Frederick v. Biden

• Court: District Court, S.D. New York
• Decided: August 28, 2023
• Docket: 1:23-cv-07094
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK NAOSI B FREDICK, Plaintiff, 23-CV-7094 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL JOE BIDEN, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Naosi B. Fredick (or Frederick)1 brings this action pro se. By order dated August 11, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. The Court dismisses the complaint for the reasons set forth below. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

1 Plaintiff spells his last name differently at different points in the complaint. original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings his claims using the court’s general complaint form. He names President

Joe Biden as the sole defendant. Plaintiff does not state the jurisdictional basis of his claims, nor does he state the constitutional or statutory basis of his claims. Plaintiff writes across the complaint form, “Arrest him[.] For the $20 million he stole [illegible] Twitter report. . . . Arrest him immediately and put him in a dirty jail.” (ECF 1, at 2.) Plaintiff states that his claims arose on “Earth,” and, in the facts section of the complaint, he alleges the following: “He stole $20 million when he make $400,000 [illegible] for free[.] Outrageous. Ugly crime[.] Ugly crime[.]” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff leaves blank the sections of the complaint asking him to describe his injuries and state the relief he is seeking. DISCUSSION The Court construes the complaint as a request to arrest and prosecute President Biden for an unspecified crime. Plaintiff cannot initiate the arrest and prosecution of an individual in this Court because “the decision to prosecute is solely within the discretion of the prosecutor.”

Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 87 (1981). Nor can Plaintiff direct prosecuting attorneys to initiate a criminal proceeding against Defendant, because prosecutors possess discretionary authority to bring criminal actions, and they are “immune from control or interference by citizen or court.” Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1972). Accordingly, the Court dismisses the action for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because the defects in Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court

declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. CONCLUSION The Court dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this action.

SO ORDERED. Dated: August 28, 2023 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge