Frazier v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford

287 N.W. 589, 66 S.D. 638, 1939 S.D. LEXIS 55
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 8, 1939
DocketFile No. 8246.
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 287 N.W. 589 (Frazier v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering South Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frazier v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, 287 N.W. 589, 66 S.D. 638, 1939 S.D. LEXIS 55 (S.D. 1939).

Opinion

ROBERTS, J.

The Travelers Insurance Company issued to Frederick H. Frazier a combined life and disability policy of insurance. The pertinent provisions of the policy are as follows:

“In accordance with the provisions for permanent Total Disability Benefits, and subject to the conditions thereof, the Company will pay to the Insured a monthly income of Fifty Dollars.

“Upon due proof that since the payment of the initial premium upon this contract, before a default in the payment of any subsequent premium, and before the anniversary of this contract nearest *640 to the sixtieth anniversary of the date of birth, the Insured has 'become wholly disabled 'by 'bodily injuries or disease and will be continuously and wholly prevented thereby for life from engaging in any occupation or employment for wage or profit, the Company will waive the payment of any premiums which ma)r fall due on this contract during such disability and will pay from the commencement of such disability and during its continuance the disability income stated on the first page of this contract. The premium so waived and the disability income so paid will not be deducted in any settlement hereunder.

“Independently of all other causes the Company will consider as permanent total disability the entire and irrevokable loss of the sight of both eyes, or of use of both hands or both feet, or of one hand and one foot.

“Pending due proof of a claim hereunder in behalf of the Insured that an existing total disability will be permanent and continue for life, when it shall appear that the Insured had been wholly disabled by 'bodily injuries or disease and has been prevented thereby from engaging in any occupation or employment for wage or profit for a period of not less than three consecutive months, the Company will grant the aforesaid benefits from the commencement of such disability and during its continuance.”

Plaintiff claims that he was totally and permanently disabled so as to be entitled to disability benefits under the terms of the policy by reason of an accident, occurring on May 8, 1923. Payments were made by the defendant company from the inception of the alleged injury until November, 1937. This action followed the refusal of the Company to1 continue the monthly payments. Defendant in its answer admits that plaintiff suffered an injury, but denies that he was totally or wholly disabled within the terms of the policy. The tidal resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff, and motion for new trial having been denied, defendant insurance company has appealed.

The appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to authorize a submission to the jury; that the evidence precludes a finding that plaintiff was wholly disabled and will be continuously and wholly prevented from engaging in any occupation or employment for wage or profit.

The evidence discloses that, prior to his injury, respondent *641 was employed on a ranch near Newcastle, Wyoming. Thrown by a horse, he sustained a fracture of the third cervical-vertebra. In January, 1924, eight months after the accident, respondent was examined by Dr. Geyerman who made the examination for the insurer. This witness testified: “An X-ray at that time of his neck showed he had sustained a fracture of the third cervical vertebra, the third one from the-base of the brain down in the neck. There was a fracture in that vertebra which I believe accounted for his condition at that time. His general condition was bad. I mean by that he was weak and that he suffered from a great deal of shock, shock to his nervous system, a condition that is known in medical terms as a traumatic neurosis, profound shock. His nervous condition was clearly discernible to me at that time. His mental condition seemed to be one which made him incapable of continuing on with any occupation by which he might earn a livelihood. I mean by that that the man was unable to continue with the kind of work he could do, the only kind of work he could do, for the reason that he wasn’t mentally able to do any more than very ordinary manual labor. I have never seen him at any time since then I thought he would be able to continue on with physical labor for any length of time. He might do a little work for a day or two or three, -but I never thought the man was able to- continue to make a living by manual labor. According to my records I examined him in 1925» I93I; I932 and 1936. He certainly hasn’t been any better since my first examination. I would say the man’s condition is probably worse after some years than it was in the beginning. I gave him an examination in March, 1936, at the request of the defendant. Then I examined him again in December, 1937, about the time this suit was commenced, at his request. His condition then was practically the same as it had been for some years previous. I never could find that the man -was any better as time went on. He seemed to be possibly drifting down hill gradually as the years went by. During the month of November, 1937, from that examination I would say he was unable to do any sustained amount of physical labor. He might be able to do a little occasionally. I think any amount of physical labor, he would be unable to do it, he just couldn’t keep it up. If he did it would affect his general condition. In my opinion he should not do any physical work of any kind to any extent. * * * I wouldn’t say that it *642 wasn’t possible for him to ride a tractor in 1935. I think if he rode a tractor for an}' great length of time, say a week or two, if he were able to ride it that long, he would suffer from it. In my opinion riding a tractor was something he should not have done.”

Dr. 'Cramer, who examined respondent in December, 1937, testified that in his opinion,the condition of respondent was such “that he could not follow any occupation for any length of time.”

There was offered in evidence by appellant to show that respondent was able to engage in an occupation or employment for wage or profit testimony that respondent in the fall of 1935 oper-, ated a tractor. There was testimony on behalf of respondent that he could not carry on the usual and ordinary activities of a farmer, and it could be reasonably inferred that he was not fitted for any other vocation. Respondent testified: “After the injury in 1923 I was never able to work. Have never done any work for any length of time. When on the farm was not able to do any chores or anything about the farm. Never did any of the work. AVas able to walk around. Never tried to do any work in the field or any work on the farm. I have attempted to put up hay and ride this tractor but found I not able to. That was in 1935. I had a -tractor and -hay-cutting outfit and attempted to drive the tractor in 1935. I wasn’t able to continue to drive it. At times I was able to drive an automobile. I experienced difficulty in driving it. After I tried to drive the tractor I had an awful pain down my ■back, across my neck, vomiting, I couldn’t stand the jolting. These spells would last a little ways; I would stop and rest and go a little ways again. That was the only way I could, ride a tractor and do anything with it. Couldn’t continute to- ride it. I finally quit trying. * * * In 1935 I didn’t cut hay for Stearns and on the Neisham place and for Wheeler. My tractor was used to cut it and also at the Cone place and the Petty place.

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Bluebook (online)
287 N.W. 589, 66 S.D. 638, 1939 S.D. LEXIS 55, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frazier-v-travelers-ins-co-of-hartford-sd-1939.