises from Hazel Park’s 1999 decision to hire John Barnett rather than Fuhr for the vacant position of boys’ _________________ varsity basketball coach. At that time, Barnett, a relatively new male teacher at Hazel Park, had coached the boys’ COUNSEL freshman basketball team for two years. On the other hand, Fuhr, a female teacher at Hazel Park, had been the head coach ARGUED: Timothy J. Mullins, COX, HODGMAN & of the girls’ varsity basketball team for some ten years, and GIARMARCO, Troy, Michigan, for Appellant. Mark

1 Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367 Fuhr v. Hazel Park 3 4 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367

coach of the boys’ junior varsity and assistant coach of the with their request.” According to Aldred, this story was boys’ varsity basketball teams for eight years.1 supported by comments made by Clint Adkins, the board president, who said he was “very concerned about a female In 1999, Charles Kirkland, the boys’ varsity basketball being the head boys’ basketball coach in Hazel Park.” A day coach, announced his intention to retire from coaching at the after the interview, Anker announced that Barnett would be end of the year. Fuhr and Barnett were the only individuals the new boys’ varsity basketball coach. who applied for the post. At the same time, David Aldred, who had been the Hazel Park High School athletic director for In October 1999, Fuhr filed suit in the Eastern District of thirteen or fourteen years, announced that he was retiring on Michigan, seeking compensatory damages, punitive damages, July 1, 1999. The committee assembled to interview the judgment for past and future lost wages and benefits, an order candidates for the position consisted of Superintendent James of the court placing her in the position of boys’ varsity Anker; Dan Grant, the district athletic director; Victor Mayo, basketball coach, attorneys’ fees, and any other appropriate the assistant superintendent; Jim Meisinger, the high school equitable relief. Hazel Park moved for summary judgment, principal; and Tom Pratt, the individual replacing Aldred as arguing that Fuhr had failed to establish a prima facie case of the high school athletic director. Neither Aldred nor sexual discrimination and that the District had legitimate, Kirkland, both of whom who supported Fuhr for the coaching non-discriminatory reasons for the decision to hire Barnett. job, was on the committee.2 According to Aldred, Grant told The district court denied defendant’s motion, and the case him that Anker did not want Aldred to participate in the proceeded to jury trial. interviews. The jury returned a verdict in Fuhr’s favor, awarding her The committee interviewed Barnett first, followed $245,000 in present damages and $210,000 in future immediately by Fuhr. Anker, who made the ultimate hiring damages. The district court thereafter granted Fuhr’s request decision, left Fuhr’s interview shortly after it started and did for injunctive relief, ordering Fuhr named boys’ varsity not return. In the committee conference following the basketball coach. In an amended order, after receiving briefs interviews, some members expressed concerns about on the subject of future damages, the district court struck the unspecified community complaints against Fuhr and the idea jury’s award of future damages in its entirety. The district that Fuhr would be coaching two major varsity sports in quick court also granted Fuhr attorneys’ fees, and denied Hazel succession. Anker eventually returned to the meeting and, Park’s motion for a new trial, motion for remittitur, and according to Meisinger, informed the committee that several renewed motion for judgment. members of the school board did not want Fuhr to be named the boys’ varsity basketball coach, and that “he had to comply Hazel Park now appeals the judgment, the award of attorneys’ fees, and the denial of its motions for a new trial and remittitur, and renewed motion for judgment. Fuhr cross- 1 appeals the district court’s order striking the award of future Through 199 9, when this suit was filed, the high school girls’ basketball season in the state of Michigan was held d uring the fall, while damages. the boys’ basketball season took place during the winter.

2 Grant admitted at trial that both Aldred and Kirkland supported Fuhr for the coaching position. In subsequent testimony, however, Grant stated that he received no formal endorsement of Fuhr from Aldred or Kirkland. Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367 Fuhr v. Hazel Park 5 6 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367

II. question includes a determination of whether there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the Hazel Park argues on appeal that it is entitled to judgment action of which Fuhr complains was adverse to her. Hazel as a matter of law for two reasons: first, that Fuhr failed to Park contends that there is not, arguing that the boys’ varsity establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination; and coaching position pays the same as the girls’ varsity position, second, that Hazel Park offered legitimate, non- that the school considers the two positions to be equal, that discriminatory reasons for its failure to hire Fuhr. We review obtaining the position would have been only a lateral move de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of for Fuhr, and that denial of a lateral move is not “adverse” as law. McCurdy v. Montgomery County, 240 F.3d 512, 517 a matter of law. Fuhr, however, points to the evidence at trial (6th Cir. 2001). that clearly established a pay differential between the position that she already had and the position that she sought. Both Hazel Park’s first argument relies on its contention that before she applied for the varsity boys’ position and after she Fuhr did not suffer an adverse employment action, and was denied that job, Fuhr coached the boys’ junior varsity therefore could not prove a prima facie case of gender team. In that job, she was paid 9% of her teacher’s salary. discrimination. Because the case proceeded to trial, however, Had she been hired for the boys’ varsity position, she would we are no longer concerned with whether the plaintiff have been paid 11% of her teacher’s salary. established a prima facie case, but instead focus on the actual question of discrimination. In Roh v. Lakeshore Estates, we The district court directly addressed this issue in its order said: denying Hazel Park’s motion for a new trial: “A Court of Appeals ‘should not review the case for “Defendant continues to argue that this is a failure to whether a prima facie case had been made, but rather, transfer case, in spite of the court’s previous ruling that whether the ultimate issue of discrimination falls in the what is at issue is either a failure to promote plaintiff favor of the Plaintiffs or Defendant.’ EEOC v. Avery from coach of the boys’ junior varsity basketball team to Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 862 (6th Cir. 1997). ‘Of boys’ varsity coach, or a simple failure to hire case. course, evidence that bears upon elements of the prima When viewed as a failure to promote or failure to hire facie case can also come into play in assessing the case, the pay differential between the boys’ junior varsity ultimate question of discrimination.’ Kovacevich v. Kent and varsity positions makes it clear that plaintiff has State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 825, 827 (6th Cir. 2000).” established adverse employment action.” Roh v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 241 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. Fuhr v. Hazel Park, No. 99-76360, Order Denying 2001). Defendant’s Motion (E.D. Mich., Feb. 21, 2002). We think the district court was entirely correct here. Although Fuhr The ultimate question of discrimination in this case is stated during trial that she would be willing to quit coaching whether Hazel Park “fail[ed] or refuse[d] to hire . . . or the girls’ varsity team in order to coach the boys’ varsity, it is otherwise . . . discriminate[d] against [Fuhr] with respect to clear from the testimony at trial that the decision-makers at h[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of Hazel Park thought Fuhr intended to coach both teams. The employment, because of [Fuhr]'s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. relevant inquiry is therefore not whether the boys’ varsity § 2000e-2(a)(1). Under the circumstances of this case, that position would have resulted in an increase in pay over that of Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367 Fuhr v. Hazel Park 7 8 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367

the girls’ varsity position, but rather whether it would have discrimination, and “a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined resulted in an increase in pay over that of the junior varsity with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted position. Clearly it would have. Contrary to Hazel Park’s justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude assertion, Fuhr did suffer an adverse employment action. that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). Hazel Park next argues that because it offered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its failure to hire Fuhr as the Here, in addition to her prima facie case, Fuhr presented boys’ varsity basketball coach , it is entitled to judgment as a direct evidence that gender was a factor in the decision not to matter of law. According to Hazel Park, Fuhr was already the hire Ms. Fuhr as the boys’ varsity basketball coach. There girls’ varsity basketball coach, and the seasons overlapped; was testimony that Clint Adkins, the President of the School the school anticipated that Michigan would move the girls’ Board, had stated that he was “very concerned about a female season to the same time as the boys’, making it much more being the head boys basketball coach in Hazel Park.” The difficult for Fuhr to coach both the boys’ and girls’ teams; Superintendent, James Anker, admitted that members of the Hazel Park had a policy of permitting any one individual to Board had indicated to him that they did not want Fuhr to get hold only one of four major varsity coaching positions; and the job as boys’ varsity coach. Following the decision not to Barnett was well qualified for the position. Citing St. Mary’s hire her, Fuhr also had conversations with Principal Jim Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993), Hazel Park Meisinger, who confirmed that the reason she did not get the contends that the burden remained on Fuhr to prove the job was her gender. school district’s reasons pretextual: “A reason cannot be proved to be ‘a pretext for discrimination’ unless it is shown The standard for granting judgment as a matter of law both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the “mirrors” that for granting summary judgment, such that “the real reason.” Id. at 515 (emphasis in original). inquiry under each is the same.” Id. at 150 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986)). In Hazel Park’s statement of the applicable law is correct, but addressing Hazel Park’s motion for judgment as a matter of its application of that law is not. As the Supreme Court has law, we must review all of the evidence in the record, and we made clear, once the plaintiff has made out her prima facie “must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the case and the defendant has articulated legitimate, non- nonmoving party . . . [T]he weighing of evidence, and the discriminatory reasons for its action, the framework of drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is functions, not those of a judge.” Id. (citation omitted). And no longer relevant, and the presumption of discrimination we must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party “simply drops out of the picture.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 that the jury is not required to believe. Id. Using this U.S. at 510-11. The factfinder must then determine whether standard, we conclude that the jury had sufficient evidence to the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff support its verdict. The jury was entitled not only to on the basis of—in this case—her gender. And while it may disbelieve Hazel Park’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons be sufficient for a finding of intentional discrimination that for denying Fuhr the position she sought, but to believe her the factfinder does not believe the defendant’s proffered non- direct evidence that the school district’s true reason for that discriminatory reason, such disbelief does not compel that action was her gender. Hazel Park’s contention that it is finding. Id. at 511. The burden is on the plaintiff to present entitled to judgment as a matter of law is without merit. enough evidence to support her claim of intentional Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367 Fuhr v. Hazel Park 9 10 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367

III. that the only thing she could ask the jury to award was monetary damages. This statement is correct. She could not Hazel Park next argues that a new trial should be awarded ask the jury to grant equitable relief even if the jury were on the basis of alleged misrepresentations committed by inclined to do so. Hazel Park, furthermore, failed even to Fuhr’s attorney during her closing argument. “Misconduct by object to the statements when they were made. We have an attorney that results in prejudice may serve as a basis for applied a high standard of review under such circumstances. a new trial. The burden of showing prejudice rests with the See Strickland v. Owens Corning, 142 F.3d 353, 358 (6th Cir. party seeking the new trial, and district courts have broad 1998) (stating that the failure to object “does raise the degree discretion in deciding whether to grant a motion for a new of prejudice which must be demonstrated in order to get a trial.” In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 524 (6th Cir. new trial”). 1996) (citations omitted). The district court did not allow counsel for Hazel Park to discuss during closing argument the Hazel Park has failed to demonstrate a reasonable availability of injunctive relief. During plaintiff’s closing probability that the jury was improperly influenced by these argument, however, Fuhr’s attorney stated that “[t]he only comments. Hazel Park offers no support for its contention thing that I can ask you for is to award money. There is that the jury would not have awarded $245,000 in present nothing else that the person can ask . . . . [A]ll we can do is damages, had the jury known that Fuhr could have sought award money damages.” Hazel Park argues that these injunctive relief once the jury found that Hazel Park had statements “are a misrepresentation of the law, and are false,” denied her the position on the basis of her gender. Hazel and incorrectly led the jury to believe that the only remedy Park’s assertions alone are not enough to establish reasonable available to Fuhr was money, and resulted in a higher award probability of improper influence. of present damages than the jury would have awarded had it known of the availability of injunctive relief. IV.

In order to be entitled to a new trial, Hazel Park must show Hazel Park also urges on appeal that the trial court erred both that the closing argument was improper and that Hazel when it ordered the school to hire Fuhr as boys’ varsity Park was prejudiced by the impropriety, that is, that there is basketball coach; denied Hazel Park’s motion for remittitur; a reasonable probability that the jury’s verdict was influenced and ordered Hazel Park to pay Fuhr’s attorneys’ fees. For the by the improper argument. Fuhr has countered, however, that reasons set forth below, we reject these arguments. the statements from her counsel were neither inaccurate nor inflammatory.3 We agree. Fuhr’s counsel informed the jury

3 Fuhr also argues that Hazel Park could have suffered no prejudice from the statements beca use the district court ultimately struck the jury’s award of future d amages when it granted Fuhr’s req uest for equitab le relief. Indeed, the case was presented to the jury for an award of all Ms. understood by the court and counsel that the jury’s award of future Fuhr’s injuries, past and future. The awards were separated, however, damages would be subject to later court review when Fuhr’s claims for because the propriety of future damages was “dependent on a court ruling equitable relief were addre ssed po st-trial. That is in fact precisely what - whether Ms. Fuhr was entitled to instatement - which had not been made later occurred. at the time the jury was considering its verdict.” According to Fuhr it was Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367 Fuhr v. Hazel Park 11 12 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367

The Order of Instatement courts have concluded that reinstatement was not proper, or noted that it would be inequitable to remove an “innocent Upon a finding of invidious discrimination, a district court incumbent” (such as John Barnett) from the position, and has wide discretion to impose equitable remedies in order to therefore denied the plaintiff’s request for equitable relief. “fashion the most complete relief possible” designed to See Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. “make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole.” Shore 1983); Wangsness v. Watertown Sch. Dist., 541 F. Supp. 332 v. Federal Express Corp., 42 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1994) (D. S.D. 1982). These cases demonstrate only that the district (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 court probably would not have abused its discretion had it (1975)). The availability of instatement or reinstatement is denied Fuhr equitable relief. They do not support the therefore entrusted to the sound discretion of the district contention that the district court abused its discretion by court, and a decision granting such relief is reviewed by this granting it. Court only for abuse of discretion. Shore, 42 F.3d at 377-78. Furthermore, as Fuhr has noted, the central purpose of the In ordering instatement, the district court weighed “the state and federal anti-discrimination laws on which this suit relative hardships that will be occasioned on Plaintiff and Mr. is based is “to make the person whole for injuries suffered on Barnett [and] to the school district itself.” The district court account of unlawful employment discrimination,” and the also made specific mention of the fact that it was considering general rule is therefore that “[t]he injured party is to be Barnett’s status as an innocent incumbent. The court placed, as near as may be, in the situation [s]he would have nonetheless recognized that denying Fuhr an equitable occupied if the wrong had not been committed.” Albemarle remedy would perpetuate the effects of the discrimination Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975). We have proved by Fuhr, and therefore found that instatement was held that victims of discrimination are presumptively entitled appropriate. The district court did not abuse its discretion by to instatement or reinstatement, Thurman v. Yellow Freight ordering Ms. Fuhr’s instatement as the coach of the boys’ Systems, Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1171 (6th Cir. 1996); Shore v. varsity team. Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155, 1159 (6th Cir. 1985), and that reinstatement is the preferred equitable remedy in The Motion for Remittitur cases where discrimination has been proved. See E.E.O.C. v. Yenkin-Majestic Paint Corp., 112 F.3d 831, 836 (6th Cir. Hazel Park has argued that it was entitled to remittitur with 1997); Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. respect to the jury’s award of $245,000 for damages that Fuhr 1995). sustained through the date of the verdict. This Court reviews the denial of remittitur for an abuse of discretion. Slayton v. Hazel Park has established that trial courts have, in some Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 206 F.3d 669, 679 (6th Cir. circumstances, not required employers to “bump” an innocent 2000); Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 96 F.3d 151, 156 (6th third party in order to instate the plaintiff into the third party’s Cir. 1996). “A trial court is within its discretion in remitting position, see Kraemer v. Franklin and Marshall College, 941 a verdict only when, after reviewing all evidence in the light F.Supp. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1996), and has noted that we have held most favorable to the awardee, it is convinced that the verdict that where “reinstatement is not possible,” an award of front is clearly excessive.” Farber v. Massillon Bd. of Educ., 917 pay is sometimes appropriate in order to effectuate the “make F.2d 1391, 1395 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Jackson v. City of whole” purposes of Title VII. Shore, 777 F.2d at 1159. The Cookeville, 31 F.3d 1354, 1359 (6th Cir. 1994); Slayton, 206 school has also emphasized a number of cases where the F.3d at 679 (holding that the district court should reduce a Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367 Fuhr v. Hazel Park 13 14 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367

jury’s verdict only when the judgment “clearly exceeds” the and Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Act give a court discretion to maximum amount of compensatory damages a jury could award attorneys’ fees when appropriate. Fuhr prevailed on her reasonably award); Bickel, 96 F.3d at 156 (same); In re claim of discrimination, and an award of attorneys’ fees is Lewis, 845 F.2d 624, 635 (6th Cir. 1988) (same). certainly appropriate. In making the latter argument, Hazel Park emphasized that the hourly rates charged by Fuhr’s Hazel Park claims that Fuhr did not present any evidence at attorneys were in excess of the average billing rates contained trial of economic damages, and that Fuhr did not suffer any in an economic survey of the Michigan Bar Journal. A non-economic damages related to the boys’ varsity basketball district court has broad discretion to determine what coaching position. The record, however, is to the contrary. constitutes a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney, Wells v. There was testimony that Fuhr earned a lower percentage of New Cherokee Corp., 58 F.3d 233, 239 (6th Cir. 1995); her teacher’s salary as coach of the boys’ junior varsity team Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 533 (6th Cir. than she would have earned as the boys’ varsity coach. The 1994), and we review such decisions only for abuse of that difference between these two figures represents the economic discretion. Granzeier v. Middleton, 173 F.3d 568, 576 (6th loss directly attributable to Fuhr’s failure to obtain the Cir. 1999); Phelan v. Bell, 8 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1993). position of boys’ varsity basketball coach. While there is The Supreme Court has stated that in awarding fees, courts conflicting evidence as to the existence of non-economic should look to the hourly rates prevailing in the community damages sustained by Fuhr, the jury found that Hazel Park’s for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable discrimination caused Fuhr emotional injury. The district skill, experience, and reputation. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. court then found, quite reasonably, that the jury’s decision to 886, 896 n.11 (1984). Fuhr presented affidavits signed by award $245,000 was not clearly excessive in light of the several attorneys attesting that the hourly rates requested by evidence presented. her attorneys were appropriate. Finally, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected Hazel Park’s argument that the district Hazel Park has also suggested that the jury’s award of past court’s award was improper because plaintiff’s counsel was damages should be stricken or reduced because Fuhr was retained on the basis of a contingency fee arrangement. “We granted the post-trial equitable relief of instatement to the have never suggested that a different approach is to be position she had been denied by Hazel Park. Defendant cited followed in cases where the prevailing party and his (or her) no authority for this proposition. Whatever effect the attorney have executed a contingent-fee agreement . . . . To equitable decree had on the propriety of future damages, it did the contrary . . . we have adopted the lodestar approach as the not affect the damages for injuries already suffered before the centerpiece of attorney’s fee awards.” Blanchard v. order. The district court did not abuse its discretion in Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94 (1989). In short, we are not denying the defendant’s motion for remittitur. convinced that the fees granted by the district court were clearly excessive, and we find no abuse of discretion here. Attorneys’ Fees V. Hazel Park contended that Fuhr was not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees, or, in the alternative, that the The final issue before this Court is Fuhr’s cross-appeal of attorneys’ fees granted by the district court were “clearly the district court’s order striking her future damages award excessive in light of the average hourly billing rates in the following her post-trial instatement to the position of boys’ community.” The first argument is meritless. Both Title VII varsity coach. Although Fuhr admits that the jury’s award of Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367 Fuhr v. Hazel Park 15 16 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367

future lost earnings had to be eliminated by the court’s make it difficult for her as boys’ varsity coach, and that she instatement order, she maintains that the same is not true of will suffer future damages as a result of a hostile work her future emotional damages. She analogizes this case to environment. But whether she will in fact suffer such harm Hill v. Xerox, 998 F.Supp. 1378 (N.D. Fla. 1998), where the is entirely speculative and in any event, that kind of harm was court recognized that a successful plaintiff’s emotional never considered by the jury, which considered only the harm injuries resulting from defendant’s discriminatory conduct resulting from Fuhr’s not being the coach of the boys’ varsity continue even in the face of reinstatement. That case, basketball team. The district court therefore did not err by however, is easily distinguished from the instant matter. The striking plaintiff’s future damages after granting injunctive plaintiff in Hill sought front pay, but not reinstatement. The relief. court nevertheless ordered reinstatement, and noted that by doing so it was granting plaintiff something less desirable CONCLUSION than what the jury had awarded him. Fuhr, on the other hand, sought—and received—a court order requiring Hazel Park to For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of put her in the position of boys’ varsity basketball coach. the district court. Furthermore, Fuhr herself has stated that the jury award was intentionally separated into past and future damages because the propriety of the future damages was “dependent on a court ruling—whether Ms. Fuhr was entitled to instatement—which had not been made at the time the jury was considering its verdict.” According to Fuhr’s own briefs, it was understood by the district court and counsel that the jury’s award of future damages would be subject to later court review when plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief were addressed post- trial. When the jury deliberated it had not been advised that Fuhr could receive injunctive relief after the trial. The jury did not distinguish between future economic and future emotional harm; rather, it formulated its future damages award to compensate plaintiff for not receiving the position. Plaintiff has now obtained that position, and future compensation received in lieu of that position is unwarranted. Even if we could separate from the jury’s total award the amount of future lost earnings (generously estimated by the district court to be around $50,000), this Court cannot say, based on the record, what the remaining amount of emotional damages should be. Fuhr has argued that the school district created an atmosphere at Hazel Park High School which will