Francis Marion Black v. O. B. Ellis, Director, Texas Department of Corrections

Fifth Circuit

Francis Marion Black v. O. B. Ellis, Director, Texas Department of Corrections

283 F.2d 314, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 3514

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedOctober 21, 1960

Docket18161

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 283 F.2d 314 (Francis Marion Black v. O. B. Ellis, Director, Texas Department of Corrections) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Francis Marion Black v. O. B. Ellis, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, 283 F.2d 314, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 3514 (5th Cir. 1960).

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Opinions

CAMERON, Circuit Judge.

This appeal tests the legality of an order of the court below denying, from the face of petitioner’s pleading, his application for writ of habeas corpus. The grounds for the denial are thus stated by the court below:

“The record does not show that the petitioner has appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States from the ruling of the Court of Criminal Appeals on February 12, 1959, and, therefore, he has not exhausted his state remedies. See Harrison v. Skeer (Skeen), D.C. W.Va.1954, 125 F.Supp. 547, appeal [315]*315•dismissed [4 Cir.], 226 F.2d 217; Johnson v. Dye, D.C.Pa.1950, 94 F. Supp. 133.”

A painstaking examination of this •confused and inadequate record¹ reveals that petitioner was convicted of murder by a trial court in Texas on June 22, 1938 and sentenced to death, his conviction being affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas March 22, 1939, rehearing denied May 31, 1939. See Black v. State, 137 Tex.Cr.R. 173, 128 S.W.2d 406. We do not find it otherwise disclosed in the record, but the respondent’s brief makes the statement concerning that case: “This case was later denied certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States.”

From the documents above referred to it appears that petitioner first applied to the Texas courts for writ of habeas corpus, upon the denial of which he applied to the Supreme Court of the United States for writ of certiorari, which was denied April 21, 1952, Black v. Moore, 343 U.S. 931, 72 S.Ct. 766, 96 L.Ed. 1340, rehearing denied 1952, 343 U.S. 959, 72 S.Ct. 1054, 96 L.Ed. 1358. In the papers before us there is copy of the original petition for certiorari in the above case, which was filed March 19, 1952 in the Supreme Court.² It further appears that petitioner filed with the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas a second application for writ of habeas corpus in June, 1956, which in September, 1956 was denied. Apparently, certiorari from this decision was also denied by the Supreme Court of the United States.³

As is often the case with records of this character, we have had to dig out of a mass of papers the true situation as it seems presented, and we think the foregoing is probably an accurate summary of the decisive proceedings which have taken place in this case. Upon the assumption that this is true, the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies and is not barred from proceeding in a District Court of the United States. Darr v. Burford, 1949, 339 U.S. 200, 70 S.Ct. 587, 94 L.Ed. 761.

Doubtless the respondent can help clarify the record in this case, and will do so if and when he is called upon to answer the petition. To the end that the court below may require such an answer or take such other steps as may be provided by law to bring the case before it for such hearing as the facts presented to it may justify, the judgment of the court below is reversed upon rehearing and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

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CAMERON, Circuit Judge.

This appeal tests the legality of an order of the court below denying, from the face of petitioner’s pleading, his application for writ of habeas corpus. The grounds for the denial are thus stated by the court below:

“The record does not show that the petitioner has appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States from the ruling of the Court of Criminal Appeals on February 12, 1959, and, therefore, he has not exhausted his state remedies. See Harrison v. Skeer (Skeen), D.C. W.Va.1954, 125 F.Supp. 547, appeal [315]*315•dismissed [4 Cir.], 226 F.2d 217; Johnson v. Dye, D.C.Pa.1950, 94 F. Supp. 133.”

A painstaking examination of this •confused and inadequate record¹ reveals that petitioner was convicted of murder by a trial court in Texas on June 22, 1938 and sentenced to death, his conviction being affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas March 22, 1939, rehearing denied May 31, 1939. See Black v. State, 137 Tex.Cr.R. 173, 128 S.W.2d 406. We do not find it otherwise disclosed in the record, but the respondent’s brief makes the statement concerning that case: “This case was later denied certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States.”

From the documents above referred to it appears that petitioner first applied to the Texas courts for writ of habeas corpus, upon the denial of which he applied to the Supreme Court of the United States for writ of certiorari, which was denied April 21, 1952, Black v. Moore, 343 U.S. 931, 72 S.Ct. 766, 96 L.Ed. 1340, rehearing denied 1952, 343 U.S. 959, 72 S.Ct. 1054, 96 L.Ed. 1358. In the papers before us there is copy of the original petition for certiorari in the above case, which was filed March 19, 1952 in the Supreme Court.² It further appears that petitioner filed with the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas a second application for writ of habeas corpus in June, 1956, which in September, 1956 was denied. Apparently, certiorari from this decision was also denied by the Supreme Court of the United States.³

As is often the case with records of this character, we have had to dig out of a mass of papers the true situation as it seems presented, and we think the foregoing is probably an accurate summary of the decisive proceedings which have taken place in this case. Upon the assumption that this is true, the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies and is not barred from proceeding in a District Court of the United States. Darr v. Burford, 1949, 339 U.S. 200, 70 S.Ct. 587, 94 L.Ed. 761.

Doubtless the respondent can help clarify the record in this case, and will do so if and when he is called upon to answer the petition. To the end that the court below may require such an answer or take such other steps as may be provided by law to bring the case before it for such hearing as the facts presented to it may justify, the judgment of the court below is reversed upon rehearing and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

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283 F.2d 314, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 3514, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/francis-marion-black-v-o-b-ellis-director-texas-department-of-ca5-1960.

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