Friends of the Capital Crescent Trail v. Federal Transit Administration

200 F. Supp. 3d 248, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102083, 2016 WL 4132188
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedAugust 3, 2016
DocketCivil Action No. 2014-1471
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 200 F. Supp. 3d 248 (Friends of the Capital Crescent Trail v. Federal Transit Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Friends of the Capital Crescent Trail v. Federal Transit Administration, 200 F. Supp. 3d 248, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102083, 2016 WL 4132188 (D.D.C. 2016).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

[Dkts. ##47, 54, 56]

RICHARD J. LEON, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Friends of the Capital Crescent Trail (“FCCT”), John MacKnight Fitzgerald, and Christine Real de Azua (“plaintiffs”) challenge the March 19, 2014 Record of Decision (“ROD”) by the Federal Transit Administration (“FTA”) and related approvals by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS,” and together with FTA and the Department of Transportation and the Department of Interior, “federal defendants”) for the Purple Line Project, a 16.2-mile light rail transit project in Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties, Maryland. Plaintiffs raise multiple claims under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., the Federal Transit Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5309, Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 23 U.S.C. § 138, the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq., and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703. See generally Am. Compl. [Dkt. #20]; First Supp. Compl. [Dkt # 33]; Second Supp. Compl. [Dkt #42], Following the filing of the complaint, the State of Maryland joined the federal defendants as an intervenor-defendant. See Minute Order, July 15, 2015. Currently before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs, federal defendants, and defendant-intervenor. See Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. #47]; Federal Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. #54]; Def.-Intervenor’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. #56]. Upon consideration of the pleadings, record, and relevant law, I find *251 that the recent revelations regarding Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s (“WMATA”) ridership and safety concerns merit a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement under NEPA and reserve judgment as to the remaining issues. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part, and federal defendants’ and defendant-intervenors’ cross-motions for summary judgment are DENIED in part.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court’s review “is based on the agency record and limited to determining whether the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously.” Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 583 F.3d 860, 865 (D.C.Cir.2009). Whereas “the role of the agency [is] to resolve factual issues,” the sole “function of the district court is to determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.” Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F.Supp.2d 76, 90 (D.D.C.2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The Court must determine “whether the agency acted within the scope of its legal authority, ... explained its decision, ... relied [on facts that] have some basis in the record, and ... considered the relevant factors.” Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F.Supp. 96, 105 (D.D.C.1995).

ANALYSIS

I. Statutory Background

NEPA requires that federal agencies consider the environmental effects of proposed actions by requiring them to “carefully consider[] detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts.” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989). Under NEPA, a federal agency must prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) whenever a proposed government action qualifies as a “major Federal action[ ] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The EIS “shall state how alternatives considered in it and decisions based on it will or will not achieve the requirements of [NEPA] and other environmental laws and policies,” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(d), discuss “[possible conflicts between the proposed action and the objectives of Federal .., land use plans, policies and controls for the area concerned,” id. § 1502.16(c), and “present the environmental impacts of the proposal and the alternatives in comparative form, thus sharply defining the issues and providing a clear basis for choice among options by the decisionmaker and the. public,” id. § 1502.14. The idea is that “[s]uch information may cause the agency to modify its proposed action.” Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. Surface Transp. Bd., 267 F.3d 1144, 1151 (D.C.Cir.2001).

Even after preparation of an EIS, an agency is obligated to undertake a supplemental EIS (“SEIS”) when presented with “substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns” or “new and significant circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.” 10 C.F.R. § 51.92(a)(l)-(2). “[A]n agency need not supplement an EIS every time new information comes to light,” Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 373, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989), but rather only when “new information provides a seriously different picture of the environmental landscape,’ ” Nat'l Comm. for the New River v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1323, *252 1330 (D.C.Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Courts review an agency’s decision whether to undertake an SEIS under the arbitrary and capricious standard. City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 274 (D.C.Cir.2002).

The scope of review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard “is narrow,” and “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

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200 F. Supp. 3d 248, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102083, 2016 WL 4132188, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/friends-of-the-capital-crescent-trail-v-federal-transit-administration-dcd-2016.