Fredrikson v. Penzone

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided August 28, 2023·No. 2:23-cv-01370·Unknown

Opinion

1 MDR 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Leslie Fredrikson, No. CV-23-01370-PHX-JAT (DMF) 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Paul Penzone, 13 Defendant.

15 Pro se Plaintiff Leslie Fredrikson, who is confined in a Maricopa County Jail, filed 16 a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to 17 Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). The Court will grant the Application to Proceed and 18 will dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend. 19 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee 20 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28 21 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915(b)(1). The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $33.17. The remainder 23 of the fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income 24 credited to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 25 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate 26 government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 3 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 4 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 5 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 6 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 7 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 8 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 9 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 10 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 11 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 12 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 13 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 14 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 15 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 16 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 17 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 18 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 19 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 20 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 21 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 22 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 23 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 24 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 25 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 26 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 27 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 28 . . . . 1 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 2 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 3 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 4 Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but because it may 5 possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave to amend. 6 III. Complaint 7 In her one-count Complaint, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendant 8 Maricopa County Sheriff Paul Penzone. Plaintiff alleges she has been denied her Eighth 9 Amendment rights because of “[i]nadequate housing[] due to neglect of the housing.” She 10 claims the “Building” has been “condemned” since 2017 and Defendant Penzone “pays the 11 fines in order to continue housing inmates.” Plaintiff asserts there is “[b]lack mold” “all 12 throughout the building” and in the showers, drinking water, and toothpaste. She contends 13 Defendant “refuses to acknowledge black mold symptoms.” Plaintiff alleges she has 14 suffered “inadvertent nose bleeds,” sinus congestion, and “emotional, physical, mental 15 tort.” 16 IV. Failure to State a Claim 17 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 18 520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 19 v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a liberal interpretation of a 20 civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 21 pled. Id. 22 To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a 23 specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link 24 between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 25 371-72, 377 (1976). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore, 26 a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s 27 constitutional rights does not impose liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 28 (1978); Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, 2 a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own 3 individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 4 A pretrial detainee has a right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 5 Amendment to be free from punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt. Bell v. Wolfish, 6 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). “Pretrial detainees are entitled to ‘adequate food, clothing, 7 shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.’” Alvarez-Machain v.

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