Frank v. Fife

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedSeptember 5, 2019
Docket17-02001
StatusUnknown

This text of Frank v. Fife (Frank v. Fife) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frank v. Fife, (Mich. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION – BAY CITY

IN RE: Case No. 16-21030-dob KEVIN KULEK, Chapter 7 Proceeding Debtor. Hon. Daniel S. Opperman ______________________________________/ RANDALL L. FRANK, TRUSTEE, Plaintiff,

v. Adversary Proceeding Case No. 17-2001-dob TIMOTHY J. FIFE, Defendant. ______________________________________/

OPINION AWARDING DEFENDANT FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. ' 1927

Introduction The remaining issue in this adversary proceeding is the amount of fees and costs that should be assessed against Plaintiff’s counsel under 28 U.S.C. ' 1927. The Defendant requests up to $31,905.00 in fees and $73.52 in costs; the Plaintiff believes the amount should be $1,296.00. For the reasons detailed in this Opinion, the Court awards $8,152.00 in fees and $73.52 in costs. Findings of Fact A. Procedural Background This Court issued an Opinion Regarding Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1927 on April 2, 2018 and directed the Defendant “to submit a statement of fees and costs incurred after August 1, 2017 that are believed linked to Plaintiff’s counsel’s actions.” The Defendant timely filed this statement, but Plaintiff’s counsel filed an appeal of the April 2, 2018 Opinion and subsequent Order. On January 14, 2019, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (“District Court”) affirmed the April 2, 2018 Opinion and subsequent Order. This Court then set deadlines for additional pleadings addressing the remaining issues. In the interim, the District Court issued an Order Denying Motion for Sanctions. Pertinent portions of this Order state: This action involved an appeal of the bankruptcy court’s decision to impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C. ' 1927. On January 11, 2019, the Court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision to sanction Appellant Keith M. Anderson [sic]. (ECF Nos. 9 and 10). Now, Appellee Timothy J. Fife has filed a “motion for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. Pro. 8020, 28 U.S.C. 1927, and this Court’s inherent authority.” (ECF No. 11). Fife argues that Nathanson’s appeal was frivolous, taken in bad faith, and unreasonably multiplied these proceedings.

. . .

The Court finds that sanctions are not appropriate under any of the cited authorities. A bankruptcy appeal is frivolous if “the result is obvious or when the appellant’s argument is wholly without merit.” IN re Smyth, 470 B.R. 459, 462 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2012). While the Court disagreed with Nathanson’s arguments on appeal, the arguments were not frivolous. Further, the Court concludes that Nathanson did not take this appeal for wholly improper purposes or out of bad faith. Accordingly, Fife’s motion for sanctions is DENIED.

For sake of brevity, this Court incorporates the Findings of Fact previously made by this Court and the District Court. B. Subsequent Facts Additional pleadings filed with the Court caused this Court to hold a telephonic status conference to determine if an evidentiary hearing was necessary to address additional issues not raised earlier. On July 9, 2019, the Defendant filed a pleading indicating that no further hearings were necessary, and that the Court could decide the matter after reviewing the pleadings. Accordingly, the Court will not address the subsequent issues raised in the later pleadings. Defendant’s counsel submitted a statement of services that reports 60.3 hours of attorney time and 6.5 hours of law clerk time. The Plaintiff has objected, in one form or the other, to all of these entries. Jurisdiction This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 157(a), and 157(b)(1) and E. D. Mich. LR 83.50(a). This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) (matters concerning the administration of the estate).

Applicable Authority

Section 1927 states:

Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct. Analysis Again, for the sake of brevity, the Court incorporates the previous Opinions and Orders of this Court and the District Court which analyzed these issues. There remains two issues: the appropriate hourly rate and the time spent by Defendant’s counsel. The Court addresses each as follows: A. The Appropriate Hourly Rate When this proceeding started, Defendant’s counsel had approximately seven years of commercial and bankruptcy litigation experience and was recognized as a Michigan Super Lawyers Rising Star. His current standard hourly rate ranges from $195.00 to $225.00, but he agreed to discount his hourly rate to $175.00 and then two months later, to $160.00, for the Defendant. In contrast, the Economics of Law Practice Survey published by the State Bar of Michigan reports a range of $200.00 to $317.00 per hour for attorneys in Livingston County, where Defendant’s counsel is based, with a greater range of $200.00 to $510.00 for Michigan bankruptcy practioners. In comparison, Plaintiff’s counsel charges $300.00 per hour. The Court starts with the language of Section 1927, which states that the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees must be “reasonably incurred”. Here, while Defendant’s counsel could have charged up to $225.00 per hour, he agreed to accept $160.00 per hour and charged the Defendant accordingly. The Defendant therefore incurred attorney fees at the rate of $160.00 per hour, so Section 1927 directs this Court to use that rate.1

The Defendant makes excellent arguments that Plaintiff’s counsel should not benefit from any discounted rate and that utilization of a higher rate enforces the deterrence and punishment element of Section 1927. While true, the statute simply awards fees, costs and expenses “reasonably incurred”, not potentially incurred or possibly charged. Absent clear statutory language, this Court declines to expand the actual words used by Congress. B. The Services and Hours Expended by Defendant’s Counsel Defendant’s counsel detailed his services with 74 entries and Plaintiff’s counsel has filed 25 objections to these entries. Plaintiff’s counsel has two overriding objections: 1) many entries are services with lumped items and 2) there are numerous “emails to client” which are unnecessary.

Plaintiff’s counsel is correct that some entries contain numerous services, but most entries are separated such that the Court can evaluate the nature of the services and the time expended on each service. Where the Court cannot make this determination, the Court notes that failure and disallows the requested fees. As to the emails to client entries, the Court encourages communications between an attorney and client and will not penalize Defendant’s counsel for these communications. If the communications are unwarranted, however, the Court will note that fact and disallow the requested fees.

1 Although dicta, this Court does find that if another hourly rate other than the actual hourly rate is to be applied, the experience of Defendant’s counsel, his actual hourly rate, and the State of Michigan survey compel this Court to conclude that the market rate for services should be $225.00 per hour.

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Related

In Re Smyth
470 B.R. 459 (Sixth Circuit, 2012)

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Bluebook (online)
Frank v. Fife, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frank-v-fife-mieb-2019.