Francisco Gil v. J. Woodend

Ninth Circuit

Francisco Gil v. J. Woodend

591 F. App'x 619

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedFebruary 3, 2015

Docket13-17190

StatusUnpublished

This text of 591 F. App'x 619 (Francisco Gil v. J. Woodend) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Francisco Gil v. J. Woodend, 591 F. App'x 619 (9th Cir. 2015).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Former California state prisoner Francisco J. Gil appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. *620 § 1988 action alleging a violation of his right to due process in connection with the forfeiture of good time credits following a rules violation hearing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir.1996). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir.2009), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Gil failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was improperly denied procedural protections during his rules violation hearing, and whether defendant incorrectly imposed a good time credit loss of 121 days. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (setting forth due process requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings); see also Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3323(d) (2007) (providing a credit forfeiture range of 121-150 days for certain offenses); Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985) (requirements of due process are satisfied if “some evidence” supports disciplinary decision to revoke good time credits).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam).

We reject Gil’s contentions concerning certain policy changes arising from In re Dikes, 121 Cal.App.4th 825, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 9 (2004), revisions to the California Code of Regulations that were not in effect at the time of Gil’s rules violation hearing, alleged fraud by defendants, and alleged bias of the magistrate judge.

Appellant’s motion to file a late and oversized reply brief, filed on December 16, 2014, is granted. The Clerk shall file the reply brief received on December 16, 2014.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Former California state prisoner Francisco J. Gil appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. *620 § 1988 action alleging a violation of his right to due process in connection with the forfeiture of good time credits following a rules violation hearing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir.1996). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir.2009), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Gil failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was improperly denied procedural protections during his rules violation hearing, and whether defendant incorrectly imposed a good time credit loss of 121 days. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (setting forth due process requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings); see also Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3323(d) (2007) (providing a credit forfeiture range of 121-150 days for certain offenses); Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985) (requirements of due process are satisfied if “some evidence” supports disciplinary decision to revoke good time credits).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam).

We reject Gil’s contentions concerning certain policy changes arising from In re Dikes, 121 Cal.App.4th 825, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 9 (2004), revisions to the California Code of Regulations that were not in effect at the time of Gil’s rules violation hearing, alleged fraud by defendants, and alleged bias of the magistrate judge.

Appellant’s motion to file a late and oversized reply brief, filed on December 16, 2014, is granted. The Clerk shall file the reply brief received on December 16, 2014.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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591 F. App'x 619, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/francisco-gil-v-j-woodend-ca9-2015.

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