Frazier v. Employers Mutual Casualty Company

368 S.W.2d 955, 1963 Tex. App. LEXIS 2446
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 12, 1963
Docket11097
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 368 S.W.2d 955 (Frazier v. Employers Mutual Casualty Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frazier v. Employers Mutual Casualty Company, 368 S.W.2d 955, 1963 Tex. App. LEXIS 2446 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963).

Opinion

HUGHES, Justice.

This is a Workmen’s Compensation case in which the jury, having failed to agree upon answers to any of the special issues submitted to it, was discharged and judgment rendered, upon appellee’s Motion, that appellant, Nancy Carolyn Frazier, take nothing by her suit. Appellee, the insurance carrier, is Employers Mutual Casualty Company.

The basis of appellee’s motion for judgment was that there was no evidence to support a jury finding that appellant sustained an injury or an accidental injury on July 31, 1961, the date of the alleged injury, within the meaning of such terms as used in the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

The specific contention of appellee is that the disability of which appellant complains was brought on gradually by the nature of her work and her physical and emotional state which cannot be traced to any definite time or place.

We accept the following statement from Solomon v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company, 347 S.W.2d 17, San Antonio Civil Appeals, writ ref., as correctly reflecting the rule of law to be applied by us to the facts of this case:

“An industrial accident or accidental injury is distinguished from an occu *956 pational disease by the following characteristics: An industrial accident or accidental injury can always be traced to a definite time, place and cause, whereas an industrial disease is of slow and gradual development, and the time, place and cause thereof are not susceptible of definite ascertainment.”

There is no claim here for disability resulting from an occupational disease.

We will recite the facts fully, but as briefly as possible, to show the nature of and circumstances attending the illness or disability from which appellant suffered and continues to suffer.

Appellant was 29 years of age in 1962. She is divorced. She has a nine year old child. She is a high school graduate with two years training in a business college. After doing filing and secretarial work for several years, appellant was employed by radio station KNOW in Austin in 1957, where her employment continued until 1962 when she became unable to perform her duties as an employee.

During her first three years with KNOW as receptionist-secretary, appellant performed her duties satisfactorily and without difficulty. In 1960, she was assigned to and put in charge of “traffic.” In radio language this meant that she must arrange and “log,” or schedule, the material to be broadcast, fitting it to a second-by-second timetable. She had to type the finished “log.” The work was exacting; it increased her duties and responsibilities.

In July 1960, appellant experienced “tightness” in her neck. She consulted a physician who prescribed medication.

In October 1960, KNOW changed its broadcasting pattern with the result of an increase in its business. The “traffic” duties of appellant were doubled. She found it necessary to take work home with her at night. The pace of her work became faster. She was under more tension and pressure. This increased her anxiety. She became nervous.

In January 1961, appellant experienced more pain in her neck, and was unable to hold her head erect.

In June 1961, appellant took a two weeks vacation. Upon her return she found that her work had been disarranged by her replacement. This required extra work by appellant, and she was compelled to take home night work, and she had to work on some week ends.

About July 20, 1961, KNOW increased its daily broadcasting hours from 18 to 24. This added to appellant’s work.

During the week before Monday, July 31, 1961, appellant had not taken any work home with her because, “I had reached a point where I was so completely exhausted that I went home * * * and was in bed around 6:00 o’clock. I had to or I couldn’t have gotten up the next morning.” Appellant did not miss time from her work. She worked all day Saturday, July 29, and Sunday, July 30. She collapsed at her place of work shortly after noon Monday, July 31st. We quote appellant’s testimony concerning her collapse:

“Q What time of day was it, Mrs. Frazier?
“A It was between 1:15 and 1:20 p. m.
“Q During the day?
“A Yes.
“Q Where were you?
“A I was at the front reception desk at KNOW.
“Q That is the same KNOW that Mr. Cook has told us about; is that correct ?
"A Yes.
“Q What did occur specifically at that time, Mrs. Frazier?
“A It was my custom to go out on the front reception desk and relieve the girl who ordinarily stayed out there all day while she *957 went to lunch. She went to lunch from 12:30 to 1:30, and I was to take my work and go out there and answer the phone and take care of the desk while she was away, and do whatever I could on my work at that time. I was sitting there typing and answering the phone and just ordinary work. I was suffering a great deal of pain at the time.
“Q Where was this pain?
“A It was in my neck, and in my back, and in my arms.
“Q All right.
“A Approximately fifteen minutes until one, I would say around that time, I placed a call to Dr. Alexander. At this time he had me on some medicine. * * * I called Dr. Alexander, and I told him— I said, ‘I just can’t make it any longer, Dr. Alexander.’ At first he didn’t recognize my voice, and he said, ‘Is this you, Miss Frazier ?’ And I said, ‘Yes, it is.’ And he said, ‘What is wrong?’ And I said, ‘I am suffering death. 1 just can’t stand it any longer. I have either got to have some stronger medicine or I just can’t work.’ So he said, ‘All right; you go on home and go to bed, and we will put you in the hospital.’ I put down the receiver, and at this time I just fell down across my typewriter and my hands went up over the typewriter like this (inr dicating).
“Q Was your physical condition different after July 31st than it was prior to July 31st?,
“A Yes.
“Q In what regard?
“A It was this date that I lost complete control of my neck.
“Q Now, let me ask you this: In what way did you lose control of the muscles in your neck?
“A At the time I collapsed my neck went down on my chest like this, and I couldn’t get it up. * * *
“Q The stresses under which you worked exhausted you, and you finally collapsed; is that the idea?
“A Yes; I collapsed.
“Q I beg your pardon?
“A Yes; I collapsed.

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368 S.W.2d 955, 1963 Tex. App. LEXIS 2446, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frazier-v-employers-mutual-casualty-company-texapp-1963.