Freeman v. Gerretts

153 S.W. 1163, 1912 Tex. App. LEXIS 1395
Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided June 12, 1912·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

KEY, C. J.

This is a personal injury suit, which resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $15,000, and the defendant has appealed. The plaintiff’s petition charged that the defendant was guilty of negligence in failing to exercise proper care to furnish and maintain a brake beam in reasonably safe condition for appellee’s use as a brakeman upon one of the defendant’s cars. *1164 The defendant pleaded a general denial, assumed risk, and contributory negligence.

11] Appellant has assigned no error upon the charges given, and only two as to the refusal of requested instructions. One of the requested instructions referred to was a peremptory charge to find for the defendant, and the other made contributory negligence an absolute defense and a bar to any recovery, which is not now the law in this class of cases. In 1909 the Legislature enacted this law: “That in all actions hereafter brought against any such common carrier or railroad, under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this act, to recover damages for personal injuries to an employé, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employé may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employé,” etc. Supp. Sayles’ Civ. Stat. 1910, p. 400. This law was in force when the plaintiff in this case was injured, and was embodied in the court's charge; but appellant contends that it should not apply, for the reason that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law. While we do not hold that appellee was guilty of such negligence, still, if he was, we see no reason why that fact would take the case out of the purview of the statute quoted. The defendant was a common carrier, and the plaintiff was his employé, which brings the case within the class covered by the statute, and the statute declares, in plain and unmistakable language, “that in all actions,” which fall within that class, the fact that the employé may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery. Under the plain and obvious purport of the statute, it is immaterial whether the 'employé is guilty of negligence as matter of law or fact. In truth, the distinction referred to is of little importance except as to questions of procedure. Hence we hold that no error was committed in refusing to give the requested instruction referred to.

All the other assignments are based upon the alleged insufficiency of the testimony to show liability, or upon the contention that if liability was shown, the amount of damages awarded was excessive.

The proof shows that on the 8th day of April, 1910, the defendant, as receiver, was operating what is known as the International & Great Northern Railroad; that the plaintiff was employed by him as a brakeman on a train running between Mart and Bryan, Tex. Among other things, the plaintiff testified as follows:

“On the morning of the 8th day of April, 1910, I was working on a local freight train] I was head brakeman. The train started out on the 8th day of April, 1910, from Mart, Tex., at about 8:15. Its destination was Bryan. It ran in a southerly direction from Mart, Tex., to Bryan, Tex. The train was made up at Mart. The car started out from Mart that morning, the car upon which I was hurt. Mart is a terminal on the line of' the International & Great Northern Railroad Company. I was hurt at about 9:30. I left Mart, Tex., at about 8:15. I was injured near McGlanahan, which is 12 miles from Mart, south thereof. My train did work that morning at McClanahan station. * * * There were orders given with reference to the work I was doing. * * * The conductor gave these orders to pick up four cars at the spur. "We moved south at that time, about two trains’ length. Then we flagged down and went back and cut off four cars and signaled the fireman to go ahead. We cut these cars off behind the engine; that is, the four cars. I did the uncoupling myself; then I flagged the fireman ahead, and I grabbed the ladder on the left side and rode to the switch, and then I got off and walked across the track and flagged the engine down and opened the switch; I mean the spur switch, which was the switch to that track. That was the track upon which these four cars were sidetracked. I threw it so that we could back those cars into the spur track to pick up those other four cars. The train had to move north when you backed those four cars against the four cars on the spur track. It had to back north. After I threw the switch, the next thing I did was to flag the engine and give them a slow back-up signal. It was responded to by the engineer backing up very slowly. In carrying out the directions of the conductor and the switchman, I noticed both couplings — on the cars that were in the train and on the car that was on the spur. Both knuckles being closed, it became my duty to open one of them so they would be able to couple.

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Freeman v. Gerretts, 153 S.W. 1163, 1912 Tex. App. LEXIS 1395 (Tex. Ct. App. 1912).

153 S.W. 1163 (Freeman v. Gerretts) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Williams
160 S.W. 639 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1913)