Mr. Chief Justice TANEY
delivered tiie opinion of the court.
The court have considered this case with much attention. It is not only important to the claimant and the public, but it is understood that many claims to land in California depend upon the same principles, and will, in effect, be decided by the judgment of the court in this case.
A preliminary question has been raised, as to the jurisdiction of the district court from which the appeal has been taken ; but the same question has been already examined and decided in the case of the United States v. Ritchie, and it is unnecessary to discuss it further. We think - it very clear that the district court had jurisdiction, and proceed to examine the validity of the claim upon this appeal.
The 8th section of the act of March 3,1851, “ to ascertain [553]*553and settle the private land claims in the State of California,” directs: “ That each and every person claiming lands in California, by virtue of any rip;ht or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government, shall present the same to the commissioners, (to be appointed under that act,) when sitting as' a board, together with such documentary evidence and testimony of witnesses as the said claimant relies upon in support of such claims; and it shall be the duty, of the commissioners, when the ease is ready for hearing, to proceed promptly to examine the samé upon such evidence, and upon the evidence produced in behalf of the United States, and to decide upon the validity of the said claim, and, within thirty days after such decision is rendered, to. certify the same, with the reasons on which it is founded, to the district attorney of the United States in and for the district in which such decision shall be rendered.”
And the 11th section provides, that the commissioners therein provided for, and the district and supreme court, in deciding on any claim brought before them under the provisions of that act, shall be governed by the treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo, the law of nations, the laws, usages, and customs of the government from which the claim is derived, the principles of equity, and the decisions of the supreme court of the United States, as far as they are applicable.
The decisions of the supreme court, mentioned in this section, evidently refer to decisions heretofore given in relation to titles in Louisiana and Florida, which were derived from the French or Spanish authorities, previous to the cession to the United States. And as these decisions must govern the case under consideration, as far as they are applicable, it is proper to state the principles upon which they were made, before we proceed to examine it. In doing this, however, we do not propose to refer separately to each of the numerous decisions which may be found in the reports; nor is it necessary. They will be found to have been uniformly decided upon certain fixed principles of law, applicable to those grants, which cannot always be applied with justice and equity to a case like the one before us. The laws of congress, giving the jurisdiction, were different in one respect; and the condition of the countries, as well as the laws and usages of the nation making the grants, were also different.
It will be seen, from the quotation we have made, that the 8th section embraces not only inchoate or equitable titles, but legal titles also; and requires them all to undergo examination, and to be passed upon by the court. The object of this provision appears to be, to place the titles to land in California upon a stable foundation, and to give the parties who possess them an [554]*554opportunity of placing them on the records of the country, in a manner and form that will prevent future controversy.
In this respect, it differs from the act of 1824, under which the claims in Louisiana and Florida were decided. • The jurisdiction of the court, in these cases, was confined to inchoate equitable titles, which required some other act of the government to vest in the party the legal title or full ownership: If
he claimed to have obtained from either of the former governments a full and perfect title, he was left to assert it in the ordinary forms of law, upon the documents under which he claimed. The court had no power to sanction or confirm it when proceeding under the act of 1824, or the subsequent laws extending its provisions.
And the language of the court, in passing judgment upon the claims in Louisiana or Florida, must always be understood as applying to cases in which the government still held the ownership of the land, and where the right of the party to demand' a conveyance, upon principles of equity and good faith, must be shown by him, before he could claim it from the .United States.
The mode and form of granting lands in these provinces, and the character and stability of the provincial governments, must also be considered, before we can determine how far the principles established in the decisions of those cases are applicable to the grants by the Mexican authorities, after the country was separated from Spain.
Grants of land in Louisiana and Florida were usually made in the following manner: The party who desired to form a settlement upon any unoccupied land presented his petition to the officer who had authority to grant, stating the quantity of land he desired, the place where it was situated, and the purposes to which it was to be applied. Upon the receipt of the petition, the governor, or other officer who had the power to grant, issued what is usually called a concession to the party, authorizing him to have the land surveyed by the official surveyor of the province. And it was the duty of this officer to ascertain whether the land asked for was vacant, or the grant of it would prejudice the rights of other parties ; and, if the surveyor found it .to be vacant, and that the grant would not interfere with the rights of others, he returned a plat, or figurative plan, as it was called, and the party thereupon received a grant in absolute ownership.
These grants were almost uniformly made upon condition of settlement, or some other improvement, by which the interest of the colony, it was supposed, would be promoted. But until the survey was made, no interest legal or equitable, passed in [555]*555the land. The original concession granted on his petition was a naked authority or permission, and nothing more. But when he had incurred the expense and trouble of the survey, under the assurances contained in the concession, he had a just ■ and equitable claim to the land thus marked out by lines, subject to the conditions upon which he had originally asked for the grant. But the examination of the surveyor, the actual survey, and the return of the plat, were conditions precedent, and he had no equity against .the government, and no just claim to a grant until they were performed; for he had paid nothing, and done nothing, which gave him a claim upon the conscience and good faith of- the government. There were some cases, indeed, in which there were absolute grants of title with conditions subsequent annexed to them. The case cf Arredondo, reported in 6 Peters, and of which we shall speak hereafter, was one of this description/ But the great mass of cases which come before this court, and which have been supposed to bear on this case, were of the character above mentioned.
It necessarily happened, from this mode of granting, that many concessions were obtained which the parties never after-wards acted on. A person who had contemplated a settlement, or planting a colony, or making some other improvement in a particular place, sometimes changed his mind, or found some other situation more suitable, or found himself unable to comply with the conditions which, in his petition, ,he had proposed to perform.
But these concessions or permissions were never recalled, and remained in the possession of the party, although he had abandoned all thoughts of acting upon them. And when the United States obtained the sovereignty of- these countries, and the energy, enterprise, and industry of our citizens were rapidly filling it, and lands which were of no value under the Spanish government would be ample fortunes under the United States, many persons, who for years had held these concessions without attémpting to avail themselves of the authority they gave him, came forward and claimed the right to do so under the government of the union.
A few cases, which appear to have been relied on in the argument in behalf of the United States, will show the character of most of them, and the principles upon which they were decided in this court. In the case of Boisdoré, (11 How. 63,) he had obtained the authority or concession on which he relied in the year. 1783. He had never caused a survey to be made during the existence of the Spanish government? although twenty years had elapsed before its cession to this country.[556]*556Nor was any step taken by him to obtain a title from the United States, nor any claim legally brought forward, for seventeen years after the territory had been ceded to the United States. And nothing like any serious attempt had been made to fulfil the conditions upon which he had obtained the concession.
So, too, in the case of Glenn and others v. The United States, 13 How. 250, (usually called the Clamorgan case,) the grant was obtained in 1796, and no possession taken, and no survey had, nor any of the stipulations into which he had entered complied with, while the Spanish government lasted. Nor, indeed, was any claim made to it for several years after the-cession to the United States; nor until the country in which it was situated was filling up with an industrious population, and the land becoming of great value.
So, again, in the case of Villemont against the United States, (13 How. 266,) the concession or authority was made in 1795, and there was an express provision in- the concession, that unless the establishment he proposed in his petition was made on the land in three years, the concession should be null. Yet he did nothing during the continuance of the Spanish government, although it lasted eight years afterwards; and the excuse from Indian hostility could hardly avail him, because no difficulty of that kind is suggested in his petition; and from the character of the improvements he promised to make, it would seem that one of the objects of this large grant was to form an establishment which would be useful in repelling Indian hostilities from the neighboring Spanish settlements.
. This brief statement of the facts in these cases shows that the parties had acquired no right, legal or equitable, to these lands under the Spanish government. The instruments under which they claimed were evidently not intended as donations of the land, as a matter of favor to the individual, or as a reward for sendees rendered to the public. They were intended to promote the settlement of the territories, and to advance its prosperity. But up to the time when Spain ceded them, the parties had done nothing to accomplish the object, or to carry out the policy of the government. They had evidently no claim, therefore, upon the justice or conscience of the Spanish government. It had not granted them the land, and they had -done nothing which, in equity, bound that government to make them á tifie. And when Spain ceded the territories to the United States, it held these lands as public domain as fully, and amply as if those concessions or authorities had never been given ; and the United States received the title in the same full and ample manner; neither the legal nor equitable right to them, as public domain, had been impaired [557]*557by any act of the Spanish authority, nor had any right been conveyed to or vested in the claimants.
It is proper to remark, that the laws of these territories under which titles were claimed, were never treated by the court’ as foreign laws, to be decided as á question of fact. It was always held that the court was bound judicially to notice them, as much so as the laws of a State of the Union. In doing this, however, it was undoubtedly often necessary to inquire into official customs and forms and usages. They constitute what may be called the common or unwritten law of every civilized country. And when there are no published reports, of judicial decisions which show the received construction of a statute, and the powers exercised under it by the tribunals or officers of the government, it is often necessary to seek information from other authentic sources, such as the records of official acts, and the practice of the different tribunals and public authorities. And it may sometimes be necessary to seek information from individuals whose official position or pursuits have given them opportunities of acquiring knowledge. But it has always been held that it is for the court to decide what weight is to be given to information obtained from any of these sources. It exercises the same discretion and power, in this respect, which it exercises when it refers to the different reported decisions of state courts, and compares them together, in order to make up an opinion as to the unwritten law of the State, or the construction giveri to one of its statutes.
With these principles, which have been adjudicated by this court, to guide us, we proceed to examine the validity of the grant to Alvarado, which is now in controversy.
There can be no question' as to the power of the governor of California to make the grant. And it appears to have been made according to the regular forms and usages of the Mexican law. It has conditions attached to it; but these are conditions subsequent. And the first point to be decided is, whether the grant vested in Alvarado any present and immediate interest; and, if it did, then, secondly, whether anything done or omitted to be done by him, during the existence of the Mexican government in California, forfeited the interest he had acquired, and revested it in the government ? For if, at the time the sovereignty of the country passed to the United States, any interest, legal or equitable, remained vested in Alvarado or his assigns, the United States are- bound in good faith to uphold and protect it.
Now, the grant in question is not like the Louisiana and Florida concessions — a mere permission to make a survey in a particular place, and return a plat of the land he desires, with [558]*558a promise from the government that he shall have a title to it when these things are done. But the grant, after reciting that Alvarado was worthy, for his patriotic services, to be preferred in his pretension for his personal benefit, and that of his family, for the tract of land "known by the name of Maripo’sas, to the extent of ten square leagues, within certain limits mentioned in the grant; and that the necessary requirements, according to the provisions of the laws and regulations, had been previously complied with, proceeds, in the name of tíre Mexican nation, to grant him the aforesaid tract, declaring the same, by that instrument, to be his property in fee, subject to the approbation of the departmental ’ assembly and the conditions annexed to the grant.
The words of the grant are positive and plain. They purport to convey to him a present and immediate interest. And the grant was not made merely to carry out the colonization policy of the government, but in consideration of the previous public ar.d patriotic services of the grantee. This inducement is carefully put forth in the title papers. And, although this cannot be regarded as a money consideration, making the transaction a purchase from the government, yet it is the acknowledgment of a just and equitable claim.; and, when the grant was made on .that consideration, the title in a court of equity ought to be as firm and valid as if it had been purchased with money on the same conditions.
It is argued -that the description is so vague and uncertain that nothing passed by the grant; and that he had no vested interest until the land was surveyed, and the part intended to be granted severed by lines or known boundaries from the public domain. But this objection cannot be maintained. It is true, that if any other person within the limits where the quantity granted to Alvarado was to be located, had afterwards obtained a grant from the government, by specific boundaries, before Alvarado had made his survey, the title of the. latter grantee could not be impaired by any subsequent survey of Alvarado. As between the individual claimants from the government, the title of the party who had obtained a grant for the specific land would be the superior and better one. For, by the general grant to Alvarado, the government did not bind itself to. make no other grant within the territory described, until after he had made his survey. But, as between him and the government, he had a vested interest in the quantity of land mentioned in the grant. The right to so much land, to be afterwards laid off by official authority, in the territory described, passed from the government to him by the execution of the instrument granting it.
[559]*559This principle of law was maintained by the decision of this court, in the case of Rutherford v. Greene’s Heirs, reported in 2 Wheat. 196. 'The State, of North Carolina, in 1780, passed an act reserving a certain tract of country to be appropriated to its officers and soldiers; and in 1782, after granting 640 acres in the territory reserved to each family that had-previously settled on it, and appointing commissioners to lay off, in one or more tracts, the land allotted to the officers and soldiers, proceeded to enact that 25,000 acres of land should be allotted for and given to Major-General Nathaniel Greene, his heirs and assigns, within the bounds of the lands reserved for the use of the army, to be laid off by the aforesaid commissioners, as a mark of the high sense the State entertained of the extraordinary services of that brave and gallant officer.”
In pursuance of this law, the commissioners allotted 25,000 acres of land to General Greene, and caused the tract to be surveyed and returned to the proper ¡office. The manner in which the title originated under which Rutherford claimed, is not very clearly stated in the case. The .decision turned altogether on the validity of the title of .General Greene, and the date at which it commenced. And the court said, that the general gift of 25¡000 acres lying in the territory reserved, became, by the survey, a particular gift of the 25,000 acres contained in the survey. And, after examining the title very fully, the court-in conclusion say: “ It is clearly and unanimously the opinion of the court, that the act of 1782 vested a title in General Greene to 25,000 acres of land, to be laid off within the boundaries allotted to the officers and soldiers, and that the survey made in pursuance of that act, and returned March 3,1783, gave precision to that title, and attached it to the land surveyed.”
There was a further objection taken to the title of General Greene, upon the ground that, by the constitution of North Carolina, there should .be a seal of the State to be kept by the governor and affixed to all grants. And it was objected, that this grant by the legislature had not the formality required by the constitution to pass the estate, But in answer to this, the court said that this provision was intended for the completion and authentication of an instrument attesting a title previously created by law. That it was merely the evidence of prior legal appropriation, and not the act of the original appropriation itself. .
The principles decided in this case appear to the court to be conclusive as to the legal effect of the grant to Alvarado. It recognizes as a general principle of justice and municipal law, that such a grant for a certain quantity of land by'the government, tó be afterwards surveyed and laid off within a certain [560]*560territory, vests in the grantee, a present and immediate interest. In the language of the court, the general gift becomes a particular gift when the survey is made; and when this doctrine has been asserted in this court, upon the general principles which courts of justice apply to such grants from the public to an individual, good faith requires that the same doctrine should be applied to grants made by the Mexican government, where a controversy arises between the United States and the Mexican ■grantee.
The act that the grant to General Greene was made by an act of assembly, did not influence the decision; nor did the court allude to it as affecting the question. It is the grant of the State, whether made by a special law of the legislature, or by the public officer authorized to make it.
Another objection has been made, upon the ground that the 8th article of the regulations of 1828 requires what is called a definite grant, signed by the governor, to serve as a title to the party interested, wherein it must be stated that the said grant is made in exact conformity with the provisions of the laws, in virtue whereof possession shall bfe given; and it is argued that no title passed until this definite grant was obtained. But this document is manifestly intended as the evidence that the conditions annexed to the grant have all been complied with. It is not required in order to give him a vested interest, but to show that the estate, conveyed by the original grant upon certain conditions, is no longer subject to them ; and that he has become definitely the owner, without any conditions annexed to the continuance of his estate. It is like the patent required by the laws of North Carolina after the original grant to General Greene, which the court said was for the completion and authentication of an instrument attesting a title previously created by law; and, lilve the case of General Greene, Alvarado had a vested interest without it.
Regarding the grant to Alvarado, therefore, as having given him a vested interest in the quantity of land therein specified, we proceed to inquire whether there was any breach of the conditions annexed to it, during the continuance of the Mexican authorities, which forfeited Ms right and revested the title in the government.
The main objection on this ground is the omission to take possession, to have the land surveyed, and to build a house on it, within the time limited in the conditions. It is a sufficient answer to this objection to say, that negligence in respect to these conditions and others annexed to the grant does not, of itself, always forfeit his right. .It subjects the land to be denounced by another, but the conditions do not declare the land [561]*561forfeited to the State, upon the failure of the grantee to perform them.
The chief object of these grants was to colonize and settle the vacant lands. The grants were usually made for that purpose, without any other consideration, and without any claim of the grantee on the bounty or justice of the government. But the public had no interest in forfeiting them even in these cases, unless some, other person desired, and was ready to occupy them, and thus carry out the policy of extending its settlements. They seem to have boen intended to stimulate the grantee to prompt action in settling and colonizing the land, by making it open to appropriation by others, in case of his failure to perform therfr. But as between him and the government, there is nothing in the language of the conditions, taking them all together, nor in their evident object and policy, which would justify the court in declaring the land forfeited to the government, where no other person sought to appropriate them, and their performance had not been unreasonably delayed; nor do we find any thing in the practice and usages of the Mexican tribunals, as far as wc can ascertain them, that would lead to a contrary conclusion.
Upon this view of the subject, we proceed to inquire whether there has been any unreasonable delay, or want of effort, on the part of Alvarado to fulfil the conditions ? For if this was the case,, it might justly be presumed, as in the Louisiana and Florida concessions, that the party had abandoned his claim, before the Mexican power ceased to exist, and was now endeavoring to resume it, from the enhanced value under the government of the United States.
The petition of Alvarado to the governor is dated February 23,1844; and, after passing through the regular official forms requir d by the Mexican law, the grant was made on the 29th of the same month. According to the regulations for granting lands, it was necessary that a plan or sketch of its lines and boundaries should be presented with the petition; but, in the construction of these regulations, the governors appear to have exercised a discretionary power to dispense with it under certain circumstances. It was not required in the present instance. The reason assigned for it in the petition was, the difficulty of preparing it, the land lying in a wilderness country, on the confines of the wild Indians. This reason was deemed by the governor sufficient, and the grant issued without it; and in deciding upon the velidity of a Mexican grant, the court could not, without doing injustice to individuals, give to the Mexican íaws a more narrow and strict construction than they received from the 'Mexican authorities who were intrusted with their execution. It is the duty of the court to protect rights obtained under them, [562]*562which would have been regarded as vested and valid by the Mexican authorities. And as the governor deemed himself authorized, under the circumstances, to dispense with the usual plan, and his decision, in this respect, was sanctioned by the other officers intrusted with the execution of the law, it must ' be presumed that the power he exercised was lawful, and that the want of a plan did not invalidate the grant. The fact that the country where the land was situated was such a wilderness, and bordered by such dangerous neighbors, that no plan could then be prepared, is proved by these, documents; and that fact, officially admitted, is worthy of consideration, when we come to the inquiry whether there was unreasonable delay in taking possession. For, by dispensing with the plan or draft, on that account, which was a condition precedent, it may justly be inferred that the conditions subsequent were not expected by the governor to be performed, nor their performance intended to be exacted, until the state of the country would permit it to be done with some degree of safety.
Now, it is well known that Mexico, and California as a part of it, had, for some years before, been in a disturbed and unsettled state, constantly threatened with insurrectionary and revolutionary movements; and in this state of things, the uncivilized Indians had become more turbulent, and were dangerous to the frontier settlements, which were not strong enough to . resist them. It is in proof that this state of things existed in the Mariposas valley when this grant was made; that it was unsafe to remain there without a military force; and that this continued to be the case until the Mexican government was overthrown by the American arms. In the very year of the grant, a civil war broke out in the province, which ended by the expulsion of the Mexican troops ; and Colonel Fremont entered California at the head of an American force, in 1846, and the country was entirely subdued, and under the military government of the United States, in the beginning of 1847, and continued to be so held until it was finally ceded to the United States under the treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo. In February, 1847, while California was thus occupied by the American forces, Alvarado conveyed to Colonel Fremont.
Now, it is very clear, from the evidence, that during the continuance of the Mexican power it was impossible to have made a survey, or to have built a house on the land, and occupied it for the purposes for which it was granted.- The difficulties which induced the governor to dispense with a plan when he made the- grant, increased instead of diminishing. We have stated them very briefly in this opinion, but they are abundantly and in more detail proved by the testimony in -the [563]*563record. Nobody proposed to settle on it, or denounced the grant for a breach of the conditions. And at the time when the Mexican authorities were displaced by the American arms, the right which Alvarado had obtained by the original grant remained vested in him, according to the laws and usages of the Mexican government, and remained so vested when the dominion and control of the government passed from Mexico to the United States. The same causes which made it impossible to take possession of the premises and obtain a survey, made it equally impracticable to obtain the approval of the departmental assembly. The confusion and disorder of the times prevented it from holding regular meetings. It is doubtful whether it met more than once after this grant was made ; and its proceedings, from the state of the country, were necessarily hurried, and the assembly too much engrossed by the public dangers to attend to the details of private interests. It does not appear that the governor ever communicated this grant to the assembly. At all events, they never acted on it. And the omission or inability of the public authorities to perform their duty, cannot, upon any sound principle of law or equity, forfeit the property of the individual to the State. It undoubtedly disabled him from obtaining what is called a definitive title, showing that all the conditions bad been performed; but it could not devest him of the' right of property he had already acquired by the original grant, and revest it in the State.
And certainly no delay is chargeable to Alvarado or Fremont after California was subjected to the American arms. The civil and municipal officers, who continued to exercise their functions afterwards, did so under the authority of the American government. The alcalde had no right to survey the land or deliver judie' ai possession, except by the permission of the American authorities. He could do nothing that would in any degree affect the rights of the United States to the public property; and the United States could not justly claim the forfeiture of the land for a breach of these conditions, without showing that there were officers in California, under the military government, who were authorized by a law- of congress to make this survey, and deliver judicial possession to the grantee. It is certain that no such authority existed after the overthrow of the Mexican government. Indeed, if it had existed, the principles decided in the case of Arredondo, 6 Pet. 745, 746, would furnish a satisfactory answer to the objection.
Two other objections on the part of the United States to the confirmation of this title remain to be noticed. The first condition annexed to the grant prohibits the grantee from selling, alienating, or mortgaging the property, or subjecting it to taxes, [564]*564entail, or any other incumbrances. And by the laws of Mexico, the grantee could not, it is said, sell or convey the land to any one but a Mexican citizen, and that Fremont was not a Mexican citizen at the time of the conveyance under which he claims.
, In relation to the first objection, it is evident from the disturbed state and frequent revolutions in the province, that there was some irregularity in the conditions annexed to grants, and that conditions appropriate to one description of grant, from clerical oversight, or some other cause, were sometimes annexed to others. This is manifestly the case in the present instance; for this «condition is in violation of the Mexican laws, and could not, therefore, be legally annexed to this grant. For by the decree of the Mexican congress of August 7,1823, all property which had been at any time entailed, ceased to be so from the 20th.of September, 1820, and was declared to be and continue absolutely free; and no one in future was. permitted to entail it. And the prohibition in the 13th article of the regulations of 1824, to transfer property in mortmain, necessarily . implies that it might be aliened and transferred in any other manner.
But if this condition was valid by the laws of Mexico, and if any conveyance made by Alvarado would have forfeited the land under the Mexican government as a breach of this condition, or if it would have been forfeited by a conveyance to an alien, it does not by any means follow that the same penalty would be incurred-by the conveyance to Fremont.
California was at that time in possession of the American forces, and held by the United States as a conquered country, subject to the authority of the American government. The Mexican- municipal laws, which were then administered, were administered under the authority of the United States, and might be repealed or abrogated at their pleasure; and any Mexican law inconsistent with the rights of the United States, or its public policy, or with the rights of its citizens, were annulled by the conquest. Now, there is no principle of public law which prohibits a citizen of a conquering country from purchasing property, real or personal, in the territory thus acquired and held; nor is there any thing in the principles of our government, in its policy or its laws, which forbids it. The Mexican government, if it had regained the- power, and it had been its policy to prevent the alienation of real estate, might have treated the sale by Alvarado as a violation of its laws; -but it becomes a very different question when the American government is called on to execute the Mexican law. And it can ■hardly be maintained that an American citizen, who makes á [565]*565contract or purchases property under such circumstances, can be punished" in a court of the United States with the penalty of forfeiture, when there is lio law of congress to indict it. The purchase was perfectly consistent with the rights and duties of Colonel Fremont, as an American officer and an American citizen; and the country in which he made the purchase was, at the time, subject to the authority and dominion of the United States.
Still less can the fact that he was not a citizen of Mexico impair the validity of the conveyance. Every American citizen who was then in California had at least equal rights with the Mexicans ; and any law of the Mexican nation which had subjected them to disabilities, or denied to them equal privileges, were necessarily abrogated without a formal repeal.
In relation to that part of the argument which disputes his right, upon the ground that his grant embraces mines of gold or silver, it is sufficient to say that, under the mining laws of Spain, the discovery of a mine of gold or silver did not destroy the title of the individual to the land granted. The only question before the court is the validity of the title. And whether there be any mines on this land, and, if there be any, what are the rights of the sovereignty in them, are questions which must be decided in another form of proceeding, and are not subjected to the jurisdiction of the commissioners or the court, by the act of 1851.
Some difficulty has been suggested as to the form of the survey. The law directs that a survey shall be made, and a plat returned, of all claims affirmed by the commissioners. And as the lines of this land have not been fixed by public authority, their proper location may be a matter of some diffir culty. Under the Mexican government, the survey was to be made or approved by the officer of the government, and the party was not at liberty to give what form he pleased to the grant. This precaution was necessary, in order to prevent the party from giving it such a form as would be inconvenient to the adjoining public domain, and impair its value. The right which the Mexican .government reserved to control this survey passed, with all other public rights, to the United States; and the survey must now be made under the authority of the United States, and in the form and divisions prescribed by law for surveys in California, embracing the entire grant in one tract.
Upon the whole, it is the opinion of the court that the claim of the petitioner is valid, and ought to be confirmed. The decree of the district court must, therefore, be reversed, and the case remanded, with directions to the district court to enter a decree conformably to this opinion.
[566]*566Mr. Justice CATliOM and Mr. Justice CAMPBELL dissented.