Fredricks v. Whittingham

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided December 5, 2022·No. 1:22-cv-04248·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK NIGEL FREDRICKS, Plaintiff, 22-CV-4248 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD PHILLIP WHITTINGHAM, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Auburn Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that, while he was detained at Rikers Island, Defendant Phillip Whittingham, a mental health doctor, violated his rights. By order dated August 8, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff sixty days’ leave to replead to file an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this complaint using the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York’s form civil rights complaint. He handwrites his responses on the form complaint and includes five additional handwritten pages. Plaintiff’s handwriting is difficult to read, and the Court is therefore unable to discern fully Plaintiff’s allegations and the claims he seeks to assert. To the extent that the Court can decipher Plaintiff’s handwriting, he appears to allege that in 2018, when he was released from Sing Sing Correctional Facility, Plaintiff was informed that

he had to report to Mount Sinai Hospital for mental health treatment. Plaintiff asserts that he complied and met with his psychiatrist. After several appointments, Plaintiff’s diagnosis was changed from “antiosocail [sic] to P.T.S.D. or major depression.” (ECF No. 2 at 6.) Plaintiff was arrested on a new charge on August 1, 2019, and he was detained at Rikers Island. While there, Plaintiff learned that at some unspecified time, Defendant Dr. Whittingham had changed his mental health records to reflect “cannabis abuse” as Plaintiff’s diagnosis. (Id. at 7.) A review of this court’s records reveals that on March 2, 2021, Plaintiff filed an action in this court seeking to hold accountable “Doctor Mrs. Ho,” a doctor with the Mental Health Unit at the George R. Vierno Center on Rikers Island, for the alleged incorrect diagnosis of cannabis abuse disorder in his medical records. See Fredricks v. Whittingham, ECF 1:21-CV-1855, 2

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2021). Plaintiff also alleged that the medical staff at Rikers Island failed to properly communicate with him regarding his mental health treatment. Id. By order dated June 17, 2021, the Court: (1) noted that Plaintiff’s handwritten statement in that case was difficult to read; (2) dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Ho and another named defendant; and (3) determined that Plaintiff failed to state an inadequate mental health care claim. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to state a claim. ECF 1:21-CV-1855, 10. On August 2, 2021, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming Dr. Whittingham as the sole defendant and reiterating the same facts as in his original complaint. ECF 1:21-CV-1855, 13. By order dated September 20, 2021, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s amended complaint for his failure to state an inadequate mental health care claim against Dr. Whittingham. ECF 1:21-CV- 1855, 16. DISCUSSION Although the facts from which Plaintiff’ s claims arose are not clearly stated, he appears to seek to hold Dr. Whittingham liable for the alleged incorrect diagnosis of cannabis abuse

disorder in his medical records again and to express his dissatisfaction with the mental health treatment he received when he was detained at Rikers Island. Plaintiff appears to allege substantially similar facts as alleged in the complaint he filed in this court last year. Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time the events giving rise to his claims occurred, the Court evaluates his claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. To state a medical claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts suggesting that (1) his medical conditions are sufficiently serious (the “objective element”), and (2) correctional staff acted with at least deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions (the “subjective element”). See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). For the objective element, a pretrial detainee “must show that the conditions, either alone

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