Home/M.D. Alabama/Frank v. Mracek

Frank v. Mracek

58 F.R.D. 365, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1261, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15385
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedJanuary 15, 1973
DocketCiv. A. No. 3855-N
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 58 F.R.D. 365 (Frank v. Mracek) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frank v. Mracek, 58 F.R.D. 365, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1261, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15385 (M.D. Ala. 1973).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

VARNER, District Judge.

This cause is now submitted upon the motions to dismiss of Defendants Thompson and McLaughin, filed December 20, 1972; of Defendant Mracek, filed December 26, 1972; and of Defendant Chambless, filed January 2, 1973.

The varying factual allegations of the complaint as to the various Defendants offer a rare opportunity to consider an apparent misunderstanding of the law relating to motions to dismiss as commented upon in the opinion, Cook & Nichol, Inc. v. Plimsoll Club (5th Cir. 1972), 451 F.2d 505.1 Hopefully, an opinion in this case will lead to some clarification of the problem of the sufficiency of so-called “barebones” pleadings in the somewhat conflicting lights cast thereon by the Supreme Court opinion of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80, 84 (1957), when construed in the light of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6).

This case is an example of a large volume of litigation now being filed by prisoners in custody of the State of Alabama authorities against various persons in authority who may be responsible for what has judicially been determined by this Court to be inadequate medical treatment of prisoners. Newman et al. v. State of Alabama (1972), U.S. District Court, MD Ala., 349 F. Supp. 278. The complaint, in pro se convict style, pleads for $75,000.00 from the four Defendants: Dr. Mracek, who is not referred to in the body of the complaint; Dr. Chambless, who is alleged to have treated the Plaintiff but whose conduct is not otherwise complained of; MTA McLaughin, who is alleged to have reported Plaintiff as a troublemaker and to have caused him to have been confined in solitary; and Warden Thompson, who is not mentioned in the body of the complaint.

A convict is especially vulnerable to requirements of nicety in pleading, but care must be taken in guaranteeing his equal protection, not to infringe the [367]*367equal protection of others. This Court is aware of the obvious hardship of denial of medical treatment over a period of many days to a person who has been shot. Proper allegations thereof by a convict against his custodian would state a violation of a constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment justiciable in federal courts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

This Court is equally aware of the possibility of harassment and hardship on public officials, the wardens, guards, official doctors, board members, and others in daily contact with convicts, of having to employ attorneys to represent them and to appear in court to answer vexatious and frivolous claims made by persons allowed to pursue their rights in forma pauperis with court-appointed attorneys. A public charge of incompetence in a doctor’s profession or in any man’s business is a serious matter, and the consequences thereof must not lightly be disposed of. The very act of being sued is considerable punishment to a responsible person, and while plaintiffs in forma pauperis proceedings have no responsibility for their claims, the defendants have responsibilities for attorneys’ fees and other costs of litigation, as well as for injuries to their reputations brought on by claims which may be fictitious. Laxity in pleading tends to increase the probability of bringing into court substantial people through fictitious claims. They may be subject to harassment and even nuisance value settlements by application of rules which require expensive and extensive discovery for relief to defeat apparently frivolous claims.

Presumably, with this in mind, the Supreme Court adopted, among others, the following rules of civil procedure:

“Rule 8(a). * * * A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief * * * shall contain (1) * * * (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. * * *
“Rule 12(b). * * * Every defense, * * * shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) * * * (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted •x- -x- *_ a motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted.”

The rule requires, at least, a statement of circumstances “showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”. Otherwise, it would appear that a motion to dismiss would lie.2

However, a prevalent rule often cited by the Supreme Court and various other appellate courts is the following:

“A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle [368]*368him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, supra, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. at 102, 2 L.Ed.2d at 84.

There can be no doubt that this rule is a well established principle of law. However, a blind allegiance thereto may well obviate the necessity of a formal complaint. It may be argued that the rule means that, unless the complaint negates a cause of action, a motion to dismiss thereto must be overruled.3 If this is true, the safe way to state a cause of action is to allege nothing at all or as little as possible so as to be assured that nothing in the pleading can be construed as a defense to the proposed cause of action. Conceivably, this is what Plaintiff proposed to do in his complaint (Appendix A).

This Court does not think the Supreme Court or the other courts intended to do away with the requirement that an affirmative pleading must, at least generally, inform the opposite party of the nature of the charge against him. Upon surviving that test, a complaint should not be dismissed on motion for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. With that background, we turn to the complaint in this cause.

Stripping the complaint of all allegations not shown to be related to the Defendants, Mracek and Thompson, we see only the heading identifying “Dr. James Mracek — Hospital, * * * Glen Thompson — Warden” and a prayer for $75,000.00 from each “Respondent” and that the Court “restrict the four Responds (Respondents) from coming into the Medical and Diagnostic Center * * * ”. Clearly, no cause of action is stated against the Defendants, Mracek and Thompson, as they are not shown in any way to be involved with the matters complained of.

In regard to the motion of Dr. Chambless, he is identified in the heading of the complaint as “Dr. Chambers —Surgeon”, and in the body of the complaint, the following is alleged:

“4 — Doctor Chamber, examined, and place me on medication and shots for pain, around 10:AM Sept. 21■ — 1972."

No other allegation specifically refers to Dr. Chambless or Dr. Chamber or Dr. Chambers. This Court cannot construe the allegation of Paragraph 4 as a complaint of the treatment by Dr. “Chamber”.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
58 F.R.D. 365, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1261, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15385, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frank-v-mracek-almd-1973.