Fry v. Commonwealth

82 S.W.2d 431, 259 Ky. 337, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 316
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedMay 14, 1935
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 82 S.W.2d 431 (Fry v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fry v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.2d 431, 259 Ky. 337, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 316 (Ky. 1935).

Opinion

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Richardson

Reversing.

In 1893, the Legislature enacted section 1159, Kentucky Statutes (Acts 1891-93, c. 182, p. 756, sec. 32), which fixed the punishment iof the common-law crimes of robbery and burglary at confinement in the penitentiary at not less than two nor mor© than ten years. In 1904, it enacted section 1159a (Acts 1904, c. 43, p. 117), prescribing the punishment for same crimes, committed by the means of explosives or any other force, at not less than two nor more than twenty years at confinement in the penitentiary.

The act of 1934 (chapter 52) merely re-enacted section 1159. It re-enacted in its entirety section 1159a with this addition:

“That if any person shall commit acts of robbery, burglary as defined in sections 1159 or 1159a, robbery of bank or safe, and in committing said act or acts shall use or display any pistol, gun or other-firearms or deadly weapon of any character in so doing; upon conviction such person shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment in the discretion of the jury,” etc.

*340 The grand' jury of Logan county indicted Richard Roe, alias Elmer Fry, under the latter clause of this section (1159a), charging that he had committed the crime of robbing a bank by “unlawfully, willfully and feloniously, and by force and violence and by the use and display of a deadly weapon, firearms, to-wit; a pistol. ” On a trial to a jury he was convicted and his punishment fixed at confinement in the state reformatory for the period of his natural life.

He is here urgently insisting that the title of the act is within the ¡inhibition of section 51 of the Stale Constitution. The former reads:

“An Act bo> amend and re-enact Sections 1159 and 1159a, Carroll’s Kentucky Statutes, prescribing punishment for robbery or burglary, robbery of bank or safe, or for having burglarious tools, the use of fire arms in committing any of said acts and knowingly giving protection or comfort to any person committing these acts.” Acts 1934, c. 52.

The general rules for amending laws by title are so familiarly and generally known, it is unnecessary to reiterate them. For an accurate statement of them, see Board of Penitentiary Com’rs v. Spencer, 159 Ky. 255, 166 S. W. 1017. An examination of the title and the context of the act, in the light iof the rules therein stated, is convincing that Fry’s objection to the title is not meritorious.

He argues that ’the statute under which he stands convicted is within the prohibition of section 17 of our Bill ¡of Rights. He does not dispute that the punishment by death or confinement in the penitentiary for life, in a proper case, is not “cruel punishment,” within the prohibition of this section of our Bill of Rights, or within the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution ¡of the United States; but he contends that the death penalty ¡is excessive or cruel in view of the degree of the crime of which he is convicted.

Much difficulty has been expressed by the courts of the country iin attempting to define the scope of these constitutional provisions. It is the thought of some that they are not a limitation of legislative discretion in determining the severity of punishment. Others view them as referring to the mode of the infliction of the punishment. Aldridge v. Com., 2 Va. Cas. (4 Va.) 447; *341 Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray (Mass.) 482; Sturtevant v. Commonwealth, 158 Mass. 598, 33 N. E. 648; State v. Williams, 77 Mo. 310; Territory v. Ketchum, 10 N. M. 718, 65 P. 169, 55 L. R. A. 90; Commonwealth v. Evans, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 448; Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130, 25 L. Ed. 345; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 10 S. Ct. 930, 34 L. Ed. 519.

Still others are of the thought they are broad enough to- confer upon the courts the power to review legislative discretion concerning the adequacy of punishment. State v. Becker, 3 S. D. 29, 51 N. W. 1018; In re McDonald, 4 Wyo. 150, 33 P. 18; In re Bayard, 25 Hun (N. Y.) 546, 63 How. Prac. 73; Thomas v. Kinkead, 55 Ark. 502, 18 S. W. 854, 15 L. R. A. 558, 29 Am. St. Rep. 68; see, also, dissenting opinions of Justices Field, Harlan and Brewer in O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 12 S. Ct. 693, 36 L. Ed. 450.

We have adopted the rule that the fixing the penalties for crimes is a legislative function; and whatever constitutes an adequate punishment is a matter of legislative judgment and discretion. We have steadfastly declined toi interfere therewith. Since fhe sentence here imposed is within the limits prescribed by the statute for the crime committed, we decline to accept the view it is cruel punishment. For the most recent statement of our views, see Crutchfield v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 704, 59 S. W. (2d) 983. With these questions disposed of, we are confronted with the difficult and perplexing one, Is the verdict against the evidence? T© dispose of it requires a patient, careful, painstaking, and extended review and analysis of the evidence, which we shall now undertake.

Around 7:30 o’clock, Saturday morning, the 22d day of September, 1934, at Russellville, Logan county, Ky., as Tom Garrison finished “cleaning up” the interior of the Southern Deposit Bank and was going out the back door, two men approached and required him to get into the bank, they followed, where they “wired” his hands and feet, laid him in a hallway, face .down, where he remained ten minutes, during which time they left him and on their return compelled him to arise, walk into the directors’ room, where they, after placing tape over,, his mouth, laid him on a couch with his face to the wall. He identified the accused as one of the two men who did this. He testified that the one he identified as *342 the accused was wearing at the time a “cap” “blue shirt,” “black shoes” and “solid colored pants.” The man whom he identified .as the accused, after he first entered the bank, put on “big, brown goggles.” About five minutes of 8 o’clock, Lewis Richardson, cashier, entered the bank, when he discovered that the¡ janitor was lying on the couch in the directors’ room, his hands behind him, tied with wire. He walked ten or twelve feet from the front door, and as he started to go behind the counter Richardson heard a voice commanding him to put up his hands and be quiet; the man was behind him with a gun in his hand, and remained behind him “nearly all the time.” At his command, Richardson entered the vault, made the electrical connection open the safe, and in .about 15 minutes he opened it, secured $7,000, and placed it in a sack. He then compelled Richardson to lie on his back in 'the floor and wired his hands and feet. At this moment Richardson discovered a second man was present. Richardson was not asked to, nor did he; identify either of the men as the accused. While Richardson was on the floor, a Mr. Yates entered the bank. He was not introduced as a witness. Following Yates, came C. Y. Williams who had an office in the bank. He walked to his desk, laid down his mail, walked back to the- cage, and as he was in the act of pulling off his raincoat, he observed a man, a distance from him of about five steps, approaching.

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Bluebook (online)
82 S.W.2d 431, 259 Ky. 337, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 316, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fry-v-commonwealth-kyctapphigh-1935.