Franklin L. Williams v. J v. Flournoy
This text of Franklin L. Williams v. J v. Flournoy (Franklin L. Williams v. J v. Flournoy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Case: 16-14230 Date Filed: 05/01/2018 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 16-14230 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:16-cv-00048-LGW-RSB
FRANKLIN L. WILLIAMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
J. V. FLOURNOY,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia ________________________
(May 1, 2018)
Before JULIE CARNES, NEWSOM, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 16-14230 Date Filed: 05/01/2018 Page: 2 of 6
Franklin Williams, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 application for habeas relief, alleging that he was
denied a transfer to a minimum-security facility without due process. The district
court construed Williams’s application as a challenge to the validity of his
conviction or sentence and concluded that because Williams failed to satisfy 28
U.S.C. § 2255(e)’s savings-clause requirements, he was not entitled to relief under
Section 2241; accordingly, the court dismissed Williams’s application for lack of
jurisdiction. On appeal, Williams argues that his Section 2241 application
challenged the execution of his sentence.1
In a federal habeas proceeding under Section 2241, the applicability of
Section 2255(e)’s savings clause is “a threshold jurisdictional issue,” and the
savings clause “imposes a subject-matter jurisdictional limit” on Section 2241
applications. Samak v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 766 F.3d 1271, 1273
(11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). We review the applicability of Section 2255(e)’s
savings clause de novo. McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851
F.3d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Pro se pleadings are construed
liberally, Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), and
federal courts have “an obligation to look behind the label of a motion filed by a
1 Because Williams submitted two initial briefs in violation of the local rules, his second initial brief is stricken. We have not considered the arguments contained in the second brief. See 11th Cir. R. 28-1, I.O.P. 5. 2 Case: 16-14230 Date Filed: 05/01/2018 Page: 3 of 6
pro se inmate and determine whether the motion is, in effect, cognizable under a
different remedial statutory framework,” United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622,
624–25 (11th Cir. 1990).
Ordinarily, a federal prisoner may attack the validity of his conviction or
sentence by filing a motion under Section 2255. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Under
Section 2255(e)’s savings clause, a federal prisoner may seek relief through a
Section 2241 application only if the remedy provided under Section 2255 “is
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
As relevant here, relief available under Section 2255 may be inadequate or
ineffective if the defendant is challenging the execution (rather than the validity) of
his sentence. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1089, 1093.
Liberally construing Williams’s claims—as we must—his application
appears to contest the Bureau of Prisons’ refusal to transfer him to a minimum-
security prison camp. In dismissing Williams’s application for lack of jurisdiction,
the district court misconstrued his application as a challenge to the validity of his
conviction or sentence, and therefore erred in failing to recognize that his claim
was instead a challenge to the execution of his sentence. Despite this error, we
affirm the district court’s dismissal in this case because, even properly construed as
a challenge to the execution of his sentence, Williams’s application fails to state a
claim for relief under § 2241.
3 Case: 16-14230 Date Filed: 05/01/2018 Page: 4 of 6
In essence, in his execution-of-sentence claim, Williams asserts: (1) that he
is eligible for transfer to a minimum security prison camp; (2) that prison officials
denied his request for such a transfer, citing his history of threatening government
officials during his incarceration; and (3) that this denial violated his due process
rights because he was not given an opportunity to contest the alleged threats at a
hearing before being denied the transfer. Without more, however, this is merely a
garden-variety prison transfer claim that is insufficient to invoke the protections of
the Due Process Clause. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976).
As the Supreme Court has explained, “the Due Process Clause in and of
itself [does not] protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer from one
institution to another.” Id. at 225. Nor does it give him a right to transfer to a
particular institution of his choosing. See id. This is so because a defendant’s
valid conviction authorizes the government to “confine him and subject him to the
rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise
violate the Constitution.” Id. at 224. Thus, the fact “[t]hat life in one prison is
much more disagreeable than in another does not in itself signify that a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest is implicated when a prisoner is transferred to [or
denied a transfer from] the institution with the more severe rules.” Id. at 225.
Furthermore, “[i]t is well settled that the decision where to house inmates is
at the core of prison administrators’ expertise.” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39
4 Case: 16-14230 Date Filed: 05/01/2018 Page: 5 of 6
(2002). Indeed, prison officials generally “have the discretion to transfer prisoners
for any number of reasons.” Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228; see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3621(b) (providing that the Bureau of Prisons “may at any time . . . direct the
transfer of a prisoner” from one facility to another subject to considerations such as
the resources of the facility, the nature of the offense, and the history and
characteristics of the prisoner). Accordingly, the Supreme Court generally “has
not required administrators to conduct a hearing before transferring [or declining to
transfer] a prisoner.” McKune, 536 U.S. at 39.
Here, Williams’s claim amounts to an assertion that the facility in which he
is currently housed is “more disagreeable” than the minimum-security prison camp
to which he would like to be transferred. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225. That
allegation alone is insufficient to show a violation of Williams’s due process rights,
and it was well within the Bureau of Prisons’ discretion to deny Williams’s
requested transfer based on his prior threats against government officials. Id. at
225, 228; 18 U.S.C.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Franklin L. Williams v. J v. Flournoy, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/franklin-l-williams-v-j-v-flournoy-ca11-2018.