Friends of Animals v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service

CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedDecember 23, 2024
Docket4:18-cv-00053
StatusUnknown

This text of Friends of Animals v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service (Friends of Animals v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Friends of Animals v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, (D. Utah 2024).

Opinion

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH

FRIENDS OF ANIMALS, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S Plaintiff, MOTION FOR REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION v. Case No. 4:18-CV-00053-DN-PK UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, District Judge David Nuffer

Defendant.

On August 22, 2018, Friends of Animals filed a Complaint against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“Agency”).1 The central aim of Friends of Animals’ Complaint is to vacate and remand the Agency’s decisions approving General Conservation Plan (“GCP”) and Incidental Take Permits (“Take Permits”) because these decisions permit entities to engage in activities that may harm the Utah prairie dog population. Friends of Animals argues the Agency’s decisions in approving the GCP and Take Permits were arbitrary and capricious, and that these decisions should be vacated pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Friends of Animals filed its Opening Brief on March 25, 2021.2 That Opening Brief functions as a Motion for Review of Agency Action.3 The Agency filed a Response,4 and Friends of Animals filed a Reply.5 Friends of Animals filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority6 that

1 Complaint docket no. 2, filed August 22, 2018. 2 Plaintiff’s Opening Brief docket no. 74, filed March 25, 2021 (“Friends of Animals Opening Br.”). 3 DUCivR 7-4. 4 Defendant’s Answer Brief docket no. 77, filed June 10, 2021 (“Agency Response”). 5 Plaintiff’s Reply docket no. 79, filed July 8, 2021. 6 Notice of Supplemental Authority, docket no. 85, filed September 16, 2024. addressed the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.7 The Agency filed a Response8 to Friends of Animals Notice of Supplemental Authority. Based on the parties’ submissions, the evidence in the record, and supplemental authority, Friends of Animals’ Motion is DENIED. Table of Contents I. Background ......................................................................................................................... 3 A. Endangered Species Act ......................................................................................... 3 B. The Utah Prairie Dog .............................................................................................. 4 C. The Agency’s Conservation Methods for the Utah Prairie Dog ............................. 5 II. The Administrative Procedure Act ..................................................................................... 5 III. Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 7 A. Friends of Animals has standing to challenge the Agency’s GCP, and the GCP constitutes a final agency action ............................................................................. 8 1. Friends of Animals has standing to challenge the Agency’s GCP ............. 8 2. Friends of Animals challenged a Final Agency Action ............................ 10 B. The GCP will minimize and mitigate the take of the Utah prairie dog to the maximum extent practicable ................................................................................. 13 1. The GCP was not required to specify every facet of its conservation plan before a permit is sought for a development project ................................. 15 2. The GCP’s mitigation and minimization measures did not violate the Endangered Species Act’s requirement that the take of the Utah prairie dog is limited to the maximum extent practicable .................................... 16 3. The GCP’s “when feasible” limitation for translocations does not violate the Endangered Species Act ...................................................................... 20 4. The GCP’s omission of mitigation and minimization measures from past HCPs and other conservation measures does not prevent the GCP from offsetting take of the Utah prairie dog to the maximum extent practicable ................................................................................................................... 22 C. The Agency was not required to consider alternatives to the GCP under the Endangered Species Act’s subsections (a)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) ..................................... 25 D. The Agency’s conclusion that the take associated with the GCP would not jeopardize the continued existence of the Utah prairie dog was not arbitrary and capricious .............................................................................................................. 26 E. The Agency’s conclusion that there was adequate funding for the GCP was not arbitrary and capricious......................................................................................... 29 F. The Agency’s decision to issue the GCP did not violate the National Environmental Policy Act ..................................................................................... 32 1. The Agency’s conclusion that the GCP would not significantly affect the quality of the human environment was not arbitrary and capricious ........ 32

7 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024). 8 Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplemental Authority, docket no. 86, filed September 20, 2024. 2. Friends of Animals did not establish the Agency failed to consider a reasonable range of alternatives to the GCP. ............................................ 35 3. The Agency discussed mitigation measures ............................................. 37 IV. ORDER ............................................................................................................................. 38

I. BACKGROUND A. Endangered Species Act Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act to conserve endangered species and the ecosystems in which they live.9 The Endangered Species Act prohibits the taking (i.e., harming) of any endangered or protected species of fish or wildlife within the United States.10 The Endangered Species Act contains an exception to the taking prohibition that allows the Agency to issue permits (i.e., “Take Permits”) to non-federal entities authorizing take where the harm to the protected species is “incidental to” the lawful activity.11 However, the permit may not be issued unless the applicant for a permit submits a Habitat Conservation Plan (“HCP”) that specifies: (i) the impact that will likely result from the incidental take; (ii) what steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate impacts . . . (iii) what alternative actions the applicant considered and the reasons these alternatives were not used; and (iv) such other measures that the Secretary may require as necessary or appropriate for the purposes of the plan.12 After the HCP is submitted, the Secretary of the Agency shall issue the permit if the Secretary finds that: (i) the taking will be incidental; (ii) the applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of such taking; (iii) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the plan will be provided;

9 Agency Response at 3. 10 Id. at (citing 16 U.S.C.§ 1538(a)(1)(B), (G)). 11 Id. at 4 (quoting 16 U.S.C.§ 1539(a)(2)(B)). 12 Id. at 4 (quoting 16 U.S.C.§ 1539(a)(2)(A)); see also 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(1).

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