Frameli v. Reed Oil Co. (In Re Frameli)

155 B.R. 354, 29 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 233, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 928, 1993 WL 213311
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 16, 1993
Docket19-20001
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 155 B.R. 354 (Frameli v. Reed Oil Co. (In Re Frameli)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frameli v. Reed Oil Co. (In Re Frameli), 155 B.R. 354, 29 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 233, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 928, 1993 WL 213311 (Pa. 1993).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERNARD MARKOVITZ, Bankruptcy Judge.

Debtors seek pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) to avoid several judicial liens against their personal residence which are held by respondents Reed Oil Company (“Reed”), Pittsburgh National Bank (“PNB”), and Three Rivers Bank (“Three Rivers”). Debtors assert that the liens may be avoided because they impair the exemption debtors have claimed in their residence pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).

Reed opposes the motion to avoid its judicial lien because debtors allegedly have no equity in their residence.

Debtors’ motions to avoid in their entirety the judicial liens held by Three Rivers and by Reed will be granted. They also will be permitted to partially avoid PNB’s judicial lien to the extent of $2,692.69. The remainder of its lien may not be avoided. However, should debtors amend within five (5) days the amount of the exemption claimed in their residence from $3,754.24 to $11,245.26, as they have stated they intend to do, they will be permitted to avoid PNB’s judicial lien in its entirety.

-I-

FACTS

Debtors jointly own two (2) parcels of real property. They use one parcel as their personal residence and operated a service station on the other.

Both properties are subject to a wraparound mortgage held by Charleroi Federal Savings Bank (“Charleroi”). The amount owed to Charleroi as of the filing of the bankruptcy petition was $71,245.76.

Both properties also are subject to several judicial liens. PNB obtained a judgment against debtors in the amount of $10,192.69 which was duly recorded in October of 1989. Three Rivers obtained a judgment against debtors in the amount of $4,042.50 which was recorded in January of 1990. Reed obtained a judgment against debtors in the amount of $10,400.00 which was recorded in March of 1990.

Debtors filed a voluntary joint chapter 11 petition on July 30, 1990. The case was converted, upon debtors’ request, to a chapter 7 proceeding on March 2, 1992. A chapter 7 trustee was appointed shortly thereafter.

Amended bankruptcy schedules were filed by debtors on June 17, 1992.

Schedule A, Real Property, lists debtors’ personal residence and the above commercial property. The declared value of their residence was $30,000.00. The declared value of the commercial property was $45,-000.00. Both properties were listed as subject to a secured claim by Charleroi in the amount of $71,245.76.

On Schedule C, Property Claimed As Exempt, debtors claimed an exemption pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) in their personal residence. The amount of the exemption is $3,754.24, the difference between combined declared value of the two properties listed in Schedule A and the amount of Charleroi’s secured claim against the properties. No objection to the claimed exemption was raised by any interested party.

Debtors claimed no exemption in the commercial property which is subject to the same wrap-around mortgage as is their residence.

Charleroi was listed on Schedule D, Creditors Holding Secured Claims, as the holder of a secured claim against both properties in the amount of $71,245.76. PNB, Three Rivers, and Reed also are listed as judgment creditors.

On August 10, 1992, debtors filed the above motions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) to avoid the judicial liens of *356 PNB, Three Rivers, and Reed. Debtors maintain that these judicial liens may be avoided because they impair the exemption debtors have claimed in their residence.

Reed opposes the motion to avoid its lien on the ground that debtors have no equity in their residence over and above the wraparound mortgage against it. PNB and Three Rivers did not respond to the motions pertaining to their judicial liens. 1

A hearing on debtors’ motions to avoid these judicial liens was held on May 19, 1993. Although the parties were given an opportunity to present evidence, they elected not to do so. It was stipulated, however, that debtors’ residence has a value of $30,000.00; and that their commercial property has a value of $52,500.00.

-II-

ANALYSIS

Debtors seek to avoid the above judicial liens pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1), which provides as follows:

(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemption, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is—
(1)a judicial lien;....

Congress intended when it enacted this provision to provide debtors in chapter 7 cases with a “fresh start”, including some equity in their residence, at the conclusion of the case. See In re Fisher, 117 B.R. 191, 192 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1990).

The following procedure applies in determining whether or not a judicial lien is avoidable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1).

The initial step is to determine whether debtor would have been entitled to claim an exemption in the property in the absence of the judicial lien. The extent to which debtor has equity, if any, in the absence of that lien must be determined. See In re Galvan, 110 B.R. 446, 450 (9th Cir. BAP 1990).

Equity in this instance is ascertained by subtracting all security interests in the property to be exempted — exclusive of the judicial lien at issue and interests, if any, which are junior to the judicial lien— from the value of the property. Id.

Section 522(f)(1) is not a device for benefitting a debtor by creating equity where none exists. Lien avoidance pursuant to this provision may not occur unless debtor has equity in the property which is subject to the judicial lien whose avoidance is sought. See In re Simonson, 758 F.2d 103, 105-06 (3d Cir.1985).

The second step is to determine the extent, if any, to which the available exemption 2 is impaired by the judicial lien. See In re Galvan, 110 B.R. at 450. A judicial lien is avoidable to the extent that it impairs the available exemption. Id.

This determination is made by subtracting the amount of the judicial lien from the equity which exists. Id. If the resultant amount is greater than the available exemption, there is no impairment and, accordingly, no avoidance of the lien. Id.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
155 B.R. 354, 29 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 233, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 928, 1993 WL 213311, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frameli-v-reed-oil-co-in-re-frameli-pawb-1993.