Frysinger v. Mitchell

District Court, D. Hawaii·Decided November 1, 2022·No. 1:22-cv-00049·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII AHAYA S. FRYSINGER; KAZUKO A. ) CIVIL NO. 22-00049 SOM-RT FRYSINGER ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) vs. ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ) LESLIE MITCHELL’S MOTION TO LESLIE MITCHELL (MERRILL) ) DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT ) MATTER JURISDICTION Defendant. ) ) ) ) _____________________________ ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT LESLIE MITCHELL’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND. At the time of filing, Plaintiff Ahaya Frysinger was a student at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. Defendant Leslie Mitchell was the Interim Director of the University of Hawaii’s Office of Student Conduct. Frysinger alleges that, in late 2021, Mitchell falsely accused her of academic dishonesty. Based on this alleged offense and the consequences that followed, Ahaya Frysinger and her mother, Kazuko Frysinger, sued Mitchell.1 1 In both the original and amended complaint, the Plaintiffs identified the Defendant as “Leslie Mitchell (Merrill)”. But there is no information on the record concerning whether “Merrill” is, in fact, a part of Mitchell’s name. Unless and until further information is provided, this court will refer to the Defendant as “Leslie Mitchell”. Mitchell moved to dismiss Ahaya and Kazuko Frysinger’s (“Plaintiffs”) initial Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 14. This court granted the motion. ECF No. 31. In its order, this court explained that the parties are not diverse, and that, by failing to assert any claim even

impliedly falling under a federal statute or constitutional clause, the Frysingers had not raised a federal question. ECF No. 31, PageID # 70–74. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to dismiss but stated that the Frysingers could file an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 31. On July 7, 2022, the Frysingers filed an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 34. Mitchell filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 35. The Frysingers filed no opposition to the motion. During the hearing on Mitchell’s motion to dismiss, the Frysingers said they had recently become citizens of Florida. They argued that their change of citizenship gave the court

diversity jurisdiction over the case. This court invited both parties to submit briefs concerning whether the court had diversity jurisdiction. Both parties submitted briefs. ECF Nos. 43 & 45. Having considered the supplemental briefs, the court grants Mitchell’s motion to dismiss and declines to grant the 2 Frysingers leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Mitchell and to close this case. II. LEGAL STANDARD. Under Rule 12(b)(1), a complaint may be dismissed for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An attack on subject matter jurisdiction “may be facial or factual.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). A facial attack asserts that “the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction[,]” while a factual attack “disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. Mitchell shows a lack of subject matter jurisdiction whether her challenge is deemed a facial or factual attack. With a facial attack, a court must assume the facts alleged in a complaint to be true and construe them in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. See Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). When a complaint includes legal conclusions, they are not accepted as true “even if ‘cast in the form of factual allegations.’” Lacano Invs., LLC v. Balash, 765 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2014)

3 (emphasis in original) (quoting Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009)). With a factual attack, “[t]he court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. Rather, the court can consider

extrinsic evidence to determine whether there is subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). III. ANALYSIS. The Frysingers’ Amended Complaint includes allegations more detailed than those provided in the original Complaint. Compare ECF No. 34 with ECF No. 1. However, like the original Complaint, the Amended Complaint fails to address subject matter jurisdiction. See ECF No. 34. During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the Frysingers claimed, for the first time, that they had recently become citizens of Florida and that, as a result, the court had

diversity jurisdiction over the case. This is incorrect. Even if the Frysingers have changed their citizenship since filing this action, this court continues to lack jurisdiction. Because of this, and because the Frysingers have failed to allege any other proper basis of subject matter jurisdiction, the court grants Mitchell’s motion to dismiss. 4 A. The Court Lacks Diversity Jurisdiction Because the Parties Were Not Diverse at the Time of Filing. “The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.” Arbaugh v. Y & HCorp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006). “Section 1331 provides for federal-question jurisdiction, § 1332 for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.” Id. (Internal brackets and quotations omitted). Here, the Complaint fails to invoke the court's subject matter jurisdiction because it neither establishes that this action may be brought under diversity jurisdiction nor raises a federal question. A federal court has original jurisdiction based on diversity if “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C.§ 1332(a)(1). “It is well-settled that the existence of complete diversity is assessed at the time of the filing of a complaint and that subsequent

changes in the citizenship of an existing party do not affect the determination of jurisdiction.” See In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1992) citing Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n. 1 (1957). During the motion hearing and supplemental briefing, the Frysingers asserted that their recent change of citizenship 5 (from Hawaii to Florida) meant that the parties had diverse citizenship. See ECF No. 43, PageID # 214. This is incorrect. The Frysingers do not dispute that they were citizens of Hawaii when they filed their original Complaint. During the motion hearing, they confirmed that they had no claim to Florida

citizenship at that time. Any change of citizenship after the Frysingers filed the original Complaint has no bearing on this court’s jurisdiction. See Mann v. City of Tucson, Dep't of Police, 782 F.2d 790, 794 (9th Cir.

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