Freedom Roofing, Windows & Siding, L.L.C. v. Jomaa

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

SANDUSKY COUNTY

Freedom Roofing, Windows & Siding, Court of Appeals No. S-25-044 LLC

Appellee Trial Court No. 25 CV 654 v.

Kaleb Jomaa, et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT Appellant Decided: August 25, 2026

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Andrew R. Mayle, Richard R. Gillum, Benjamin G. Padanilam, and Nichole K. Papageorgiou, for appellee.

Peter A. Dewhirst, and Lacey Riley, for appellant.

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SULEK, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Kaleb Jomaa, appeals a judgment of the Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas granting appellee, Freedom Roofing, Windows & Siding, LLC’s motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining him from breaching the noncompete agreement entered into between the parties. Because the judgment granting the preliminary injunction is not a final appealable order, the appeal is dismissed.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In October 2023, Freedom, a residential and commercial roofing, windows, and siding company, hired Jomaa as a project estimator. In February 2024, Freedom promoted Jomaa to Director of Sales. That Fall, looking to expand to other geographic locations Freedom’s Expansion Committee discussed implementing a noncompete agreement for top level management, including Jomaa. Jomaa was a member of the Expansion Committee and was present during discussions involving the time restriction and geographic radius of the noncompete. On October 21, 2024, Jomaa signed the agreement, which stated that its purpose was to “protect the Company’s legitimate business interests and confidential information.” The agreement precluded Jomaa from post-employment competition with Freedom for a period of nine months and within “50 miles of any operating Freedom Roofing, Windows, and Siding location[.]”

{¶ 3} In February 2025, Jomaa requested unpaid leave due to “heightened anxiety.” Returning to work after 30 days, Freedom assigned him the job title of Branch Sales Manager. The job had fewer responsibilities, though his compensation and bonus potential remained unchanged. Jomaa resigned on March 17, 2025.

{¶ 4} Approximately two weeks following his resignation, Salinas Construction and Repairs, LLC employed Jomaa in a sales position. It is undisputed that Salinas is a direct competitor of Freedom and their operations are within 50 miles of each other.

{¶ 5} Following unsuccessful cease and desist letters, on July 15, 2025, Freedom commenced this action against Jomaa, Salinas Construction, and Salinas’ “founder and proprietor” Kevin Salinas raising two claims. Against Jomaa, Freedom alleged that he breached the noncompete agreement and as to Salinas Construction and Salinas, that they tortiously interfered with the noncompete agreement by willfully ignoring its terms. Freedom requested that the trial court enjoin Jomaa from breaching the noncompete terms for nine months, minus the time between his resignation and employment with Salinas. As to Salinas Construction and Salinas, Freedom requested they be enjoined from employing Jomaa.

{¶ 6} Jomaa filed an answer and raised the counterclaims of hostile work environment and constructive discharge. In essence, Jomaa attributed his anxiety and panic disorder diagnoses to the working conditions at Freedom and claimed that he had to resign to protect his mental health. Salinas Construction and Salinas filed a separate answer generally denying the claims.

{¶ 7} Freedom moved to dismiss Jomaa’s counterclaim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), contending that his hostile work environment claim was insufficient because he failed to allege that he was part of a protected class and that constructive discharge is not an independent cause of action. Opposing the motion, Jomaa argued that Freedom discriminated against him based on his mental health status and that he asserted his constructive discharge claim in conjunction with the hostile work environment claim. He requested leave to amend his counterclaim to set forth his protected class status.

{¶ 8} Freedom also moved for a preliminary injunction requesting that the court enforce the terms of the noncompete during the pendency of the case. Jomaa opposed the motion and the court held a hearing on October 6, 8, and 30, with the parties submitting post-hearing memoranda. On November 20, 2025, the trial court granted the preliminary injunction noting that “the terms of the non-compete provisions [are] reasonable in scope, duration, and geographical limitation” and ordered that “[b]ased on the continuous nature of the violation of the non-compete the duration shall commence upon the issuance of this Order.”

{¶ 9} This appeal followed.

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 10} Jomaa raises three assignments of error on appeal:

I. The trial court committed reversible error when it granted Plaintiff/Appellee’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.

II. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to meet the specificity requirements of Civ.R. 65(D) in its November 20, 2025, Decision, Judgment Entry.

III. The trial court committed reversible error when [it] did not require any security in its November 20, 2025, Decision, Judgment Entry.

III. Analysis

{¶ 11} Jomaa’s assignments of error relate to the trial court’s order granting Freedom’s motion for a preliminary inunction pending final determination on the merits of the appeal. Freedom first contends, however, that the appeal should be dismissed because the order was not final and appealable. We agree.

{¶ 12} Under Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, a trial court’s judgment can be immediately reviewed by an appellate court only if it constitutes a “final order” in the action. Taxiputinbay, LLC v. Put-in-Bay, 2021-Ohio-191, ¶ 7 (6th Dist.), citing Deyerle v. City of Perrysburg, 2004-Ohio-4273 (6th Dist.), ¶ 3. If, however, a trial court’s order is not final, then an appellate court does not have jurisdiction to review the matter, and the matter must be dismissed. Id., citing Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20 (1989).

{¶ 13} A preliminary injunction is considered a provisional remedy, R.C.

2505.02(A)(3), and is generally not appealable unless it meets the following criteria under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4):

(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:

...

(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of the following apply:

(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.

(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.

See Doe v. Columbus, 2026-Ohio-1095, ¶ 11-12.

{¶ 14} Under the first prong, R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(a), an appealing party must show that “there was no further opportunity to petition the court for the remedy being sought, and there existed nothing further for the trial court to decide with respect to the provisional remedy.” (Cleaned up.) Id. at ¶ 14. The preliminary injunction granted in this case facially satisfies this prong as there is nothing further for the trial court to decide with respect to it. However, because Freedom claims that Jomaa continues to violate the terms of the noncompete, it is uncertain what additional actions may be taken by the trial court.

{¶ 15} Next, under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b), an appealing party must also demonstrate that by waiting until a final judgment is issued as to all claims and parties, the party would be denied a meaningful or effective remedy. This requirement acknowledges that there are certain exceptions to the substantial interest in avoiding piecemeal litigation. Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic, 2016-Ohio-8000, ¶ 22.

{¶ 16} In Preterm-Cleveland v. Yost, 2022-Ohio-4540 (1st. Dist.), the First Appellate District identified three classes of caselaw interpreting the “meaningful or effective remedy” requirement including:

(1) cases holding that a preliminary injunction does not meet the standard of R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b) when the plaintiff ultimately seeks a permanent injunction; (2) cases recognizing that preservation of the status quo generally fails to satisfy the requirements of finality; and (3) cases illustrating the “unringing” of the bell concept.

Id. at ¶ 17.

{¶ 17} Here, as to the first class of caselaw, Freedom’s complaint sought temporary, preliminary, or permanent injunctive relief preventing Jomaa from working for Salinas or any company that would violate the terms of the noncompete. The noncompete is, however, by its nature limited in duration.

{¶ 18} The second class of caselaw involves the appealability of injunctions issued to preserving the status quo during litigation. In Quinlivan v. H.E.A.T. Total Facility Solutions, Inc., 2010-Ohio-1603, ¶ 5 (6th Dist.), this court observed:

“[C]ourts have found that “‘a preliminary injunction which acts to maintain the status quo pending a ruling on the merits is not a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02.’” Hootman [v. Zock], 2007-Ohio-5619, at ¶ 16, quoting E. Cleveland Firefighters, IAFF Local 500 v. E. Cleveland, 8th Dist. No. 88273, 2007-Ohio-1447, ¶ 5; Deyerle v. Perrysburg, 6th Dist. No.

WD-03-063, 2004-Ohio-4273, ¶ 15. Although ‘status quo’ has apparently not been defined by the General Assembly or by Ohio courts in the context of preliminary injunctions, the Supreme Court of Illinois has held that ‘[t]he status quo to be preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last, actual, peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.’

Postma v. Jack Brown Buick, Inc. (1993), 157 Ill.2d 391, 193 Ill.Dec. 166, 626 N.E.2d 199, 202. The holdings of cases decided in Ohio courts evince a similar precedent for determining the status quo. See Hootman, 2007-Ohio-

5619, at ¶ 17 (finding that the trial court was maintaining the status quo by ordering parties to remove an obstruction from a drainage ditch pursuant to a preliminary injunction order); Neamonitis v. Gilmour Academy, 8th Dist.

No. 92452, 2009-Ohio-2023, ¶¶ 11-12 (finding that the trial court was maintaining the status quo by ordering a school, via temporary restraining order, to reinstate a student it had expelled, and then granting preliminary injunction indefinitely extending the temporary restraining order); but, see, Neamonitis, 2009-Ohio-2023, at ¶ 22 (Kilbane, P.J., dissenting).”

See Taxiputinbay at ¶ 17-19 (taxi company’s last uncontested status prior to enactment of the amended ordinance was operating licensed taxi cabs and the injunction allowing the company to continue operating the taxicabs preserved the status quo); All Foils, Inc. v. Kulik, 2026-Ohio-2534, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).

{¶ 19} Where a noncompete agreement is involved, the status quo is maintained where the preliminary injunction prevents a defendant from violating the noncompete obligations. Medpace Inc. v. ICON Clinical Research, LLC, 2023-Ohio-4552, ¶ 29 (1st Dist.). In Medpace, the employer sought a permanent injucnction against competitors, recruiters, and former employees of a research facility relating to an alleged breach of the employees’ noncompete agreement. The trial court entered a cease-and-desist order pending litigation. Id. at ¶ 4. The defendants appealed the order. Id. at ¶ 6-7.

{¶ 20} The appellate court first determined that the order was a preliminary injunction, though labeled otherwise and, thus, a provisional remedy under R.C. 2505.02(A)(3). The court then observed that

[a]n order maintaining the status quo returns the parties to their last legally uncontested status. Here, Medpace claims that Defendants are tortiously interfering with its contractual and business relationships by coaching its employees on how to breach their contractual obligations to Medpace (among other things). Therefore, the order returns the parties to the status quo by preventing Defendants from “hiring, soliciting, and/or recruiting Medpace Inc.’s employees” subject to active noncompete obligations. The trial court likewise described its order as “intended to maintain the status quo among the parties during the pendency of this litigation.” Although the trial court’s label is not dispositive, we agree that the function of this preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo, which further militates against a conclusion that the order is final and appealable.

Id. at ¶ 29.

{¶ 21} Here, as in Medpace, the last peaceable status is the period prior to Jomaa breaching the noncompete agreement with Freedom which he helped draft and signed. This preserves “the contractual rights of the party who argued that its rights were infringed upon during the pendency of the litigation.” Id. at ¶ 32.

{¶ 22} Finally, in the third category of cases courts recognize that an order may be final and appealable if “‘the proverbial bell cannot be unrung.’” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting State v. Muncie, 91 Ohio St.3d 440, 451 (2001). “Ohio courts have generally limited this inquiry to ‘situations that would irreparably change the party’s position between provisional remedy and final judgment.’” Id., quoting Preterm-Cleveland, 2022-Ohio- 4540, at ¶ 24. These types of cases generally include the potential release of confidential information or trade secrets, or involve personal liberty interests such as the forced administration of medication. Id., citing Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Levin, 2008-Ohio- 6197 and Muncie.

{¶ 23} Rejecting the “unringing of the bell” argument the Medpace court noted:

Defendants’ alleged harm falls outside the scope of this inquiry. While they insist that the trial court’s order prevents people from seeking greener employment pastures elsewhere, the individuals at hand all signed noncompetition agreements and any restriction on their ability to consider other employment is temporary in nature. Nothing irretrievable will be lost, nor will anything irreversible transpire. Yes, if the preliminary injunction is ultimately reversed, certain parties will be negatively impacted during the period between the preliminary injunction and appellate vindication. But this is the case with any preliminary injunction (which is exactly why courts impose bond requirements). Therefore, this strand of Ohio caselaw does not provide a pathway to immediate appellate review.

{¶ 24} Id. at ¶ 27. See Wells Fargo Ins. Serv. USA, Inc. v. Gingrich, 2012-Ohio-

677 (12th Dist.) (preliminary injunction not a final order where the company presented no evidence that money damages at the conclusion of the case would not provide sufficient compensation for any loss).

{¶ 25} As in Medpace, the “bell cannot be unrung” argument is not persuasive under these facts. The noncompete’s restriction on Jomaa’s reemployment is of a limited duration and recompense for any loss or damages is available. Moreover, Jomaa has counterclaims pending which may provide for additional damages.

{¶ 26} Because Jomaa’s assignments of error are based on a nonfinal order, they are moot and not well-taken.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 27} Upon due consideration, Jomaa’s appeal of the Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas’ judgment granting a preliminary injunction is dismissed for lack of a final appealable order. Pursuant to App.R. 24, Jomaa is ordered to pay costs.

Judgment dismissed

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Gene A. Zmuda, J.

JUDGE

Charles E. Sulek, J.

JUDGE

Juergen A. Waldick, V.J.1 CONCUR. JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

1 Judge Juergen A. Waldick, Third District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.