Fred Riley Home Building Corp. v. Cosgrove

864 F. Supp. 1034, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15170, 1994 WL 566942
CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedAugust 19, 1994
DocketNo. 93-2313-KHV
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 864 F. Supp. 1034 (Fred Riley Home Building Corp. v. Cosgrove) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fred Riley Home Building Corp. v. Cosgrove, 864 F. Supp. 1034, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15170, 1994 WL 566942 (D. Kan. 1994).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NEWMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

This copyright infringement case was scheduled for a jury trial commencing August 1,1994. Prior to empaneling a jury, the defendants Charles Cosgrove and Traditional Homes, Inc., orally moved to dismiss the action arguing that all the copyright registrations of the plaintiffs were invalid and that plaintiffs Fred Riley Home Building Corporation and Bonnie’s Designs, Inc., were precluded from proceeding herein due to various settlement agreements and due to the satisfaction of a consent judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs on Count II. The court took the defendants’ motion under advisement.

A jury was then empaneled and evidence taken. Plaintiffs presented their evidence and rested. At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law, renewing their arguments previously made. The court took the motion under advisement.

The defendants presented their evidence and rested. At the close of the defendants’ case, defendants renewed their motions for judgment as a matter of law. The court took these motions under advisement.

Thereafter, plaintiffs requested leave to reopen their case, or in the alternative, to offer rebuttal evidence. The court overruled the plaintiffs’ motion after argument, but allowed the plaintiffs to make an offer of proof. After hearing the offer of proof, the court again denied the plaintiffs’ request to reopen their case. The court further found that the proffered evidence was not proper rebuttal and denied plaintiffs’ request to offer this evidence in rebuttal.

[1037]*1037After the court announced the issues to be submitted to the jury and made partial rulings on the motions for judgment as a matter of law, as stated on the record, the case was submitted to the jury on special questions. The court now formalizes its oral rulings on the motions for judgment as a matter of law and enters additional rulings on such motions. The court further enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law on plaintiffs’ requests for injunctive relief.

Applicable Law

To prove copyright infringement, two elements must be proven: 1) ownership of a copyright and 2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991).

It is well-established, as a general rule, that copyright ownership vests in the author of the work, that is, the person who creates the work or translates it into a fixed, tangible expression is entitled to copyright protection. There is an exception related to “work made for hire.” The employer of the person who prepares the work is the author and owns the copyright unless there is a written agreement to the contrary. When a work is classified as one “made for hire,” it determines not only the initial ownership of the copyright, but all rights under the Copyright Act, including rights to transfer the ownership of the copyright. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989).

The authors of a joint work are co-owners of the copyright in the work. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). A joint work is defined as a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or independent parts of a unitary whole. 17 U.S.C. § 101. Joint authorship requires that the respective contributions of each alleged joint author must be independently copyrightable and that the alleged co-authors intend, at the time of creation of the work, to regard themselves as co-authors. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir.1994); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir.1991); Ashton-Tate Corporation v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.1990).

Although a builder presents ideas and concepts to a designer who prepares the architectural plans and drawings, including sketches of concepts which become a part of the final plans and drawings, and retains approval authority thereafter, such participation is insufficient to establish a claim of co-authorship. A work is only created when it is fixed in a final work product. Ideas and concepts are not copyrightable. M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir.1990).

In order to be considered a derivative work under 17 U.S.C. § 103 the work must be recast, transformed or adapted from a pre-existing work. 17 U.S.C. § 101. To be copyrightable as a derivative work, it must be substantially different from the pre-existing work. The original aspects of the derivative work must be more than trivial. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.1976). The work must not consist of actual copying and must include more than mechanical copying. Fundamentally, the work must be the original product of the claimant. Batlin, id.; Durham Industries v. Tomy Corporation, 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.1980). Further, the copyright claimant the derivative work must have the consent of the holder of the copyright in the pre-existing work for the creation of the derivative work. Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir.1983). The creation of the derivative work may not be an infringement upon the pre-existing work from which it is derived. 17 U.S.C. § 103.

Transfer of ownership of a copyright is not valid unless it is evidenced by a writing signed by the owner of the rights conveyed. 17 U.S.C. § 204.

A certificate of registration of copyright constitutes prima facie evidence of validity of the copyright and the facts stated in the certificate. By presenting a registration certificate, a party establishes prima facie the validity of the copyright and the burden then shifts to the party challenging the copyright to dispute its validity. Once evidence is presented disputing the copy[1038]*1038right, the ultimate burden of proof of the validity of the copyright is with the party claiming under it. AutoSkill, Inc. v. National Educational Support Systems, Inc.,

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Bluebook (online)
864 F. Supp. 1034, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15170, 1994 WL 566942, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fred-riley-home-building-corp-v-cosgrove-ksd-1994.