NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: August 12, 2025
S25A0604. FRIPP v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
Jeremiah Fripp appeals his convictions for malice murder and
other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Sherman
Ratliff and the armed robbery of Qwondez Calvert. 1 Fripp contends
1The crimes occurred on November 27, 2020. On June 25, 2021, a Laurens County grand jury returned an indictment charging Fripp with malice murder (Count 1); felony murder (Counts 2-3); armed robbery of Ratliff (Count 4); armed robbery of Calvert (Count 5); aggravated assault of Ratliff (Counts 6-7); aggravated assault of Calvert (Counts 8-9); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 10). At the conclusion of a jury trial that began on June 14, 2023, the jury found Fripp guilty on all counts. On July 31, 2023, the trial court sentenced Fripp to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the count of malice murder (Count 1). The felony murder counts (Counts 2-3) were vacated by operation of law. The court imposed a 20-year prison term for the armed robbery of Ratliff (Count 4), to run consecutively to Count 1, and a 20-year prison term for the armed robbery of Calvert (Count 5), to run consecutively to Counts 1 and 4. The court merged each of the aggravated assault counts (Counts 6-9) into Counts 4, 6, 5, and 8 respectively. The court imposed a five-year prison term for the firearms charge (Count 10), to run consecutively to Counts 1, 4, and 5. Prior to his sentencing, Fripp filed a premature motion for new trial, which ripened upon entry of the final disposition order. See Tavarez v. State, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that
his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance for
failing to pursue an alibi defense, and that the trial court erred by
giving a misleading jury instruction on the defense of coercion that
was not tailored to the evidence. For the reasons explained below,
we affirm.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial showed that, on November 27, 2020,
Ratliff and his cousin, Calvert, drove from Collins, Mississippi to
Dublin, Georgia to pick up an AK-style gun that belonged to Ratliff.
Calvert testified that, at some point during the drive, Ratliff spoke
on the phone with someone Ratcliff called “Baby Four,” who told
Ratliff where to meet them in Dublin. When Ratliff and Calvert
arrived at the meeting place, they drove into a recreational ballpark
319 Ga. 480, 480 n.1 (2024). He filed another motion for new trial, which he amended through new counsel. On June 4, 2024, Fripp filed a second amended motion for new trial and brief in support. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied the motion for new trial, as amended, on November 12, 2024. Fripp filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court to the April 2025 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 where they parked and waited. Ratliff received a phone call, and
soon thereafter, a red car pulled up next to them, and a short man
got out of it. Ratliff got out of his car to speak with the man while
Calvert remained in the car. Ratliff was carrying a pistol when he
got out of the car. Moments later, a black car pulled up, and Ratliff
handed the gun to Calvert, who placed the pistol on the driver’s side
floor. “Four to five” men got out of the black car wearing all black
clothing and ski masks, and Calvert rolled up the windows and
locked the doors. The man who arrived in the red car was “[s]till
there” at this time, and when Calvert locked the doors, the men,
including the man from the red car, drew their weapons and pointed
them at Ratliff and Calvert.
Calvert testified that one man attempted to open the locked car
door and threatened to shoot Calvert if he did not unlock the car
door, so Calvert complied. Two men dragged Calvert out of the car,
and one man rummaged through the car and took Calvert’s cell
phone while another—the short man from the red car—pistol-
whipped Calvert until Calvert fell to his knees. While Calvert was
3 still on his knees, Ratliff attempted to run away. One of the men,
who was holding a “Draco”-style gun, shot Ratliff in the back, and
Ratliff collapsed to the ground. Moments later, Calvert heard sirens
in the distance. The man from the red car got in his car and “left
after the shooting,” and the men from the black car threw their guns
in the trunk, “jumped in [the car,] and pe[e]led out.” After the
assailants drove away, Calvert put Ratliff in their car and tried to
find a hospital. He flagged down a paramedic who called for police
and additional EMS assistance. Ratliff later died at the hospital, and
his cause of death was determined to be the gunshot wound to the
back.
When officers arrived to the scene of the shooting, Calvert told
them that the “leader” of the group was about six feet tall with a
long “dreads” hairstyle. He held the Draco-style gun and was the one
who was instructing others what to do. Although Calvert did not see
who shot Ratliff, he believed it was the man with the Draco-style
gun.
Calvert’s trial testimony about the timing of the departure of
4 the two cars was not entirely consistent with his initial statement to
police. In the police body-camera footage from the night of the
shooting that was played for the jury, Calvert told the officer at the
scene that the red car pulled up first, and then it “pulled off, and
another car pulled up,” indicating that the red car had left before the
shooting occurred. On cross-examination, Calvert conceded that, in
his initial statement to police on the night of the shooting, he said
that the red car had left before the black car pulled up, that he could
not give detailed descriptions of any of the men from the black car,
and that he did not mention them wearing ski masks. Calvert also
testified that, in his initial statement to police, he said that he
believed that the person with dreadlock-style hair was called “Baby
Four,” was taller than 5’ 9”, and was the leader of the group. Calvert
also testified that the leader was the one holding the AK-style or
Draco-style gun and was the one who shot Ratliff.
During their canvas of the crime scene, law enforcement
officers did not locate Calvert’s cell phone that the assailant had
grabbed out of the car, but law enforcement did find a cell phone
5 belonging to Jeremiah Salter. Officers visited Salter’s residence and
informed Salter’s brother that Salter was wanted for questioning
related to a murder.
On November 29, 2020, Fripp and Salter went to a police
station in Columbia, South Carolina. They arrived in a red car,
which they parked in the station parking lot. Upon entering the
station, they told an officer that they were wanted for questioning
involving the murder of a man named Sherman Ratliff in Dublin,
Georgia.
Officer Timothy Carpenter testified that he asked Fripp what
his involvement was, and Fripp responded, “I did it.” The officer
asked for clarification, and Fripp stated, “I killed him.” The officer
asked, “The Sherman guy?” to which Fripp nodded his head
affirmatively and stated, “Yeah.” Officer Carpenter testified that,
at that time, Fripp and Salter were not under arrest and were free
to leave but that, while trying to obtain a body camera, Officer
Carpenter spoke with Investigator James Fisher, who wanted to
detain them for further questioning. Officer Carpenter was never
6 able to retrieve a body camera and did not otherwise record the
conversation with Fripp. He testified that Salter’s only statement
was that he came to the police station because officers showed up at
his house stating that Salter’s phone was found at the scene.
Investigator Fisher testified that when he encountered Salter
and Fripp in the police station lobby, Fripp repeated his statement
that he had been involved in Ratliff’s shooting, and Salter did not
say anything. Investigator Fisher then placed Salter and Fripp in
two separate interview rooms until the Dublin police could arrive to
continue the investigation but did not conduct his own custodial
interviews.
The South Carolina police officers contacted law enforcement
in Dublin and secured a warrant to search Fripp’s car, which was
still in the Columbia police station parking lot. While searching the
car, the officers recovered a Draco-style rifle gun from the trunk and
a pistol from the backseat. A GBI firearms examiner test-fired the
weapons and compared the markings on the test-fired bullets and
shell casings with the markings on the shell casing recovered from
7 the crime scene and the bullet fragment recovered from Ratliff’s
body. He determined that the Draco-style gun retrieved from Fripp’s
trunk was the same gun that killed Ratliff. A gun trace performed
on the gun that was used to kill Ratcliff showed that Ratliff was its
original purchaser.
Fripp testified at trial to the following. Fripp, Ratliff, and
Salter were friends. On the night of the shooting, he received a
phone call from Ratliff informing him that Ratliff and Calvert were
at the ballpark, and that he came to the park to speak briefly with
Ratliff. While they talked for about five minutes, Ratliff informed
Fripp that Ratliff was waiting on someone else to arrive. He then
left the park and drove to his mother’s house before anyone else
arrived and was not present for the shooting.
The next day, Salter called Fripp requesting a ride. When
Fripp arrived to pick him up, Salter asked Fripp to open his trunk
so that he could put something in it. Fripp did not see Salter carrying
a weapon. However, he believed Salter had a gun concealed on his
person and that Salter put that gun in Fripp’s trunk. Salter then put
8 a second gun in the backseat. They then drove to visit Fripp’s cousin,
Lashonda Dupree, in Columbia. When they arrived, they were
hanging out in front of Dupree’s apartment, and Salter was “jittery.”
Without testifying as to what was said, Fripp testified that,
following the conversation that took place, Dupree advised them to
turn themselves in. From there, they drove to the police station, and
on their way to the police station, Salter aggressively threatened
Fripp in a way that made Fripp feel that his family members’ lives
were in danger if he did not admit to the shooting.
After receiving Salter’s threat, he and Salter drove to the police
station where he gave his false statement. He did not kill Ratliff and
did not have any animosity or anger toward him. He was shocked
and saddened to learn that Ratliff had died and did not know
anything about Calvert’s testimony regarding the stolen cell phone,
the pistol-whipping, or the taking of a gun that belonged to Ratliff.
He did not have a dreadlock hairstyle, himself, and he was neither
six feet tall, nor was he the short man from the red car who pistol-
whipped Calvert. Further, he was not aware that Salter arrived at
9 the park after he left.
2. Fripp contends that the evidence was legally insufficient
to support his convictions as a matter of constitutional due process.
He argues that Calvert’s testimony, upon which the State largely
depended, was impeached by Calvert’s prior inconsistent statements
to the police. Specifically, Fripp asserts that, on the night of the
shooting, Calvert told officers that the red car had left before the
shooting occurred. Two years later, however, Calvert changed his
story and testified that the red car was still there during the
shooting. Additionally, Fripp contends that there was no physical
evidence collected at the scene related to him and that “the murder
weapon was found in his car” only because Salter placed it in Fripp’s
trunk before they headed to the police station. He argues that he
was unable to provide any details about the shooting to law
enforcement because he was not present, that he only admitted to
the shooting because Salter “coerc[ed]” him to, and that, accordingly,
the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish Fripp’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
10 “When evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
we view all of the evidence presented at trial in the light most
favorable to the verdict and ask whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
the crimes of which he was convicted.” Jones v. State, 304 Ga. 594,
598 (2018) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 318-19 (1979)).
“This Court does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in
testimony but rather defers to the jury’s assessment of the weight
and credibility of the evidence.” Davis v. State, 316 Ga. 418, 420
(2023).
Fripp first argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict
because the State relied on Calvert’s trial testimony which
contradicted his statements to the police as depicted in the body
camera video from the night of the shooting. But just as the court
instructed, it was the jury’s role to determine the credibility of the
witnesses and to decide whether there was a reasonable explanation
for any inconsistencies in a witness’s pre-trial statements. See
Harris v. State, 313 Ga. 225, 229 (2022) (“We leave to the jury the
11 resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, . . . and we
do not reweigh the evidence.” (citations and punctuation omitted)).
Here, the evidence was sufficient to support Fripp’s
convictions. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts,
Fripp’s own testimony that he arrived at the scene to meet with
Ratliff, his own admission that he “did it,” his arrival at the police
station in a red car with the gun that was used to kill Ratcliff inside,
and Calvert’s testimony at trial all support the jury’s finding Fripp
guilty of the counts beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jones, 304 Ga.
at 598; see also Davis, 316 Ga. at 420 (evidence sufficient to convict
for felony murder because it showed defendant shot and killed the
victim in front of eyewitnesses, admitted the shooting to his uncle,
and was in possession of the gun that was used to kill the victim two
days after the shooting); see also Matthews v. State, 311 Ga. 531,
536–37 (2021) (defendant’s admission to stabbing the victim and
possession of a steak knife set matching the knife blade used to stab
the victim constituted sufficient evidence to authorize defendant’s
convictions of malice murder and possession of a knife during the
12 commission of a crime). It was the jury’s role to assess the credibility
of witnesses and resolve inconsistencies, and here, the jury was
entitled to believe Calvert’s trial testimony, even if it was
inconsistent with a prior statement, and to disbelieve Fripp’s
testimony that he had left the scene before the shooting. See Harris,
313 Ga. at 229.
Fripp next contends that there was no physical evidence
collected at the scene related to him and that “the murder weapon
was found in his car” only because Salter put it in his trunk before
they went to the police station. But the State “was not required to
produce any physical evidence.” Jackson v. State, 307 Ga. 770, 772
(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). “Although the State is
required to prove its case with competent evidence, there is no
requirement that it prove its case with any particular sort of
evidence.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
Finally, as to Fripp’s argument that he was “coerc[ed]” to make
the statement to police, while the jury heard Fripp’s testimony that
Salter threatened him on the way to the police station, the jury also
13 heard testimony that Fripp and Salter were friends, that Fripp
drove his own car and Salter to the police station, and that Fripp
made the statement twice, to two separate officers, while he was not
under arrest and was still free to leave the police station. It was the
jury’s duty to assess credibility and weigh the evidence of Fripp’s
testimony about the alleged threat against the police officer’s
testimony about Fripp’s giving of the statement and the other
evidence of his guilt. The jury was authorized to disbelieve or give
less weight to Fripp’s testimony that he was “coerc[ed]” into
admitting to the crimes, and this Court does not reweigh evidence.
See Harris, 313 Ga. at 229; Davis, 316 Ga. at 420.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdicts, we conclude that it was sufficient to authorize a rational
trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Fripp was guilty
of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Harris, 313 Ga. at 229;
Jones, 304 Ga. at 598.
3. Fripp next contends that his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for failing to pursue an alibi defense.
14 Specifically, he asserts that he would have benefitted from an alibi
witness’s testimony that could support Calvert’s original
statement—and Fripp’s testimony—that Fripp had left before the
shooting. Further, he argues that his counsel admitted at the motion
for new trial hearing that there were “a couple of people that
probably could have served as alibi witnesses” but that his counsel
failed to call any of them and even failed to pursue Salter as a
potential alibi witness based only on his assumption that Salter
would not testify. But because Fripp does not name who the alibi
witnesses would have been and has failed to show how his trial
counsel’s decision to forgo pursuing an alibi defense prejudiced him,
his ineffective assistance claim fails.
In order to succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance, Fripp
must prove both that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient
and that there is a reasonable probability that the trial result would
have been different if not for the deficient performance. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (1984); see also McKelvey v. State,
311 Ga. 34, 42 (2021). To satisfy the deficiency prong, Fripp “must
15 show that counsel performed his duties in an objectively
unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances and in light of
prevailing professional norms.” Bowman v. State, 319 Ga. 573, 576
(2024) (citations and punctuation omitted). To satisfy the prejudice
prong, Fripp “must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Palmer v. State, 310 Ga. 668, 678 (2021).
“If an appellant fails to meet his burden of proving either prong of
the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine
the other prong.” Lupoe v. State, 284 Ga. 576, 578 (2008).
Here, Fripp has failed to demonstrate prejudice. At the hearing
on Fripp’s motion for new trial, he failed to identify a single witness
who “would have given him a solid and complete alibi for the time of
the murder.” McKelvey, 311 Ga. at 44. This failure to present the
testimony of Salter, any other alibi witness, or a legally acceptable
substitute, “as required to demonstrate prejudice in the context of
ineffective assistance of counsel,” is detrimental to his claim of
ineffective assistance. Palmer, 310 Ga. at 678; see also Lupoe, 284
16 Ga. at 578 (explaining that there can be no ineffective assistance
where “[t]he alleged alibi witness that [the defendant] claims should
have been investigated by his trial counsel did not testify at the
motion for new trial hearing”); see also McIlwain v. State, 287 Ga.
115, 118 (2010) (Attorney “could not be ineffective for failing to . . .
call a potential alibi witness of whom she was not informed.”).
Because Fripp has failed to present the testimony of any such alibi
witness that would have been favorable to his defense, we conclude
that Fripp has not shown that the failure to call an alibi witness
prejudiced him. See Palmer, 310 Ga. at 678
4. In Fripp’s final enumeration of error, he contends that the
court erred by giving a misleading jury instruction on coercion that
was not tailored to the evidence presented at trial. At one point
during Fripp’s testimony about the threat Salter made while on
their way to the police station, Fripp’s counsel asked Fripp, “How
would you characterize the demeanor or the way the person was
looking at you or when y’all – were y’all –.” The court interrupted
and asked counsel to approach, and the following transpired at a
17 bench conference.
The court asked Fripp’s counsel, “[I]s this some coercion
defense?” and explained that “coercion is not a defense to murder.”
Fripp’s counsel said he understood but explained that Fripp had
gone into the police station out of fear. The court asked how this line
of questioning was relevant since coercion was not a defense to
murder. Fripp’s counsel explained that it was relevant to why Fripp
made the statement to law enforcement. The court replied, “Well,
I’ve got to give a jury charge that coercion is not a defense to murder”
but stated that it would allow the line of questioning for the limited
purpose of explaining Fripp’s conduct. Fripp’s counsel explained:
“[H]e’s not using that to try to say that he was coerced at that scene
and did something at the scene,” but rather, only to say why he made
a statement to police.
During the charge conference, the court asked the parties if it
needed to instruct the jury regarding the coercion argument they
discussed at the bench conference. The State requested a charge
related to the bench conference and argued that coercion is not a
18 defense to murder. The court initially explained its intention to give
the instruction, but after Fripp’s counsel argued against it, the court
acknowledged the concern in giving it. After taking a break, the
court stated that it intended to give the coercion instruction from
OCGA § 16-3-26. 2 Defense counsel objected on the basis that the
charge was not tailored to the evidence presented, as there was no
evidence that Fripp was coerced to commit any act other than to
make a statement.
During the jury charge, the court instructed the jury, among
other things, on the presumption of innocence, the credibility of
witnesses, inconsistencies in a witness’s pre-trial statements when
compared to the witness’s testimony at trial, the voluntariness of the
defendant’s statement, and the coercion defense under
OCGA § 16-3-26.
2 OCGA § 16-3-26 provides that:
A person is not guilty of a crime, except murder, if the act upon which the supposed criminal liability is based is performed under such coercion that the person reasonably believes that performing the act is the only way to prevent his imminent death or great bodily injury. 19 Fripp contends the coercion defense instruction the trial court
gave was misleading because there was no evidence that Fripp was
coerced to participate in the criminal conduct. This instruction,
Fripp argues, could have confused the jury by suggesting that Fripp
was trying to assert an affirmative defense of coercion, in
contradiction to his theory of defense that he was not present at the
time of the shooting. Finally, he contends that the court’s instruction
on the voluntariness of Fripp’s statement increased the harm of the
coercion instruction because a jury would believe the coercion
instruction to be related to the committing of the crimes instead of
the making of the statement to police.
Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred by giving
this instruction, we conclude that any error was harmless. “Even
when we find error in a jury charge, we will not reverse when the
error is harmless, that is, when it is highly probable that the
instruction did not contribute to the verdict.” Jones v. State, 316 Ga.
481, 486 (2023). “To figure out whether an instructional error was
harmless, we assess it in the context of the instructions as a whole.”
20 Id. “And as with other trial errors, in assessing harm we review the
record de novo, and we weigh the evidence as we would expect
reasonable jurors to have done so.” Id. (citation and punctuation
omitted).
Under this standard, the question then becomes whether the
court instructing the jury on the coercion defense was harmless. See
Jones, 316 Ga. at 486. Here, it is highly probable that the instruction
on the coercion defense did not contribute to the verdict given the
strong evidence of Fripp’s guilt and the totality of the instructions
provided.
As to the evidence presented, the jury heard Fripp’s own
testimony that he was at the scene, at least shortly before the
shooting occurred, Calvert’s testimony that a man matching Fripp’s
description was still present at the scene during the shooting and
pistol-whipped Calvert, and law enforcement’s testimony that Fripp
arrived at the police station the next day with the gun that was used
to kill Ratcliff in the trunk of Fripp’s red car—the same vehicle in
which he arrived to the shooting scene. See Jones, 316 Ga. at 487
21 (any error in giving an instruction about evidence of other crimes
was harmless where “the evidence against Jones was quite strong”).
As to the other instructions given, Fripp argues that the
harmful nature of the coercion instruction was worsened by the
court’s instruction on the voluntariness of the defendant’s
statement. He contends that the instruction went to the
voluntariness of Fripp’s statement, which thereby implied that the
coercion instruction went to a different issue—whether Fripp was
coerced into committing the murder—which was inconsistent with
Fripp’s contention at trial that he left the scene before the shooting
occurred.3 We disagree. When analyzed in “the context of the
3 The court instructed the jury:
A statement that the Defendant allegedly made has been offered for your consideration. Before you may consider this as evidence for any purpose, you must determine whether the Defendant’s statement was voluntary. To be voluntary, a statement must be freely and willingly given and without coercion, duress, threats, use of violence, fear of injury, or any suggestions or promises of leniency or reward. A statement induced by the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury is not voluntary. To be voluntary, a statement must be the product of a free will and not under compulsion or any necessity imposed by others.
. 22 instructions as a whole,” Jones, 316 Ga. at 486, the coercion defense
instruction was harmless because Fripp did not assert that he was
coerced into committing the murder and the jury was adequately
instructed on other aspects for their deliberations.
The jury was instructed on, among other things, the
presumption of innocence, the credibility of witnesses,
inconsistencies in a witness’s pre-trial statements when compared
to the witness’s testimony at trial, and the voluntariness of the
defendant’s statement. Regarding the voluntariness of the
statement instruction, the jury was instructed to determine whether
it believed that Fripp’s statement was voluntarily given and, only
then, could it consider the statement as evidence. Fripp does not
challenge the correctness of the voluntariness charge, and “[i]t is
presumed that the jury, which was under oath, followed the trial
court’s instructions unless there is clear evidence to the contrary.”
Brooks v. State, 309 Ga. 630, 636 (2020). Seeing no evidence that the
jury did not follow the court’s instruction to analyze whether the
statement was voluntarily given before considering it as evidence or
23 any of the other proper instructions, we conclude that the
voluntariness instruction did not make giving of the coercion
defense instruction any more harmful and, thus, the coercion
defense instruction was harmless. See Jones, 316 Ga. at 486.
Accordingly, when considered in the context of the jury
instructions as a whole, the jury instructions clearly informed the
jury of its duty to weigh the evidence presented at trial and make
determinations as to credibility and voluntariness of statements,
and it was highly probable that the coercion defense instruction did
not contribute to the jury’s verdict. See Jones, 316 Ga. at 486.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Land, J., not participating.