Fry's v. Lexington & Big Sandy Railroad

59 Ky. 314, 2 Met. 314, 1859 Ky. LEXIS 106
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedOctober 8, 1859
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 59 Ky. 314 (Fry's v. Lexington & Big Sandy Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fry's v. Lexington & Big Sandy Railroad, 59 Ky. 314, 2 Met. 314, 1859 Ky. LEXIS 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 1859).

Opinion

CHIEF JUSTICE SIMPSON

delivered the opinion of the court:

This action was brought by the Lexington and Big Sandy railroad company against James W. Fry, since deceased, to compel him to pay the unpaid bálance upon seventy shares of stock which the plaintiff alleged he had subscribed for on the books of said company.

Several grounds of defense are relied upon, each of which we will notice in its regular order.

[316]*316The subscription, it is contended, was not made in conformity with the requirements of the charter, nor in such a manner as to impose any obligation upon the subscribers.

The original subscription has been lost. A copy thereof, certified by the cominissioners who were appointed by the charter to receive subscriptions to the capital stock of the corporation, was produced, the heading of which is as follows:

“ Railroad stock taken at Catlettsburg, Ky., in Lexington and Big Sandy R. R. company, May 12th, 1852.”

The names of the subscribers, and the number of shares subscribed by each one of them, are written underneath, and among the names so written is that of the defendant, James W. Fry, having seventy shares, amounting to thirty-five hundred dollars, annexed to his name.

Fry, in his answer, did not deny that he subscribed for seventy shares of stock, but alleged that “ the paper upon which his name was written was not such a writing as the act of incorporation required to bind him as a stockholder or subscriber of stock to said road.”

It is evident, from the statements contained in the defendant’s answer, that he supposed it was necessary, under the charter, that there should have been some promise or agreement in writing on the part of the subscribers to pay to the company the amount subscribed by them in stock, otherwise they were not responsible for their subscriptions. No such promise, however, is required by the charter. It authorized the commissioners therein named to open books at such places as they might deem fit, and to receive subscriptions to the capital stock of said company. The subscriber was to pay to the commissioners the sum of two dollars on every share sub- ' scribed by him, and the residue thereof was to be paid in such installments, and at such times, as might be required by the president and directors of said company.

It is usual for subscriptions of stock to be made underneath a writing containing a stipulation that the subscribers are to pay the sums annexed to their names, as they may be required by the president and directors of the company; but euch a stipulation is not necessary under a charter like this, in [317]*317which the terms of the contract between the company and the stockholder are created and defined by the act of incorporation itself. In subscribing for stock, it is only necessary that the writing should indicate the intention to become a stockholder, and the number of shares that are taken by the subscriber. The taking of stock in a corporation creates a contract, express or implied, to pay for it, in the mode prescribed in the charter.

The fact that Fry subscribed for seventy shares of stock in this company is clearly and fully established by the testimony. And it also appears that he considered himself a stockholder, acted as such in the election of directors, and made partial payments on his stock after the company had been organized. That he was properly and legally a stockholder in the company is, therefore, a matter about which no doubt can exist.

After the line of the road had been located by the directors of the company, it was changed, and placed by them on a different route; and this alteration in the line.of the road is x^ecf on as sufficient to exonerate the subscribers from the pawrrxéi't of their stock. JJ fcr?

When the line of a road has been once actually fixed, tile pa power to make an essential alteration therein may not, exist, ffj unless it be conferred by the charter. But even where fi| isfafot authorized by the charter, the alteration, to have the effé'Qkpí^Cjl exonerating the subscribers for stock, must be one which removes the inducement to subscribe, or else changes essentially the duties and responsibilities of the company. Such an effect cannot be produced by an alteratioxx which is immatexúal, or which does not operate to the prejudice of the stockholders.

The power to make the alteration in the line of this road was, however, conferred on the directox's by the charter. It is provided in the tenth section thereof, that if said directox’s, after having selected a x’oute for said railway, find any obstacle to continuing said location, either by the difficulty of construction or procux’ing right of way at reasonable cost, or whenever a cheaper or hotter route can be had, they shall have authority to vary the route and change the location.” The alteration complained of was fully authorized by this provision in the char[318]*318ter. It placed the line of the road on a cheaper route, as is proved by the testimony, and also procured'for the company an additional subscription of stock, to the amount of two hundred thousand dollars. The change was, therefore, manifestly advantageous to the stockholders in the aggregate, and tended to promote the general interests of the company.

It is said, however, that the alteration of the line of the road removed the prevailing motive for the subscription of stock on the part of Fry, and was, in fact, a violation of the agreement or understanding under which his subscription was made.

. It appears that Catlettsburg is a town situated on or near the Ohio river, at the mouth of Big Sandy. Fry/ was the owner of a large real estate in and adjoining said town, and was, therefore, interested in its growth and prosperity. He alleged in his answer that he agreed to take stock, under the belief, which was created by the commissioners and other agents of the company, that Catlettsburg would be the Ohio river terminus of said road; and that it was made so by the original location of the road; but by the alteration the town of Ashland, which is situated on the Ohio river several miles below the mouth of Big Sandy, was made the, Ohio river terminus, whereby the object he had in view in subscribing for stock was completely frustrated and defeated.

The commencement and termination of the road were both fixed by the charter. It was to “commence at any eligible point in or near the city of Lexington, in Fayette county; thence by the most practicable route to the mouth of Big Sandy.” The company had a discretion as to the selection of intermedidiate points, but could not alter the place at which the road was to terminate. And as the town of Catlettsburg is situated at the mouth of Big Sandy, the representations which were made that Catlettsburg would be the the Ohio river terminus of the road, were true. It was made the terminus by the charter, and was always so treated and regarded by the company. The alteration complained of did not make the road terminate at a different point, but only made it approach its termination by a different route than the one that was first selected.

An effort was made to prove that some letters which were written by a friend of the enterprise to induce the citizens of [319]*319Catlettsburg to subscribe for stock, contained a. statement that the road would not touch the Ohio river until it reached its terminus. But this was evidently an after thought.

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Bluebook (online)
59 Ky. 314, 2 Met. 314, 1859 Ky. LEXIS 106, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frys-v-lexington-big-sandy-railroad-kyctapp-1859.