Francisco Sanchez v. Unknown Marion, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMarch 30, 2026
Docket2:25-cv-00564
StatusUnknown

This text of Francisco Sanchez v. Unknown Marion, et al. (Francisco Sanchez v. Unknown Marion, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Francisco Sanchez v. Unknown Marion, et al., (D. Ariz. 2026).

Opinion

1 KAB 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Francisco Sanchez, No. CV-25-00564-PHX-JAT (MTM) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Unknown Marion, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 Plaintiff Francisco Sanchez, who is currently confined in the Arizona State Prison 16 Complex-Lewis, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending 17 before the Court are Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21) and Plaintiff’s 18 Motion for Rule 56(d) Relief (Doc. 26). 19 I. Background 20 On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated 21 an excessive force claim against Defendants Marion and Prater in Count One based on 22 Plaintiff’s allegations that, while incarcerated in the Pinal County Adult Detention Center 23 (PCADC), Pod Officer Marion “grabbed [Plaintiff], threw [him] against the wall, 24 kneed[him] on the side, and threw [him] violently to the ground,” causing Plaintiff to injure 25 his shoulder and Pod Officer Prater, who was present, did not intervene to stop the assault. 26 (Docs. 6, 1.) The Court dismissed the remaining claims and Defendants. (Doc. 6.) 27 II. Motion for Summary Judgment 28 In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants assert that Plaintiff did not properly 1 exhaust his available administrative remedies. 2 A. Legal Standards 3 1. Summary Judgment 4 A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 5 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The 7 movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 8 those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 9 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 10 If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 11 produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 12 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts 13 to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in 14 contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 15 governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 16 jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 17 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th 18 Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its 19 favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, 20 it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 21 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal 22 citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 23 At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 24 determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 25 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw 26 all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited 27 materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 28 . . . . 1 2. Exhaustion 2 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner must exhaust “available” 3 administrative remedies before filing an action in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); 4 Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 5 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). The prisoner must complete the administrative review process in 6 accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). 7 Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 8 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through the administrative process, Booth v. 9 Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 10 The defendant bears the initial burden to show that there was an available 11 administrative remedy and that the prisoner did not exhaust it. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 12 1162, 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014); see Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37 (a defendant must 13 demonstrate that applicable relief remained available in the grievance process). Once that 14 showing is made, the burden shifts to the prisoner, who must either demonstrate that he, in 15 fact, exhausted administrative remedies or “come forward with evidence showing that there 16 is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available 17 administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. The 18 ultimate burden, however, rests with the defendant. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate 19 if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner, shows a 20 failure to exhaust. Id. at 1166, 1168; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 21 If summary judgment is denied, disputed factual questions relevant to exhaustion 22 should be decided by the judge; a plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of 23 exhaustion. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1170-71. But if a court finds that the prisoner exhausted 24 administrative remedies, that administrative remedies were not available, or that the failure 25 to exhaust administrative remedies should be excused, the case proceeds to the merits. Id. 26 at 1171. 27 B. Facts 28 Pinal County Sheriff’s Office (PCSO) Standard Operating Procedure 4.3 sets forth 1 the procedure for detainees incarcerated in PCADC to grieve claims that arise during their 2 incarceration. (Doc. 22 ¶ 4.) The grievance procedure generally requires a detainee to 3 complete an Inmate Request Form within 5 days of the incident giving rise to the grievance. 4 (Id. ¶¶ 16, 19.) The remaining steps in the procedure require the detainee to submit an 5 Informal Resolution Form, a Formal Grievance Form, an appeal form, and a second-level 6 appeal form. (Id.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Co.
391 U.S. 253 (Supreme Court, 1968)
Booth v. Churner
532 U.S. 731 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Porter v. Nussle
534 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Brown v. Valoff
422 F.3d 926 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co.
68 F.3d 1216 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)
In re Plaza-Martínez
747 F.3d 10 (First Circuit, 2014)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Francisco Sanchez v. Unknown Marion, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/francisco-sanchez-v-unknown-marion-et-al-azd-2026.