Francisco Lopez Barrios v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 12, 2026
• Docket: 17-72606
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 12 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANCISCO JAVIER LOPEZ BARRIOS, No. 17-72606

Petitioner, Agency No. A205-054-230

v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 10, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Francisco Javier Lopez Barrios (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen

of Mexico, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)

decision dismissing an appeal from a decision by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)

denying Petitioner’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Against Torture (“CAT”) protection. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252,

and we deny the petition.

“Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision and also contributes its own

reasoning to the analysis, we review both decisions.” Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088,

1091 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2005)).

We review findings of fact for substantial evidence. See Ruiz-Colmenares v.

Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022). Under this standard, the IJ’s and BIA’s

factual findings are considered “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would

be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (citation omitted). We review

questions of law de novo. Id.

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Petitioner’s

asylum application is time barred. Petitioner argues that he established “changed

circumstances” based on “increased crime in Mexico” and the “attempted

kidnapping of [his] cousin.” But the evidence that Petitioner provided showed that

“corruption as well as generalized fear from the populous of drug cartels, criminal

organizations, and gangs has been going on for a number of years in Mexico,”

including between 2011 (when Petitioner most recently arrived in the United States)

and 2016 (when Petitioner applied for asylum). And the record does not compel the

conclusion that the alleged attempted kidnapping of Petitioner’s cousin establishes

changed circumstances in Mexico. Petitioner provided no evidence that the

2 17-72606 unidentified abductors would harm him in Mexico “because of” his “race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(A). Finally, as the government argues, Petitioner failed to exhaust his

argument before the agency that he established “extraordinary circumstances” based

on the purportedly ineffective assistance of a former attorney. See Sola v. Holder,

720 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“A petitioner’s failure to raise an

issue before the BIA generally constitutes a failure to exhaust ....”); Suate-Orellana

v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 629 (9th Cir. 2024) (observing that the exhaustion

requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule

that is mandatorily enforced if a party properly raises it, and a noncitizen must put

the BIA on notice of the challenge to exhaust a claim). We therefore may not

consider it.

2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of withholding of

removal. Petitioner failed to define a proposed particular social group (“PSG”) at

any point before the IJ or the BIA. Petitioner also failed to define a proposed PSG

in his opening brief in our court. Thus, the record does not compel the conclusion

that Petitioner satisfied his burden of demonstrating entitlement to withholding of

removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b) (“The burden of proof is on the applicant for

withholding of removal….”); Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 344 (A.G. 2018)

(“[A]n applicant seeking asylum or withholding of removal based on membership

3 17-72606 in a particular social group must clearly indicate, on the record and before the

immigration judge, the exact delineation of any proposed particular social group.”).

3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief. Petitioner

argues that he established a likelihood of torture based on his fear of his father’s

enemies, drug cartels, and government corruption. But Petitioner’s fear of his

father’s enemies rests on the speculative idea that they would recognize him after

nearly thirty years and that they would inflict torturous harm on him, even though

they left him unharmed for many years while he was still in Mexico. See Garcia v.

Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that “a speculative fear of

torture is insufficient to satisfy the ‘more likely than not’ standard”). And

Petitioner’s general fears of drug cartels and government corruption do not suffice

to prove eligibility for CAT relief. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148,

1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).1

PETITION DENIED.

1 Petitioner’s motion to remand, see Dkt. No. 22, is denied. See Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc).

4 17-72606