Frisch v. Liebowitz

85 Misc. 2d 822, 381 N.Y.S.2d 396, 1976 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2065
CourtCivil Court of the City of New York
DecidedMarch 5, 1976
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 85 Misc. 2d 822 (Frisch v. Liebowitz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Civil Court of the City of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frisch v. Liebowitz, 85 Misc. 2d 822, 381 N.Y.S.2d 396, 1976 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2065 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1976).

Opinion

Herbert Shapiro, J.

In this summary proceeding landlord seeks to recover possession of an apartment in a multiple dwelling alleging that rent has not been paid for the months of April, May and June, 1975 at the rate of $130.50 per month; for the month of July, 1975 at the rate of $138.33; and for the months of August, September and October, 1975 at the rate of $134.86 per month.

Tenant has interposed an answer containing a general denial and several affirmative defenses which allege, in substance, as follows: (1) that the rent sought to be collected is in excess of the permissible maximum rent fixed by the Office of Rent Control; and (2) that the landlord has failed to file a registration statement with the Office of Code Enforcement as required by section 325 of the Multiple Dwelling Law and section D26-41.01 et seq. of the Administrative Code of the City of New York. Two counterclaims are also asserted seek[824]*824ing to recover for alleged rent overcharges; one bottomed on rent collected in excess of the permissible maximum rent and one bottomed on the alleged fraud of the landlord in submitting false statements to the Office of Rent Control.

Upon a pretrial conference with the court, the parties stipulated to certain facts and agreed that a motion for summary judgment with respect to the remaining issues would be made by the tenant. That motion is the one now under consideration.

Some of the issues having been put to rest by stipulation there remain only two determinations to be made. They are (1) what is the legally permissible maximum rental with respect to the months for which rent is sought in the petition and (2) has the respondent asserted a valid defense to the effect that landlord may not prevail in this proceeding by reason of its failure to properly and timely file a registration statement as required by section 325 of the Multiple Dwelling Law and section D26-41.01 et seq. of the Administrative Code of the City of New York.

In support of landlord’s position that the rents demanded in the petition are within legally permissible limits, landlord submits certified copies of several documents on file in the Office of Rent Control. It is contended by landlord that such documents demonstrate that the rents sought to be recovered in this nonpayment proceeding are no more than are legally permissible. I find that such is the case.

The only argument advanced by tenant against such a finding is that the records submitted were not "certified” by the Office of Rent Control. Tenant attempts to spell out such lack of "certification” by referring to the language of the stamp affixed to the documents by the District Rent Control Office and signed by the District Rent Director. That stamp reads as follows: "I hereby certify that the attached document is a true copy of a registration statement, or of an order, filed with this office, of which I have the legal custody, or which was in the records of the temporary State Housing Rent Commission, now in the custody of the City Rent and Rehabilitation Administrator pursuant to the Local Emergency Housing Rent Control Act .... The acceptance of a registration statement, and the certification thereof, does not mean that this office certifies to the correctness of the various statements made therein.”

Respondent urges that such language precludes using a [825]*825document so stamped as a basis for determining the maximum rent collectible. I disagree. It would appear that the "disclaimer” at the end of the statement applies only to "registration statements”, i.e. documents submitted ex parte by the landlord for filing with the Office of Rent Control and not to documents prepared by the Office of Rent Control itself. That being so, the documents prepared by the rent office and which are "certified”, reveal the following history of the collectible rental for the subject apartment: as of December 31, 1973 that figure was $102.76. The rental was then increased by 7.5% for the calendar year 1974, to the sum of $110.47. To that sum was then added two increases (for additional capital improvements) in the amounts of $8.90 and $3.80 resulting in a new maximum rental of $123.17 for the balance of the year 1974. The 1975 increase of 7.5% was' then added and a new collectible rental of $132.41 established. A rental decrease of $.75 per month was then ordered against the landlord for failure to make certain repairs. The resulting rental of $131.66 was then subject to the "fuel pass-a-long” increase of $7.76 a month, bringing the maximum rent collectible to $139.42.

As indicated, my analysis of the meaning of the Office of Rent Control "Certification” is such as to cause me to conclude that the only document relevant to the rent history aforesaid which may be questioned in this proceeding is the landlord’s report concerning the "fuel pass-a-long” increase. That is so since it is a unilateral submission by the landlord not passed upon on the merits by the rent office. However, while the propriety of the "fuel pass-a-long” increase as asserted by landlord is subject to review by this court, there is no issue with respect hereto. The tenant fails to contradict any of the computations therein contained or raise any question with respect thereto. That being so, the rental computations of that report must be accepted.

Concluding,. as I do, that the rentals sought to be recovered in the petition are legally permissible, there then remains only one question to be determined — is there merit to the affirmative defense which contends that the landlord failed to timely and properly file the registration statement. That alleged failure is based upon the contention that the statement filed was not filed by the "owner” of the building.

Section 325 of the Multiple Dwelling Law provides in pertinent part as follows: "2. In any city of over one million which, by local law, requires the registration of owners of multiple [826]*826dwellings and which prescribes penalties, remedies, and sanctions to be imposed for the violation of such local registration requirements, no rent shall be recovered by the owner of a multiple dwelling who fails to comply with such registration requirements”.

Section D26-41.01 et seq. of the Administrative Code sets forth the requirements for the registration of multiple dwelling in the City of New York. Section D26-41.01 of article 41 provides inter alia, that the "owner of a dwelling * * * shall register with the department in accordance with the provisions of this article.”

Subdivision (2) of section D26-41.03 of article 41 requires that the registration statement contain an "identification of the owner by name, residence and business address.” It goes on to state: "If the owner is a corporation, the identification shall include the name and address of such corporation together with the names, residences and business addresses of the officers.”

The registration certificate filed by the landlord herein listed as the owner, "E & O Associates” and indicated 2765-69 Matthews Avenue (the address of the subject building) as the owner’s business address and 43 N. Village Avenue, Rockville Centre, New York as its home address. The managing agent was listed as "Richard Parkoff”; his business address as 2765-69 Matthews Avenue and his home address as 43 N. Village Avenue, Rockville Centre.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
85 Misc. 2d 822, 381 N.Y.S.2d 396, 1976 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2065, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frisch-v-liebowitz-nycivct-1976.