USCA4 Appeal: 25-1391 Doc: 30 Filed: 03/05/2026 Pg: 1 of 7
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-1391
FREDIS RUBEN ORTEZ REYES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES; UR M. JADDOU, in her official capacity as Director of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services; TED H. KIM, in his official capacity as the Associate Director of Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate of USCIS; KIMBERLY ZANOTTI, in her official capacity as the Director of the USCIS Washington Field Office,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Rossie David Alston, Jr., District Judge. (1:24-cv-00711-RDA-IDD)
Argued: December 11, 2025 Decided: March 5, 2026
Before GREGORY, QUATTLEBAUM, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Quattlebaum and Judge Berner joined.
ARGUED: Joseph David Moravec, BLESSINGER LEGAL, PLLC, Falls Church, Virginia, for Appellant. Christian James Cooper, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Eileen P. Blessinger, Jessica A. Dawgert, BLESSINGER LEGAL, PLLC, Falls Church, Virginia, for Appellant. USCA4 Appeal: 25-1391 Doc: 30 Filed: 03/05/2026 Pg: 2 of 7
Erik S. Siebert, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellees.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1391 Doc: 30 Filed: 03/05/2026 Pg: 3 of 7
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
This case raises the jurisdictional question of whether courts have authority to
review the decision of an immigration judge that is based exclusively on a matter of
statutory interpretation. This question is not new. In accordance with our past holdings
and the holdings of the Supreme Court, we hold that courts do retain this authority.
I.
Plaintiff Fredis Ortez Reyes is a native of Honduras and an asylee in the United States.
He is married to Gloria Magaly Estrada Moreno (“Ms. Estrada”) and has been married since
January 28, 2005. Ms. Estrada had previously been removed from the United States when
she was seized after crossing the border in 2014. In 2020, Ms. Estrada returned to the United
States with her husband, who sought asylum. Ms. Estrada was ineligible to seek asylum
herself because of her previous removal. She did seek withholding of removal and protection
under the Convention Against Torture. In January 2020, an immigration judge granted Mr.
Ortez asylum but denied Ms. Estrada’s request for withholding of removal, which requires
the applicant to meet a higher burden to show a fear of future persecution. Ms. Estrada’s
appeal of that decision is now before the Board of Immigration Appeals.
In the meantime, Ms. Estrada’s husband filed a Form I-730 petition for Ms. Estrada
to receive derivative asylee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). On July 25, 2023,
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denied the I-730 petition
on the basis that Section 241(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), or 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (“Section 1231(a)(5)”), bars any form of relief for noncitizens who
3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1391 Doc: 30 Filed: 03/05/2026 Pg: 4 of 7
have prior orders of removal, such as Ms. Estrada. The USCIS decision treats Section
1231(a)(5) as the dispositive and exclusive reason for its denial of the I-730 petition.
Ms. Estrada’s husband challenged USCIS’s decision in federal district court. He
contends that the USCIS was incorrect to apply Section 1231(a)(5) when making its
eligibility determination on the I-730 petition, which is governed separately by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(3)(A).
The District Court did not reach the merits of the complaint, instead dismissing it
on jurisdictional grounds. Specifically, the District Court recognized that the INA provides
that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review” any “decision or action of the Attorney
General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under
this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland
Security.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Because the statutory language governing I-730
petitions does give USCIS the discretion to deny or approve such applications, the District
Court determined that the USCIS’s I-730 denial was an exercise of discretion which federal
courts lack authority to review.
Ms. Estrada’s husband now appeals the jurisdictional issue. The question before
this Court is whether the USCIS’s decision to apply Section 1231(a)(5) to a petition raised
under Section 1158(b)(3)(A) is an exercise of discretion that falls beyond the review of the
court. Per longstanding precedent, it is not.
4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1391 Doc: 30 Filed: 03/05/2026 Pg: 5 of 7
II.
The INA strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review “any judgment regarding the
granting of relief under” an enumerated list of types of relief. 8. U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) to “preclude[] judicial review
of factual findings that underlie a denial of discretionary relief—including when those
findings are ‘threshold requirements established by Congress’ to access the relevant
discretion.” Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 604 U.S. 6, 18–19 (2024) (quoting Patel v. Garland,
596 U.S. 328, 332 (2022)). We applied this reasoning in Shaiban v. Jaddou to hold that
Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review “any other
decision or action . . . the authority for which is specified . . . to be in the discretion of the
Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security,” similarly precludes judicial
review of factual findings underlying decisions to grant or deny discretionary relief. See
97 F.4th 263, 267 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1046 (2025) (discussing Patel,
596 U.S. 328).
We are now tasked with deciding whether Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes
judicial review of a decision to deny discretionary relief where the decision was based
solely on the USCIS’s interpretation of the INA. We hold that it does not. Pure decisions
of law, such as the one at issue here, fall outside of the scope of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s
command.
In determining whether jurisdiction properly lies, we must “look at the particular
decision being made and [] ascertain whether that decision is one that Congress has
designated to be discretionary.” Mejia Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 562 F.3d
5 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1391 Doc: 30 Filed: 03/05/2026 Pg: 6 of 7
1137, 1143 (11th Cir. 2009). Although Section 1158(b)(3)(A) confers discretion to USCIS
to approve or deny I-730 petitions, see Lin v. Heffron, No. 22-1380, 2023 WL 566343 (4th
Cir. Jan. 27, 2023), in this case the USCIS’s decision was not an exercise of that discretion
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
USCA4 Appeal: 25-1391 Doc: 30 Filed: 03/05/2026 Pg: 1 of 7
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-1391
FREDIS RUBEN ORTEZ REYES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES; UR M. JADDOU, in her official capacity as Director of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services; TED H. KIM, in his official capacity as the Associate Director of Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate of USCIS; KIMBERLY ZANOTTI, in her official capacity as the Director of the USCIS Washington Field Office,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Rossie David Alston, Jr., District Judge. (1:24-cv-00711-RDA-IDD)
Argued: December 11, 2025 Decided: March 5, 2026
Before GREGORY, QUATTLEBAUM, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Quattlebaum and Judge Berner joined.
ARGUED: Joseph David Moravec, BLESSINGER LEGAL, PLLC, Falls Church, Virginia, for Appellant. Christian James Cooper, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Eileen P. Blessinger, Jessica A. Dawgert, BLESSINGER LEGAL, PLLC, Falls Church, Virginia, for Appellant. USCA4 Appeal: 25-1391 Doc: 30 Filed: 03/05/2026 Pg: 2 of 7
Erik S. Siebert, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellees.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1391 Doc: 30 Filed: 03/05/2026 Pg: 3 of 7
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
This case raises the jurisdictional question of whether courts have authority to
review the decision of an immigration judge that is based exclusively on a matter of
statutory interpretation. This question is not new. In accordance with our past holdings
and the holdings of the Supreme Court, we hold that courts do retain this authority.
I.
Plaintiff Fredis Ortez Reyes is a native of Honduras and an asylee in the United States.
He is married to Gloria Magaly Estrada Moreno (“Ms. Estrada”) and has been married since
January 28, 2005. Ms. Estrada had previously been removed from the United States when
she was seized after crossing the border in 2014. In 2020, Ms. Estrada returned to the United
States with her husband, who sought asylum. Ms. Estrada was ineligible to seek asylum
herself because of her previous removal. She did seek withholding of removal and protection
under the Convention Against Torture. In January 2020, an immigration judge granted Mr.
Ortez asylum but denied Ms. Estrada’s request for withholding of removal, which requires
the applicant to meet a higher burden to show a fear of future persecution. Ms. Estrada’s
appeal of that decision is now before the Board of Immigration Appeals.
In the meantime, Ms. Estrada’s husband filed a Form I-730 petition for Ms. Estrada
to receive derivative asylee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). On July 25, 2023,
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denied the I-730 petition
on the basis that Section 241(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), or 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (“Section 1231(a)(5)”), bars any form of relief for noncitizens who
3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1391 Doc: 30 Filed: 03/05/2026 Pg: 4 of 7
have prior orders of removal, such as Ms. Estrada. The USCIS decision treats Section
1231(a)(5) as the dispositive and exclusive reason for its denial of the I-730 petition.
Ms. Estrada’s husband challenged USCIS’s decision in federal district court. He
contends that the USCIS was incorrect to apply Section 1231(a)(5) when making its
eligibility determination on the I-730 petition, which is governed separately by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(3)(A).
The District Court did not reach the merits of the complaint, instead dismissing it
on jurisdictional grounds. Specifically, the District Court recognized that the INA provides
that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review” any “decision or action of the Attorney
General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under
this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland
Security.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Because the statutory language governing I-730
petitions does give USCIS the discretion to deny or approve such applications, the District
Court determined that the USCIS’s I-730 denial was an exercise of discretion which federal
courts lack authority to review.
Ms. Estrada’s husband now appeals the jurisdictional issue. The question before
this Court is whether the USCIS’s decision to apply Section 1231(a)(5) to a petition raised
under Section 1158(b)(3)(A) is an exercise of discretion that falls beyond the review of the
court. Per longstanding precedent, it is not.
4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1391 Doc: 30 Filed: 03/05/2026 Pg: 5 of 7
II.
The INA strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review “any judgment regarding the
granting of relief under” an enumerated list of types of relief. 8. U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) to “preclude[] judicial review
of factual findings that underlie a denial of discretionary relief—including when those
findings are ‘threshold requirements established by Congress’ to access the relevant
discretion.” Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 604 U.S. 6, 18–19 (2024) (quoting Patel v. Garland,
596 U.S. 328, 332 (2022)). We applied this reasoning in Shaiban v. Jaddou to hold that
Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review “any other
decision or action . . . the authority for which is specified . . . to be in the discretion of the
Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security,” similarly precludes judicial
review of factual findings underlying decisions to grant or deny discretionary relief. See
97 F.4th 263, 267 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1046 (2025) (discussing Patel,
596 U.S. 328).
We are now tasked with deciding whether Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes
judicial review of a decision to deny discretionary relief where the decision was based
solely on the USCIS’s interpretation of the INA. We hold that it does not. Pure decisions
of law, such as the one at issue here, fall outside of the scope of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s
command.
In determining whether jurisdiction properly lies, we must “look at the particular
decision being made and [] ascertain whether that decision is one that Congress has
designated to be discretionary.” Mejia Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 562 F.3d
5 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1391 Doc: 30 Filed: 03/05/2026 Pg: 6 of 7
1137, 1143 (11th Cir. 2009). Although Section 1158(b)(3)(A) confers discretion to USCIS
to approve or deny I-730 petitions, see Lin v. Heffron, No. 22-1380, 2023 WL 566343 (4th
Cir. Jan. 27, 2023), in this case the USCIS’s decision was not an exercise of that discretion
but exclusively a matter of statutory interpretation. There was no consideration of Ms.
Estrada and her husband’s unique circumstances, nor the application of the Section
1158(b)(3)(A) guidelines and standards. Rather, USCIS had determined, without
discussion, that Section 1158(b)(3)(A) should be interpreted to incorporate the prohibitions
of Section 1231(a)(5). For this reason alone, USCIS denied the I-730 petition.
USCIS contends that this case should be treated akin to Shaiban v. Jaddou, where
we held that a threshold eligibility determination was within the discretionary authority
conferred by Section 1159(b) and thus fell within the scope of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)
jurisdiction stripping. 97 F.4th at 268. But Shaiban does not govern the question here. In
Shaiban, USCIS was determining whether the petitioner had engaged in terrorist activity
as a threshold eligibility issue for refugee status readjustment under Section 1159(b).
Although this determination involved a question of law regarding collateral estoppel, this
was ultimately a factual inquiry made under the explicit discretion that USCIS held to
determine eligibility. Id. at 268 (“USCIS under § 1159(b) applied a fact-bound estoppel
determination, which was subject to the overarching discretionary determination.”). As
Shaiban recognized, such fact-bound inquiries are distinct from inherently legal questions
about the applicability of statutes. See id.
The issue here is a pure legal question of statutory construction: whether Section
1158(b)(3)(A) should be interpreted to incorporate the prohibitions of Section 1231(a)(5).
6 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1391 Doc: 30 Filed: 03/05/2026 Pg: 7 of 7
In this way, Ms. Estrada’s husband does not challenge “how the agency exercised its
discretion” but rather USCIS’s interpretation of the INA itself. See Shaiban, 97 F.4th at
268 (citing Moore v. Frazier, 941 F.3d 717, 724 n.6 (4th Cir. 2019)). Such a challenge to
the agency’s statutory interpretation “is entirely separate from other discretionary decisions
and involves a question of USCIS’s statutory authority” that falls outside the scope of
Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) jurisdiction stripping. Id. (contrasting Moore, 941 F.3d 717); see
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001) (explaining that Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)
strips courts of jurisdiction only to review “the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion”
and not “the extent of the Attorney General’s authority” which “is not a matter of
discretion”).
We hold that the district court had jurisdiction to review USCIS’s decision to deny
derivative asylum under Section 1158(b)(3)(A) because the agency’s decision was not an
exercise of discretion but rather turned on a legal interpretation of the statute. As both
parties requested at oral argument, we remand this case to the District Court to address the
merits of that question.
REVERSED AND REMANDED