Freeman v. Matson

41 N.W.2d 249, 230 Minn. 261, 1950 Minn. LEXIS 611
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedFebruary 17, 1950
Docket35,018
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 41 N.W.2d 249 (Freeman v. Matson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Freeman v. Matson, 41 N.W.2d 249, 230 Minn. 261, 1950 Minn. LEXIS 611 (Mich. 1950).

Opinion

Knutson, Justice.

This is an action by the special administrator of the estate of William D. Fletcher, deceased, to recover damages for wrongful death alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant Hall M. Matson in the operation of an automobile owned by defendant Henry Matson, which collided with one driven by Fletcher. Plaintiff recovered a verdict, and this appeal is from an order denying an alternative motion for judgment or a new trial.

On September 14, 1946, at about 12:15 a. m., William D. Fletcher was driving his automobile west on Forty-second street in the city of Minneapolis. Portland avenue runs north and south and intersects Forty-second street at approximately right angles. When Fletcher approached Portland avenue, he came to a complete stop at the stop sign east thereof. He then proceeded slowly into the intersection, and when about one-half or two-thirds of the way across he was struck by an automobile being driven in a northerly direction without lights and at a rate of speed of about 50 to 60 miles per hour. Defendants’ automobile, driven by Hall M. Mat-son, came over to the left side of the street, struck the Fletcher car on the left front, glanced off the front of it, and proceeded for about 150 feet before it came to a stop. Hall was drunk at the time. The court instructed the jury that Hall was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, and he does not question that instruction.

Fletcher suffered no visible bruises, lacerations, or other outward signs of physical injury. The testimony shows that he was *263 pale, Ms speech incoherent, that he exhibited nervousness and was confused, and that he was perspiring, although it was a cool evening. He was seen rubbing his left arm. He stayed in the car until a truck came for it, and then went home. He seemed to be exhausted and could not sleep. He asked his wife to rub his arm.

Prior to the accident, Fletcher had exhibited good health. He worked daily as a salesman, was interested in sports such as golf, and made no complaints about any ailments. After the accident, he had 12 to 15 spells in which he perspired and was shaky. He had difficulty sleeping and breathing. He gave up all sports, and, while he returned to work, he had his son drive his car for him. He died on October 24, 1946.

There is no dispute on the part of anyone that Fletcher died from coronary sclerosis or a thrombosis. The condition of his heart as disclosed by the autopsy is best described by the doctor who took part in the autopsy, as follows:

“The heart weighs 400 grams. It has a thinned-out right ventricle wall. The left myocardium is thicker; it has a fibrosis of its wall. At some points the-wall of the ventricle is only one millimeter thick. The right coronary is almost completely closed in spots by sclerosis, whereas the left-hand anterior descending is 75 per cent closed by sclerosis. No thrombi are found in the coronaries. There is a mural thrombus present at the apex of the left ventricle. The root of the aorta shows a moderate sclerosis. The mitral valve has a thickened nodular border.”

It is the contention of plaintiff that the shock incident to the accident brought about injuries to Fletcher’s heart which aggravated the existing condition of his heart and was the exciting or immediate cause of death. Defendants contend that decedent’s heart was in such condition that he would have died irrespective of the accident and that, at best, the opinions of the doctors are so speculative and conjectural that a verdict based thereon cannot stand.

*264 The court refused to submit the contributory negligence of Fletcher to the jury. The questions presented for our determination are:

(1) Was it error to refuse to submit to the jury the question of the contributory negligence of decedent?

(2) Does the evidence sustain the verdict that the death was caused or contributed to by the accident?

We need waste no time on the question of contributory negligence. The decedent did all that he was required to do. He came to a complete stop. Thereafter, he proceeded cautiously through the intersection and was struck when more than halfway through by an automobile being driven without lights at midnight by a drunken driver, obviously trying to scoot in front of the Fletcher car at a high rate of speed. We have no difficulty in holding that the court was correct in refusing to submit the question of contributory negligence to the jury.

The next question is more troublesome. Three reputable doctors, two of whom have specialized in heart diseases, testified that in their opinion the accident brought about shock, which in turn caused injuries to the heart, leading progressively to a weakened condition of the heart, which brought about death. Dr. Eobert B. Potter explained his opinion thus:

“He had essentially negative past history; he had had no attacks that we could find in his history. Suddenly he has a severe shock. That shock, as you just mentioned, is sufficient to bring on an angina attack and the angina attack cuts down the circulation to the heart and damages the heart. Therefore, the next time it will take less exertion or excitement to bring pain in or damage to the heart. .Therefore he was nervous after the accident, which evidenced a decreased circulation. This brought on more heart damage, progressively weakened and damaged the heart muscle, until finally the coronary plugged up completely, in other words, sufficiently to give him an infarct in the heart muscle.”

*265 As to whether decedent would have died had he not been in the accident, Dr. Potter testified as follows:

“Q. Having in mind the extent of this man’s two coronaries— and there are only two?
“A. Yes.
“Q. —were obstructed by sclerosis, isn’t it a fact that he couldn’t possibly have gotten along without many, many attacks of angina before this accident ever happened?
“A. Not possibly because he did get along.
“Q. Do you believe that a man can have his coronaries obstructed to the extent that his two were and not have angina attacks long before the accident happened?
“A. I don’t see how he could stand much exertion, but we do see some terribly closed and they still get around without any trouble.”

Dr. Reuben Berman had this explanation of his opinion:

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Bluebook (online)
41 N.W.2d 249, 230 Minn. 261, 1950 Minn. LEXIS 611, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/freeman-v-matson-minn-1950.