Friedman v. Kennedy

182 S.E.2d 761, 227 Ga. 722, 1971 Ga. LEXIS 823
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedJune 4, 1971
Docket26379
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 182 S.E.2d 761 (Friedman v. Kennedy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Friedman v. Kennedy, 182 S.E.2d 761, 227 Ga. 722, 1971 Ga. LEXIS 823 (Ga. 1971).

Opinions

Felton, Justice.

Louis Friedman filed his complaint against Royal-Crown Bottling Company, a partnership, seeking to recover damages for alleged personal injuries. Count 1 alleged that the defendants had impliedly warranted to the plaintiff that the bottle of carbonated beverage was merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended and that the defendants knew of no latent defects undisclosed, to wit: that the carbonated beverage was a mixture suitable for human consumption and would not cause its container to explode or fragment. Count 2 alleged that the defendants impliedly warranted to the plaintiff that the glass bottles containing the beverage were merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended. Count 3 alleged that the defendants impliedly warranted that the glass containers containing the carbonated beverage would not explode or fragment during their keeping, storage and handling by the plaintiff, [723]*723under ordinary and customary circumstances and conditions. Count 4 alleged that the defendants were negligent in not properly inspecting and testing the bottle prior to filling it with a carbonated beverage.

On the trial of the case the motion of the defendants for a directed verdict was overruled and the jury returned a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that the trial court erred in overruling the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict. Kennedy v. Friedman, 123 Ga. App. 105 (179 SE2d 566). The court, in its opinion (p. 108), said: "Here the plaintiff had the burden to produce evidence on these critical elements of his case. From the time the bottle left the manufacturer, only three people had access to it. Nevertheless, plaintiff failed to show that two of them had not tampered with, banged, or otherwise handled the bottle in such a way that it could have caused the explosion. For this reason, plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case either in negligence or warranty” and in its headnote of the opinion ruled: "In a products liability action, whether based on negligence or breach of implied warranty, the plaintiff must account for the product from the time it leaves the defendant’s hands until the time of the occurrence in order to eliminate other explanations than the defendant’s negligence (if plaintiff is relying upon res ipsa loquitur) or to prove by inference that the product was defective when sold.”

We granted the plaintiff application for the writ of certiorari, and we now reverse.

It appears without dispute that the plaintiff purchased 24 bottles of Diet-Rite Cola beverage from the defendants; that he carried them to his home and placed one six-pack carton on a pantry shelf in his kitchen; that on May 21, 1962, he went into the pantry and as he removed a bottle from the carton, the bottle exploded causing injuries to his person.

There was evidence that the plaintiff’s wife and the housemaid had access to the pantry where the bottle that exploded was located, but the record is silent as to whether either one prior to the explosion had or had not handled or touched the bottle that exploded.

[724]*724On the trial, glass fragments of the bottle that had exploded were introduced in evidence. Earl W. Toulouse, Regional Service Engineer for Owens-Illinois Company, on direct examination as a witness for the defendants, testified as follows: That he determined from the glass fragments of the bottle that the bottle was manufactured by Owens-Illinois. He described the method and standard employed by that company and the test to which the bottles were subjected. He stated that after he had reassembled the glass fragments of the broken bottle he had reached the conclusion that the cause of the bottle breaking was an impact or external pressure and not internal pressure.

Dr. Oscar G. Fryer, consultant for the Science Center of Drury College, a witness for the defendants, testified that he had examined the fragments of the broken bottle and in his opinion, the bottle was broken by reason of external pressure.

On cross examination the witness Toulouse testified as follows: "Q. What other kind of examination did you make of this glass bottle here, sir? A. This particular bottle? Q. Yes, sir. A. We examined the — well, of course, all of the pieces we examined for the detravel, we examined the — what might have been left of any stress that may have been in it, uneven stress. Q. Part of the glass was pulverized, was it not? A. That’s correct. Q. Did you determine anything on that account? A. No, other than we could tell that most of the pulverized glass came from the — directly behind the point of impact, by determining this because that was the only portion of the glass, of the bottle itself where the pieces, except for one or two places, where goodly size pieces were missing. Just two, I think two. And the other pulverized glass, of course, too small to put back together or anything like this, but knowing from other tests that we have made and knowing that the pulverized pieces that we get come from directly behind the point of impact where the stress is the greatest. Q. Yes, sir. Did you find any internal strains in' that bottle? A. It has what we classify as a number two, this is extra-polated to our standards, then compared with other bottles that had broken, the strain that remained — now, we did this with a polariscope when we did this in Toledo in 1966. We did [725]*725not do that with this one right now, but at that time with what we call a number two. Q. You did find internal strains in the glass? A. That’s correct. This is normal. Q. Would a combination of internal strain and external scratching with carbonated beverage being contained there, wouldn’t that accentuate any one of those defects? A. It would add to it. Now, by accentuating, I might have to say relative there, too, because this amount of strain is insignificant in this respect because the other strains from impact are so high that this is lost, this amount. Q. All right. But you talked about, a while ago, of internal pressure by the carbonated beverages on the inside exerting pressure on the outside? A. That’s correct, yes. Q. Because of the pressure pushing out? A. Uh, huh. Q. All right. And then if you strike it on the outside it is more inclined to break or explode with these defects than it is without them, is it not? A. Right, correct. Q. Yes, sir. And it wouldn’t take as much of an impact with these defects in the bottle as it would with a good sound bottle without any of these defects, would it? A. It wouldn’t take as much, and then again you have to get back to the pattern itself and relate this to fracture analysis to determine whether or not — which was involved and how much. Q. But it is a relative term? A. It is a relative term, yes. Q. And the defects. . . A. And it depends on the individual bottle itself — that is the pattern of the fracture itself. Q. Did you ever experience any bottle exploding at your factory because of scratches internally caused during the manufacturing process? A. Yes, we have — where they are badly annealed, where they haven’t been annealed properly, you can scratch the inside surface and they will break. They won’t explode, but they’ll crack. Q. What do you mean by annealed? A. All glass that is cooled fast sets up a strain in the glass itself.

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Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc.
225 S.E.2d 691 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1976)
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196 S.E.2d 670 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1973)
Kennedy v. Friedman
183 S.E.2d 920 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1971)
Friedman v. Kennedy
182 S.E.2d 761 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1971)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
182 S.E.2d 761, 227 Ga. 722, 1971 Ga. LEXIS 823, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/friedman-v-kennedy-ga-1971.