Fredricks v. Shaheen

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: July 16, 2025
• Docket: 22-2480
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

22-2480 Fredricks v. Shaheen

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16th day of July, two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, STEVEN J. MENASHI, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

Nigel Fredricks,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 22-2480

Correction Officer John Shaheen, #5258, individually and in their official capacities; Correction Officer John Richards, #18595, individually and in their official capacities; Andrew Henry, Correction Officer; Alexis Parrilla, Assistant Deputy Warden; Duayne John, Assistant Deputy Warden; Omar Smith, Captain; Travis Richards,

Defendants-Appellees,

Captain Officer John Doe, individually and in their official capacities; Captain or Deputy John Doe; Captain John Smith, #1651, individually and in their official capacities; Correction Officer John Doe, Post A, individually and in their official capacities; Deputy Officer John Doe, individually and in their official capacities,

Defendants. _____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Nigel Fredricks, pro se, Romulus, NY.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Jonathan A. Popolow, of counsel, for Muriel Goode-Trufant, Acting Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Torres, D.J.; Cott, M.J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the September 13, 2022, judgment is VACATED and this matter

is REMANDED to the District Court for further proceedings.

Nigel Fredricks, an incarcerated person proceeding pro se, brought this action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 asserting that defendants, all of whom are alleged to have

been employed as correctional workers at Rikers Island at the relevant time, violated his

First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. Specifically, Fredricks alleges that defendants

incited an attack on him by another inmate, failed to protect him from that attack, and/or

retaliated against him after he filed a grievance and a lawsuit related to that attack.

2 Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the Magistrate Judge issued a

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the motion be granted.

Having received no objections to the R&R, the District Judge reviewed it only for clear

error. See Miller v. Brightstar Asia, Ltd., 43 F.4th 112, 120 (2d Cir. 2022). The District

Judge adopted that recommendation 41 days later, granted summary judgment for

defendants, and closed the case. See Fredricks v. Parrilla, 1:20CV05738(AT)(JLC), 2022

WL 4227077 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2022). Fredricks now appeals from that decision.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted and

drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. See Capitol Recs., LLC v. Vimeo,

Inc., 125 F.4th 409, 418 (2d Cir. 2025). We conclude that a confluence of factors here

deprived Fredricks of a meaningful opportunity to oppose summary judgment.

Specifically, he was not provided with notice regarding the nature of summary judgment

and his obligations in responding to a summary judgment motion, as our precedent

requires. This error was further compounded by Fredricks’s failure to receive adequate

notice pertaining to the R&R, apparently as a result of court confusion about his mailing

address.

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining facts, the procedural history,

and the issues on appeal, which we discuss only as necessary to explain our decision to

vacate and remand.

3 I. Notice Regarding Obligations in Responding to Summary Judgment Motion

“It is well established that a court is ordinarily obligated to afford a special

solicitude to pro se litigants.” Rosa v. Doe, 86 F.4th 1001, 1007 (2d Cir. 2023) (citation

and quotation marks omitted). This is particularly true in the context of summary

judgment, where, as we have recognized, “it is not obvious to a layman that when his

opponent files a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits he must file his

own affidavits contradicting his opponent’s if he wants to preserve factual issues for

trial.” Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 620 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and

quotation marks omitted). We therefore require district courts “to apprise pro se litigants

of the consequences of failing to respond to a motion for summary judgment,” and failure

to provide such notice “is ordinarily grounds for reversal.” Id. (citation and quotation

marks omitted).

To ensure that appropriate notice is given, the Southern District of New York has

adopted a Local Rule requiring: “Any represented party moving for summary judgment

against a party proceeding pro se must serve and file as a separate document, together

with the papers in support of the motion, [a] ‘Notice To Pro Se Litigant Who Opposes a

Motion For Summary Judgment’ with the full texts of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and Local Civil

Rule 56.1 attached.” S.D.N.Y. Loc. Civ. R. 56.2. The required Notice is set forth,

verbatim, in the Local Rules. The version in effect in 2022, when the motion for

summary judgment was filed in this case, informed the pro se opposing party of the

nature of a summary judgment motion, and warned, in relevant part:

4 THE CLAIMS YOU ASSERT IN YOUR COMPLAINT MAY BE DISMISSED WITHOUT A TRIAL IF YOU DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS MOTION ON TIME by filing sworn affidavits and/or other documents as required by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by Local Civil Rule 56.1. ... In short, Rule 56 provides that you may NOT oppose summary judgment simply by relying upon the allegations in your complaint. Rather, you must submit evidence, such as witness statements or documents, countering the facts asserted by the defendant and raising specific facts that support your claim. If you have proof of your claim, now is the time to submit it. Any witness statements must be in the form of affidavits. An affidavit is a sworn statement of fact based on personal knowledge stating facts that would be admissible in evidence at trial. You may submit your own affidavit and/or the affidavits of others. You may submit affidavits that were prepared specifically in response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

If you do not respond to the motion for summary judgment on time with affidavits and/or documents contradicting the material facts asserted by the defendant, the Court may accept defendant’s facts as true. Your case may be dismissed and judgment may be entered in defendant’s favor without a trial.

S.D.N.Y. Loc. Civ. R. 56.2 (effective Oct. 15, 2021, through July 1, 2024).

It is undisputed that defendants did not provide Fredricks with the required notice.

The R&R acknowledged that failure, but rather than holding the motion in abeyance until

proper notice could be given, the Magistrate Judge concluded “that Fredricks understood

that he was required to produce evidence opposing the motion” because “Fredricks

responded to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with opposition briefing, a

Rule 56.1 Statement, and supporting exhibits.” Doc. 121 at 15. 1 It is correct that a

failure to provide the required notice to “a pro se litigant as to the nature of summary

1 Documents filed on the Southern District of New York docket in case number 1:20CV05738 are cited herein as “Doc. [docket entry number] at [page number].”

5 judgment” does not constitute reversible error if “the record otherwise makes clear that

the litigant understood the nature and consequences of summary judgment.” McPherson

v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 281 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted). But

the record here is insufficient to make clear that Fredricks understood his obligations

under the relevant rules.

Notably, Fredricks did not file a document that was specifically designated as

being his response to the summary judgment motion. Rather, he filed several letters

indicating that he believed there was still discovery outstanding. See, e.g., Docs. 98, 99,

101, 110, 111. While he filed a document entitled “Notice of Motion for Summary

Judgment in Reply to Defendant’s Counsel Pursuant to Rule 56 of Civil Procedure Rules

of Federal (S.D.N.Y.),” Doc. 105 (capitalization and spelling altered), that one-page

document made no argument and attached no exhibits. He filed a document entitled a

motion for summary judgment, but that attached only a copy of a prison grievance he

filed, and again, no affidavit. See Doc. 106. Fredricks did file a declaration suggesting

that he was providing evidence in opposition to summary judgment but failed to attach

the proposed exhibits to this declaration. Compare Doc. 104 at 2 (stating that included

exhibit is “true and correct copy of plaintiff interrogatory”) with id. at 4–8 (suggesting no

such document included). In any event, none of these submissions shows that Fredricks

“understood summary judgment in the way required by McPherson and Vital.”

Hernandez v. Coffey, 582 F.3d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 2009).

6 Fredricks also filed a document entitled “Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Material

Facts in Reply to the Opposite Motion for Summary Judgment,” but it lists only nine

statements, none of which responds directly to any of the ninety-six statements of fact

asserted in the defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement. Doc. 107 (capitalization and spelling

altered); see also Doc. 90. In the absence of the required notice, a court could not

conclude from such a defective submission that Fredricks understood the scope of his

obligation in responding to defendants’ motion. “[T]he mere fact that the pro se litigant

has made some response to the motion for summary judgment is not dispositive where

neither his response nor other parts of the record reveal that he understood the nature of

the summary judgment process.” McPherson, 174 F.3d at 281 (citation and quotation

marks omitted). In sum, the record does not support a conclusion that, despite failing to

receive the required notice, Fredricks “understood the nature of [defendants’] summary

judgment motion and the consequences of not properly opposing it.” Sawyer v. Am.

Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO, 180 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1999). As we have stated, “in

the absence of explicit notice, the mere existence of a response does not automatically

give rise to the inference that a pro se litigant understood the nature of a summary

judgment motion.” Id. Here, “the nature of the papers” Fredricks filed “and the

assertions made therein” do not demonstrate an understanding of summary judgment.

Vital, 168 F.3d at 621. Accordingly, the lack of notice was not harmless, and this matter

must be remanded to permit Fredricks to oppose summary judgment after receiving the

required notice.

7 II. Fredricks’s Opportunity to Object to the R&R

That conclusion is reinforced by further concerns about the adequacy of the notice

sent to Fredricks regarding events leading to the entry of summary judgment.

Throughout this litigation, Fredricks regularly communicated with the District Court,

including by filing over a dozen separate notices of change of address. See, e.g., Docs.

7, 20, 54, 56, 60, 64, 84, 87, 117. On April 19, 2022, Fredricks filed his final formal

address update in the District Court, indicating that he was then incarcerated at a facility

in Elmira. See Doc. 117. In June 2022, however, Fredricks submitted documents

showing a return address at a correctional facility in Auburn. The District Court appears

to have taken note because, on June 30, 2022, the S.D.N.Y. Clerk’s Office sent materials

to Fredricks at the Auburn address. See Doc. 120.

The R&R issued on August 3, 2022; however, the District Court mailed it to

Fredricks on Thursday, August 4, 2022, at the Elmira address. 2 On August 16, 2022, the

Clerk’s Office docketed a letter from Fredricks seeking an extension of time to file

objections to the R&R. See Doc. 122. That letter was dated August 11 by Fredricks;

postmarked (from Auburn) August 12; and received by the Clerk’s Office on August 15.

See id. On Thursday, August 18, 2022, the District Court granted Fredricks an extension

of time to object to the R&R through and including August 25, 2022. See Doc. 123. That

order was mailed to Fredricks at the Elmira address on Friday, August 19, 2022. Even if

2 The “Mailing Receipt,” docketed without a number, appears between docket entries 121 and 122.

8 it had been mailed to the right address (Auburn), it appears unlikely that Fredricks would

have received it and have been able to respond within only six days.

The District Judge’s order adopting the R&R was issued on September 13, 2022,

and mailed to Fredricks at the Elmira address on September 14, 2022; the Judgment was

mailed to Fredricks at the Elmira address on September 15, 2022. Four days later – likely

before either the R&R or judgment arrived at Elmira, let alone reached Fredricks in

Auburn – Fredricks wrote a letter to the District Court dated September 19, 2022,

requesting “a second extension of time on the report-recommendation.” Doc. 126. This

suggests that he was unaware the R&R had been adopted and judgment issued. Indeed,

in his Notice of Appeal filed September 28, 2022, Fredricks stated that he had been

“oblivious” that his first request for an extension of time to object “was ever granted.”

Doc. 127.

This record suggests that Fredricks had reason to think that the District Court had

his correct mailing address (in Auburn) as of June 2022, despite his failure to file a

formal address change. He failed to receive notice of significant court actions after that

time, however, because the Court mailed such notices to Elmira. The lack of notice

regarding the Court’s actions resulted in Fredricks’s failure to file an objection to the

R&R, which was therefore adopted by the District Judge without de novo review. This

9 compounds the error arising out of the failure to provide Fredricks with notice of the

nature of summary judgment. 3

III. Conclusion

We conclude from the totality of the circumstances described that Fredricks was

not afforded a meaningful opportunity to oppose defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. The “opportunity to be heard plays an important role in establishing the

fairness and reliability of” court orders, Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir.

1999), and Fredricks was not afforded that opportunity here. We offer no view on the

merits of the summary judgment motion; it may well be that on remand, Fredricks is

unable to establish a genuine dispute of material fact sufficient to permit this matter to

proceed to trial. But he is entitled to the opportunity to try.

Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the District Court and REMAND this

matter for further proceedings in accordance with this Order.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

3 On this record, we also reject defendants’ argument that Fredricks waived appellate review by failing to object to the R&R.