Freeman v. District of Columbia Department of Human Services

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: May 11, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-3846
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ ) CONSTANCE FREEMAN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 25-cv-03846 (APM) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, ) ) Defendant. ) _________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Plaintiff Constance Freeman brings various claims against her employer the

D.C. Department of Human Services. Compl., ECF No. 1. 1 Defendant moves to dismiss the

complaint in its entirety. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss the Compl., ECF No. 7. The court provided

notice to Plaintiff of the potential consequence of not opposing the motion, Order, ECF No. 8,

but she did not respond. The court treats the motion as conceded, LCvR 7(b); Cohen v. Bd. of

Trs. of the Univ. of D.C., 819 F.3d 476, 480 (D.C. Cir. 2016), but it also addresses the merits,

see Cohen, 819 F.3d at 481–82 (expressing concern about treating an unopposed motion to

dismiss as conceded).

First, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act and

the D.C. Human Rights Act because she fails to plausibly allege that she has a qualifying

disability. See Humphries v. Newman, No. 18-cv-2936 (JMC), 2022 WL 612657, at *5 (D.D.C.

Mar. 2, 2022), aff’d, No. 22-7043, 2022 WL 3449226, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2022) (affirming

1 The court treats the complaint as if were brought against the District of Columbia. dismissal for failure to plead disability). Plaintiff alleges that she has a “mental disability” but

no more. Compl. at 4. Such a bare-boned pleading is not sufficient to plausibly establish that

she has a “mental [disability] that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”

See Humphries, 2022 WL 612657, at *5 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)).

Second, Plaintiff has not pleaded a claim for retaliation. She has only alleged that the

ADA coordinator twice did not respond to her request to meet. See Compl. at 5. She has not,

however, alleged that she was subject to any adverse action by her employer due to her exercise

of rights under the statute. Solomon v. Vilsack, 763 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (setting forth

elements of ADA retaliation claim).

Third, Plaintiff fails to assert a claim under the D.C. Protecting Pregnant Workers

Fairness Act, D.C. Code § 32-1231.01. She nowhere alleges that she was denied reasonable

accommodation “related to pregnancy, childbirth, related medical conditions, or breastfeeding,”

id. § 32-1231.03(1). See generally Compl.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, ECF No. 7, is

granted without prejudice. See Cohen, 819 F.3d at 484. A separate final order accompanies this

Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: May 11, 2026 Amit P. Mehta United States District Judge