French v. Owens

538 F. Supp. 910, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12227
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedMay 7, 1982
DocketIP 75-677-C
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 538 F. Supp. 910 (French v. Owens) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12227 (S.D. Ind. 1982).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

DILLIN, District Judge.

This is a class action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by four inmates in the Indiana Reformatory at Pendleton, Indiana on behalf of all persons who are or will be confined in the Reformatory. The inmates allege that the conditions, rules, and practices at the Reformatory violate inmates’ rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and by the Indiana Constitution and laws of the state. The inmates seek to enjoin the responsible state officials from further violations.

The inmates complain of poor living conditions, inadequate medical care, lack of safety and security, bad food services, inadequate educational and vocational programs, an arbitrary system of prison discipline, and insufficient access to the courts. The inmates maintain that conditions at the Reformatory violate their right under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The inmates also argue that the system of prison discipline and the access to legal materials fall short of the demands of due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The inmates also insist that their right to equal protection found in the Fourteenth Amendment is violated because they are subject to harsher conditions and treatment than are inmates at the Indiana State Farm. Lastly, the inmates press a claim based on state law, arguing that they are being denied their right to rehabilitative and educational programs as guaranteed by Article I, § 18 of the Indiana Constitution and I.C. 1971, 11-I- 1.1-26. Since the initiation of the action, the statute just mentioned has been repealed. However, it and other former sections of statute defining prisoners’ rights have been replaced by various sections of P.L. 120 of the Acts of 1979 (hereafter P.L. 120), having to do with the Department of Correction. The 1979 Act is codified in I.C. II- 8-1-1 through 11-13-6-9; particular sections will be considered to the extent that the evidence may tend to show a violation thereof. Rule 15(b), F.R.Civ.P.

Jurisdiction over this case is based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and (4), which provide for the original jurisdiction of federal district courts in suits authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The inmates’ request for declaratory relief is authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. Jurisdiction over the state law claims is based on pendent jurisdiction.

Procedural Background

This case began on November 21, 1975, when four inmates in the Indiana Reformatory filed a pro se complaint alleging that the conditions, rules, practices, and policies at the Reformatory were unconstitutional. This complaint was dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint.

On May 13,1976, an amended class action complaint was filed, charging constitutional violations at the Reformatory. Plaintiffs’ motion to maintain the suit as a class action was granted on December 20, 1977. The plaintiff class was defined as “all persons who are or may in the future be confined in the Indiana Reformatory, Pendleton, Indiana.” The United States Government entered the case on March 10, 1978 when the Government was granted leave to participate as amicus curiae.

Trial began on July 5, 1978 and ended on August 14, 1978. Ruling was reserved pending submission of proposed findings of *912 fact and conclusions of law by both parties and filing of post-trial briefs. The cause was reopened for the taking of additional evidence March 1-5, 1982. The Court, in the presence of counsel, inspected the cell-blocks, inside dormitories, kitchen, dining hall, visitors’ room, and infirmary on March 5, 1982.

General Principles

The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. State of California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962). There is no precise definition of cruel and unusual punishment nor are there any mechanical standards to apply; rather, the Eighth Amendment embodies broad concepts of decency and humanity against which penal measures must be evaluated. Punishment must be made compatible with “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1957).

The ban on cruel and unusual punishment was first used to check the use of torture and other physical abuse; however, the ban has developed into a means to prevent conditions which involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or go beyond present notions of decency. There is no iron curtain surrounding prisons. Prison confinement is a form of punishment subject to the stricture of the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5 Cir. 1977); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F.Supp. 269 (D.N.H.1977).

The shifting standard of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is not, however, an invitation to a federal court to create its vision of an ideal prison. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2977,41 L.Ed.2d 935, 954 (1974), prison is “a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so.” Lawful incarceration by definition involves withdrawal of some rights and privileges. The running of prisons involves complex and often contradictory objectives. Notions of punishment and rehabilitation mix with the need for safety and security. Courts must proceed cautiously in making an Eighth Amendment judgment. See Rhodes v. Chapman, supra.

However, the need for discretion does not mean no judicial oversight. “Courts certainly have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel and unusual confinement and conditions in a number of prisons, especially older ones, have justly been described as ‘deplorable’ and ‘sordid’. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. [520], at 562, 99 S.Ct. 1861 [at 1886], 60 L.Ed.2d 447.” Rhodes v. Chapman, supra.

In determining whether the conditions at the Reformatory are cruel and unusual, each factor cannot be viewed separately.

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Bluebook (online)
538 F. Supp. 910, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12227, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/french-v-owens-insd-1982.