Filed 8/25/26 Franco v. Prime Healthcare Huntington Beach CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ALEJANDRO ARGUELLES FRANCO,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G065595
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2020-
01169203)
PRIME HEALTHCARE HUNTINGTON BEACH, LLC, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Robert S. Nelson, Judge. Dismissed.
Littler Mendelson, Stacey F. Blank and Sara Zimmerman for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Gavril T. Gabriel, Gavril T. Gabriel and Nikolaos Kefallonitis for Plaintiff and Respondent.
After Alejandro Arguelles Franco’s claims against his former employer Prime Healthcare Huntington Beach, LLC were compelled to arbitration, Prime Healthcare filed a motion for summary judgment, or alternatively, for summary adjudication. The arbitrator issued a tentative decision granting summary adjudication of 11 of Franco’s claims and otherwise denying summary adjudication, but the arbitrator later issued a final ruling and award (final decision) granting the motion for summary judgment in its entirety.
Franco filed a motion to vacate the final decision with respect to five of his claims, including those of which the arbitrator had tentatively denied summary adjudication. The trial court granted the motion to vacate with respect to four of the five claims because the final decision did not state the essential findings and conclusions underlying the decision. The trial court also remanded the matter to the arbitrator to clarify the final decision with respect to the four claims, so the court could evaluate Franco’s arguments, and otherwise denied the motion to vacate.
Prime Healthcare purports to appeal from the trial court’s May 5, 2025 order granting in part and denying in part the motion to vacate the final decision (the minute order). While an order vacating an arbitration award is appealable, such an order is not appealable if “a rehearing in arbitration is ordered.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. (c).)1 Here, the court ordered a rehearing in arbitration within the meaning of section 1294, subdivision (c) by remanding the matter to the arbitrator to clarify the basis of the final decision. As the minute order was not a final appealable order, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise specified.
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BACKGROUND
I.
THE COMPLAINT
Franco filed a complaint asserting claims against Prime Healthcare for failure to provide rest breaks (first cause of action); failure to provide meal breaks (second cause of action); failure to pay wages (third cause of action); failure to pay overtime compensation (fourth cause of action); waiting time penalties (fifth cause of action); failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (sixth cause of action); racial discrimination (seventh cause of action); harassment based on race (eighth cause of action); retaliation based on race (ninth cause of action); retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 (tenth cause of action); failure to prevent harassment, discrimination, and retaliation (eleventh cause of action); negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of employee (twelfth cause of action); unfair and unlawful business practices (thirteenth cause of action); and wrongful termination (fourteenth cause of action).2 II.
FRANCO’S CLAIMS ARE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATION Prime Healthcare filed a motion to compel all of Franco’s claims to binding arbitration pursuant to the parties’ arbitration agreement. In that agreement, the parties agreed, inter alia, they would submit certain claims to arbitration and the agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; FAA). The trial court granted the motion as to all but the third and fourth causes of action. Prime Healthcare appealed from the
2 Franco named several other defendants in his complaint, but
the clerk entered the dismissal of those defendants without prejudice pursuant to Franco’s request.
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court’s order denying its motion to compel as to those claims. A panel of this court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant Prime Healthcare’s motion to compel as to all causes of action. (Franco v. Prime Healthcare Huntington Beach, LLC (Apr. 8, 2022, G060181) [nonpub. opn.].) In its opinion, the panel confirmed the parties agreed to adopt “‘all of’” the FAA to govern their arbitration. (Ibid.)
III.
THE ARBITRATOR GRANTS PRIME HEALTHCARE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Prime Healthcare later filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, for summary adjudication. The arbitrator issued a tentative ruling granting summary adjudication as to Franco’s first through tenth and thirteenth causes of action but denying it as to the eleventh, twelfth, and fourteen causes of action.
After issuing its tentative decision, the arbitrator heard argument and took the matter under submission. The arbitrator thereafter changed the tentative decision with respect to the denial of summary adjudication as to the eleventh, twelfth, and fourteenth causes of action and instead issued the final decision granting Prime Healthcare’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The final decision, however, did not add any statement regarding the arbitrator’s findings or conclusions supporting his reversal of the tentative decision to deny summary adjudication of those causes of action. The arbitrator thereafter dismissed the arbitration proceedings.
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IV.
THE TRIAL COURT VACATES THE AWARD IN PART AND REMANDS TO THE ARBITRATOR TO CLARIFY THE BASES FOR HIS FINAL DECISION Franco filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award with respect to the ninth through twelfth and fourteenth causes of action.3 In the minute order, the trial court denied the motion to vacate with respect to the tenth cause of action, granted the motion as to the remaining causes of action that were at issue, and remanded the matter back to the arbitrator with directions. The court explained: “Here, given that the arbitration involved an employment dispute, which requires a reasoned decision, the court finds that the arbitrator’s award as it relates to the ninth, eleventh, twelfth, and fourteenth causes of action was insufficient to provide [Franco] and the court with sufficient detail as to the legal and factual basis for the arbitrator’s decision. As such, as the court explains further below, the court finds that vacating the award and remanding to the arbitrator to provide for further clarification is appropriate.”
With respect to the ninth cause of action, the trial court further explained: “Here, the arbitrator’s award on this action simply states: ‘Claimant’s claims for harassment based on race and retaliation based on race are derivative of his claim for discrimination based on race. Since claimant’s claim for discrimination based on race failed, so too do his claims for harassment based on race and retaliation based on race and discrimination based on race. [Prime Healthcare’s] dispositive motion as to claims 8 [and] 9 are granted.’ [Citation.] The decision, however, is unclear as
3 As the prior panel concluded the FAA applied to the parties’
arbitration agreement (Franco v. Prime Healthcare Huntington Beach, LLC, supra, G060181), Franco’s motion to vacate the arbitration award was filed pursuant to section 10(a)(4) of title 9 of the United States Code, accordingly.
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to what actual basis or element of [Franco’s] retaliation claim the arbitrator found was insufficient. To the extent that it is based on [Franco’s] subjective belief, there is no finding as to whether or not that belief was reasonable, even if [Prime Healthcare’s] conduct did not violate [the Fair Employment and Housing Act]. To the extent that the arbitrator found that there was no retaliatory intent by [Prime Healthcare] or that [Franco] did not engage in any protected activity, that is not stated in the award. [¶] As such, the court finds that the arbitrator’s decision on this cause of action did not provide ‘the essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based.’[4] [¶] This cause of action is remanded for the arbitrator to provide a more detailed written decision on the ninth cause of action that reveals the legal and factual basis for the arbitrator’s decision.” (Capitalization omitted.)
And with respect to the eleventh, twelfth, and fourteenth causes of action, the minute order stated: “In the final award by the arbitrator, the arbitrator provided the arbitrator’s tentative ruling, which set forth the reasons why the arbitrator was inclined to deny [Prime Healthcare’s] motion for summary judgment as to the eleventh, twelfth, and fourteenth causes of action. [Citation.] However, the award then states that the [a]rbitrator reverses his tentative ruling as to [Franco’s] claims and grants [Prime Healthcare’s] motion as to the eleventh, twelfth, and fourteenth causes of action. The arbitrator fails to provide any factual or legal basis for reversing the tentative ruling. As it stands, the tentative ruling only provides the essential findings and conclusions to deny [Prime Healthcare’s] motion for summary judgment as to these causes of action, but does not provide any
4 The parties’ arbitration agreement required “[t]he decision of
the arbitrator shall be in writing and shall provide the essential findings and conclusions for the arbitrator’s award.” (Italics added.)
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basis for granting the motion. As such, the court finds that the award fails to provide ‘the essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based’ and, therefore, fails to comply with Armendariz [v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83]. [¶] The eleventh, twelfth, and fourteenth causes of action are remanded for the arbitrator to provide a more detailed written decision that reveals the legal and factual basis for the arbitrator’s decision on these causes of action. [¶] [Franco] to provide notice to arbitrator and reinstate proceedings for remand.” (Italics added.) The minute order further stated: “The ADR [r]eview [h]earing is continued to August 28, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. in this department.”
Prime Healthcare filed a notice of appeal from the minute order.
DISCUSSION
I.
GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW For this court to have jurisdiction to consider an appeal, a party must timely appeal from an appealable judgment or order. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696.) “‘The existence of an appealable [order or] judgment,’” therefore, is a “‘jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal.’” (Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 21.)
Whereas here, the parties may agree to be governed by the procedural terms of the FAA, they cannot create appellate jurisdiction in California through such an agreement. (Vivid Video, Inc. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 434, 440–441 (Vivid Video); see Muao v. Grosvenor Properties, Ltd. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1090 [Section 16 of the FAA does not govern the appealability of an arbitration order in California state court].)
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In California state courts, section 1294 governs appeals in arbitration matters, providing: “An aggrieved party may appeal from: [¶] (a) An order dismissing or denying a petition to compel arbitration. [¶] (b) An order dismissing a petition to confirm, correct or vacate an award. [¶] (c) An order vacating an award unless a rehearing in arbitration is ordered. [¶] (d) A judgment entered pursuant to this title. [¶] (e) A special order after final judgment.” (Italics added; see Kirk v. Ratner (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1059–1060 (Kirk) [“Our jurisdiction to review superior court orders in arbitration matters is defined by section 1294”].)
Although neither party in their respective appellate briefs questioned the appealability of the minute order granting in part the motion to vacate portions of the arbitration award and remanding to the arbitrator with directions to clarify the award, “we must raise the issue on our own initiative whenever a doubt exists as to whether the superior court has entered an appealable judgment or order: ‘[W]e have an independent obligation in this as in every matter to confirm whether jurisdiction exists.’” (Kirk, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 1060.)5 “We independently review questions regarding our own jurisdiction. [Citation.] In addition, we review questions of statutory construction de novo.” (Kirk, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 1060.)
5 We invited the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing
why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of an appealable order. Each party submitted a supplemental brief accordingly.
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II.
THE FAA PERMITS VACATUR OF AN ARBITRATION AWARD WHEN IT FAILS TO COMPLY WITH TERMS OF THE PARTIES’ ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND THUS EXCEEDS THE ARBITRATOR’S POWERS Here, the trial court partially granted the motion to vacate the arbitrator’s award on the ground the final decision failed to state the “essential findings and conclusions” of the award with respect to the resolution of the subject causes of action, as required by the parties’ arbitration agreement. Under the FAA, “a court ‘must’ confirm an arbitration award ‘unless’ it is vacated, modified, or corrected ‘as prescribed’ in [sections] 10 and 11 [of title 9 of the United States Code].” (Hall Street Associates, L.L.C., v. Mattel, Inc. (2008) 552 U.S. 576, 582.) An arbitrator’s award may be vacated “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.” (9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).)
Arbitration is “a creature of contract.” (Cat Charter, LLC v.
Schurtenberger (11th Cir. 2011) 646 F.3d 836, 843.) Consequently, “arbitrators may exceed their power within the meaning of [title 9 of the United States Code section] 10(a)(4) if they fail to comply with mutually agreed-upon contractual provisions in an agreement to arbitrate.” (Ibid.; see Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter (2013) 569 U.S. 564, 569 [9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) applies “[o]nly if ‘the arbitrator act[s] outside the scope of his contractually delegated authority’”].)
In Western Employers Ins. Co. v. Jefferies & Co., Inc. (9th Cir.
1992) 958 F.2d 258, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded an arbitration award should be vacated because it failed to include a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Ninth Circuit held the parties had “a right to arbitration according to the terms for which it contracted.” (Id. at p. 261.)
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More recently, in Advantage Veterans Services v. United Steel (4th Cir. 2023) 70 F.4th 751, 758, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated the Western Employers Inc. court’s reasoning “makes sense,” explaining: “Our deferential standard for determining whether an arbitrator erred substantively is rooted in the contractual nature of arbitration. If the parties agree to resolve disputes by arbitration, we defer to the determinations made in the process the parties agreed to.”
Prime Healthcare argues “the trial court vacated the award for the purpose of obtaining additional information so that it could perform a merits review,” which is prohibited by the FAA. But in the minute order, the court acknowledged: “[C]ourts generally may not review arbitration awards for errors of fact or law, ‘even when those errors appear on the face of the award or cause substantial injustice to the parties.’” The court explained: “By this order, this court is not undermining or rejecting the arbitrator’s decision. The court makes no finding as to any substantive error in the arbitration award. Rather, the court is remanding and asking for clarification as to the legal and factual basis for the arbitrator’s decision as it relates to certain causes of action.”
III.
THE MINUTE ORDER IS NOT APPEALABLE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT REMANDED TO THE ARBITRATOR FOR CLARIFICATION As discussed ante, even when the FAA otherwise applies, section 1294, subdivision (c), governs whether an order vacating an arbitration agreement is appealable. Such an order is appealable “unless a rehearing in arbitration is ordered.” (§ 1294, subd. (c).)
Here, the trial court vacated the arbitration award with respect to the ninth, eleventh, twelfth, and fourteenth causes of action because the
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award did not state the arbitrator’s essential findings and conclusions with respect to those claims as required by the parties’ arbitration agreement. Had the court stopped there, the order would clearly be an appealable order under section 1294, subdivision (c). But the court did not stop there. In its order, it remanded the matter to the arbitrator to correct the award’s omission of the arbitrator’s essential findings and conclusions with respect to the subject causes of action. The issue presented then is whether the court’s remand order directs a “rehearing” within the meaning of section 1294, subdivision (c). We conclude it does, rendering the order not appealable.
“Under section 1294, appealable arbitration orders require finality. . . . ‘It is quite obvious that the Legislature’s philosophy and intent in drafting section 1294 was that there should be no appellate consideration of intermediate rulings in arbitration disputes if the superior court was of the view that there should be initial or further proceedings in arbitration.” (Vivid Video, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 442.) Furthermore, “[a]n intermediate ruling in an arbitration dispute that contemplates further proceedings in arbitration is not appealable. [Citations.] Requiring finality in appealable arbitration orders is consistent both with the language of section 1294 and the general prohibition of appeals from interlocutory nonfinal judgments in section 904.1, subdivision (a).” (Id. at p. 442.)
Here, the minute order reinstated arbitration proceedings by remanding to the arbitrator with directions to clarify the award. Such action does not indicate finality, rather “contemplates further proceedings in arbitration.” (Vivid Video, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 442.) Therefore, although the trial court does not use the word “rehearing” in its minute order,
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for the reasons we have explained, we conclude the minute order constituted a remand for rehearing within the meaning of section 1294, subdivision (c).6 In its supplemental brief, Prime Healthcare argues, “In the alternative, exceptional circumstances warrant treating the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate.” (Boldface and capitalization omitted.) “We may treat an improper appeal as a petition for a writ of mandate in unusual circumstances. [Citation.] It is appropriate to treat an appeal from a nonappealable judgment as a petition for extraordinary writ when requiring the parties to wait for entry of final judgment might lead to unnecessary trial proceedings, the briefs and the record include the necessary elements for a writ of mandate, there is no indication the trial court would appear as a party in the writ proceeding, the appealability of the order was not clear, and all parties urge the court to decide the issue rather than dismiss the appeal.” (Turman v. Superior Court (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 969, 979.)
This case does not present unusual circumstances warranting our treating this appeal as a petition for writ of mandate because, inter alia, there is no indication the trial court’s remand to the arbitrator to clarify the final decision would lead to unnecessary trial proceedings and Franco does not join Prime Healthcare in urging us to decide the issue rather than
6 We reject Prime Healthcare’s argument in its supplemental
brief and at oral argument that the trial court did not order a remand for rehearing within the meaning of section 1294, subdivision (c) because the order did not reference section 1287. Section 1287 permits the court to order a rehearing before new arbitrators. In addition, it provides that in the event the court vacated an award based on section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4) and (5) of the California Arbitration Act (§ 1280 et seq.), with the parties’ consent, the court may order rehearing before the original arbitrator. (§ 1287.) Here, as discussed ante, the FAA governed the parties’ agreement. Hence the vacatur of the award was based on the FAA and not the California Arbitration Act.
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dismiss the appeal. We therefore decline to treat this appeal as a petition for a writ of mandate.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Respondent to recover costs on appeal.
MOTOIKE, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, J.
DELANEY, J.