Fox v. Schwartz & Dompier

2026 Ohio 1025

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 24, 2026
• Docket: 2025 CA 00024
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Fox v. Schwartz & Dompier, 2026-Ohio-1025.]

COURT OF APPEALS FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DAVID E. FOX Case No. 2025 CA 00024

Plaintiff – Appellee/Cross - Appellant Opinion and Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 20CV 160 DAVID N.J. SCHWARTZ, ET AL. AND ASHLIE AND RYAN DOMPIER Judgment: Affirmed in part; Reversed and Remanded in part Defendants – Appellants/Cross - Appellees Date of Judgment Entry: March 24, 2026

BEFORE: Robert G. Montgomery; William B. Hoffman; Craig R. Baldwin, Judges

APPEARANCES: Andrew C. Clark, Colleen R. Vance, Patrick S. Carpenter, Onda LaBuhn Ernsberger & Boggs Co., LPA, for Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant; Stephen D. Brown, Brown Law Limited, for Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

Hoffman, J.

{¶1} Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees Ashlie and Ryan Dompier

(hereinafter “Dompiers”) appeal the judgment entered by the Fairfield County Common

Pleas Court following bench trial awarding declaratory judgment to Plaintiff-

Appellee/Cross-Appellant David E. Fox (hereinafter “Fox”) allowing certain actions to be

taken by Fox with respect to real property owned by the Dompiers. Fox appeals the

judgment entered by the Fairfield County Common Pleas Court following bench trial

finding in favor of the Dompiers on his claim for tortious interference with contract. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} David and Katie Schwartz, defendants below but not parties to this appeal,

owned a farm in Fairfield County. Fox and his then-partner McKonkey1 were interested

in buying a parcel of land from Schwartz. The Dompiers were also interested in buying a

parcel of land from Schwartz.

{¶3} David and Katie Schwartz moved to New York state in March of 2019,

leaving their son, Sammie, to negotiate with potential buyers and act as a messenger.

Because the Schwartzes were of the Amish faith, they did not use modern technology.

Both Fox and the Dompiers were interested in separate parcels of land from the farm.

{¶4} On April 30, 2019, Fox and Sammie Schwartz signed an agreement

(hereinafter “Proposal”). The agreement is entitled “Proposal” and is on the letter head

of Fox Den Construction, Inc. Below the preprinted heading on the form is a handwritten

section titled “conditions on farm purchase.” The conditions included a price of crop

acreage at $5,500 per acre and non-crop acreage at $3,000 per acre. The conditions also

included provisions regarding maintenance of a creek bed and dry dams which allowed

encroachment on the property the Dompiers became interested in purchasing. Sammie

accepted a down payment of $1,000 from Fox. David Schwartz became aware of the

signing of this proposal no later than May 5, 2019. By letter dated March 10, 2020, David

Schwartz offered a price reduction from the sale price listed on the proposal and agreed

to close by April 15, 2020. Fox confirmed the agreement by letter dated March 13, 2020.

The sale involved a parcel totaling approximately 44 acres of the 123 acre farm owned by

the Schwartzes. However, the property was not transferred to Fox. Meanwhile, the

1 McConkey, originally a plaintiff in this action, passed away during the pendency of litigation, and the

parties stipulated to his removal from this case, leaving Fox as the sole plaintiff. See Judgment Entry, June 9, 2025. Dompiers purchased the neighboring parcel to the 44-acre parcel Fox sought to purchase

on October 29, 2019.

{¶5} Fox brought the instant action on June 18, 2020, alleging ten causes of

action: (1) declaratory judgment finding Fox and Schwartz entered an enforceable

contract for the sale of the property, (2) specific performance ordering Schwartz to convey

the property via general warranty deed and seeking damages for breach of contract, (3)

breach of contract damages for inability to farm the property, (4) declaratory judgment

against the Dompiers finding Fox is entitled to take action on the Dompiers’ property

pursuant to the terms of the Proposal, (5) tortious interference with contract against the

Dompiers, (6) breach of contract against Schwartz for transferring the parcel to the

Dompiers without preserving Fox’s rights with respect to the parcel, (7)equitable estoppel

against Schwartz regarding improvements Fox made to the parcel, (8) unjust enrichment

and quantum meruit in the event the court found no enforceable contract for sale of the

parcel, (9) fraud against Sammie Schwartz, and (10) tortious interference with contract

against the tenant farming the property.

{¶6} The case proceeded to bench trial in the Fairfield County Common Pleas

Court. Relevant to this appeal, the trial court found an enforceable contract for the sale

of the 44 acre parcel from Schwartz to Fox existed, based on two theories: (1) the Proposal

coupled with subsequent correspondence between the parties formed an enforceable

contract for sale of the property, or in the alternative, (2) Sammie Schwartz had authority

to sign the Proposal on behalf of David and Katie Schwartz. The trial court ordered

transfer of the property from Schwartz to Fox for $216,010.50, which included the sale

price reduction set forth in the letters exchanged between Schwartz and Fox subsequent

to the Proposal. Based on conveyance of the property, the trial court did not award money damages to Fox based on Schwartz’s breach of the contract. The trial court scheduled a

later hearing on attorney fees for breach of the contract.

{¶7} As to the Dompiers, the trial court granted Fox declaratory judgment,

finding the Dompiers were not bona fide purchases for value because they were present

at the signing of the Proposal. The trial court declared Fox was entitled to remove the

fence and trees on the lower portion of his property and place the materials on the

Dompiers’ property, to cut and remove trees on the west side of the top portion of his

property, to build and maintain two dry dams on the west side of his property, and to

remove trees from and maintain the side of the creek banks adjacent to his property. The

trial court found the testimony related to Fox’s claim against the Dompiers for tortious

interference of property to be too general and speculative, and found because the court

was enforcing the underlying contract in the first instance, there were no resulting

damages to award on the claim.

{¶8} Subsequent to its January 28, 2025 judgment entry following bench trial,

the parties sought an agreed final judgment entry. On June 5, 2025, the trial court entered

judgment incorporating its January 28, 2025 judgment entry; deleting McConkey from

the case by virtue of the suggestion of death filed in the case and the notice of waiver and

release filed in the action, accepting the resolution of a reduction of the purchase price by

$23,000 in full resolution of Fox’s claims for attorney fees against Schwartz, and ordering

the closing the sale of the property by June 9, 2025.

{¶9} It is from the January 28, 2025, and June 5, 2025, judgments of the trial

court the Dompiers prosecute their appeal, assigning as error: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED

APPELLANTS WERE NOT GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS OF THEIR

PROPERTY AND NOT ENTITLED TO GOOD FAITH PURCHASE

PROTECTION.

{¶10} It is also from the January 28, 2025 and June 5, 2025, judgments of the trial

court Fox prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error:

I. THE FAIRFIELD COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY REFUSING TO FIND RYAN AND

ASHLIE DOMPIER LIABLE FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH

CONTRACT AND AWARDING COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE

DAMAGES ARISING THEREFROM PLUS ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED

IN RELATION THERETO.

{¶11} We first address the Dompiers’ assignment of error on appeal.

I.

{¶12} In their sole assignment of error, the Dompiers argue the trial court erred

in finding they were not bona fide purchases for value. We agree the trial court made an

erroneous factual finding, but decline to decide based on procedural posture of this case

whether the Dompiers are or are not bona fide purchasers for value.

{¶13} Fox sought a declaration he was entitled to enforce the provisions of the

Proposal which encroached upon the Dompiers’ land. The Dompiers argued because they were bona fide purchasers for value of the property, they were not subject to these

provisions of the Proposal.

{¶14} A bona fide purchaser for value is a purchaser who takes property: 1) for

valuable consideration, 2) in good faith, and 3) absent notice of any adverse claims. The

Shaker Corlett Land Co. v. Cleveland, 39 Ohio St. 536, 542 (1942).

{¶15} The trial court made the following finding regarding whether the Dompiers

were bona fide purchasers for value:

Testimony and evidence presented at trial confirms that the

Dompiers acquired the Dompier Parcel on October 29, 2019, by General

Warranty Survivorship Deed. The Proposal was signed in the presence of

the Dompiers, on April 30, 2019. The Dompiers, therefore, were aware of

the provisions in the Proposal relating to the respective rights of the Subject

Property and the Dompier Parcel at the time of conveyance. The Court finds

that the Dompiers do not, by law, receive the protections of bona fide

purchases [sic], and took title to the Dompier Parcel subject to the

enforceable provisions in the Proposal.

{¶16} Judgment Entry, January 28, 2025, p. 15 (emphasis added).

{¶17} Both parties agree the trial court’s finding the Dompiers were present when

the Proposal was signed is incorrect. The Dompiers argue the trial court erred in finding

they were not bona fide purchasers because they were not present at the signing, the

contract between Fox and Schwartz was not formed until long after the Dompiers

purchased their parcel, and when they investigated the work they observed on the property prior to their purchase, the Dompiers believed only preparations for farming

were being conducted. In the alternative to a finding by this Court they were in fact bona

fide purchasers for value, the Dompiers’ counsel agreed at oral argument the matter could

be remanded to the trial court for determination of the issue based on the evidence,

excluding the trial court’s erroneous factual conclusion the Dompiers were present at the

signing of the Proposal.

{¶18} Fox argues any error in the trial court’s erroneous factual finding is

harmless. He argues the evidence reflects the Dompiers reviewed the Proposal prior to

purchasing their parcel, and their claim they believed the Proposal was merely a work

order and not a contract is unreasonable. Fox argues the trial court’s alternate theory that

Sammie Schwartz had authority to sell the property on behalf of his parents renders the

Proposal an enforceable contract for the sale of the property, independent of later

communications between the parties.

{¶19} We disagree with Fox’s interpretation of the trial court’s judgment

regarding the date the contract for sale of the land was formed between the parties. The

trial court did find Sammie had authority to sell the property and to sign the Proposal on

behalf of his parents. However, in granting declaratory judgment and specific

performance, the trial court incorporated the later agreement between the parties

pursuant to the 2020 correspondence, and concluded the purchase price was $20,000.00

less than the amount set forth in the Proposal. Had the trial court found the Proposal to

be a fully complete and enforceable contract as of April 30, 2019, the trial court would

have entered judgment in accordance with the purchase price set forth therein.

Therefore, it is clear the trial court did not find the Proposal constituted a complete

contract of sale between the parties because it enforced agreed-upon terms set forth nearly a year after the signing of the Proposal, in subsequent communications between

Fox and Schwartz.

{¶20} However, while there is evidence the Dompiers reviewed the Proposal prior

to purchasing their property, we decline to find the trial court’s error in finding the

Dompiers were present at the signing of the Proposal to be harmless. Because the trial

court did not cite to other evidence regarding the Dompiers’ knowledge of the Proposal

and relied solely on their presence at its signing, we do not know how the trial court would

have evaluated and resolved the other evidence in its role as trier of fact. As stated

recently by the Tenth District Court of Appeals:

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it would be inappropriate for this

court to consider and resolve the issues raised in appellant's second

assignment of error (i.e., the assignments of error asserted by appellant in

the trial court which the trial court did not consider on the basis of

mootness). This is so because "an appellate court limits its review to issues

actually decided by the trial court in its judgment." Lycan v. Cleveland,

2016-Ohio-422, ¶ 21; accord Young v. Univ. of Akron, 2007-Ohio-4663, ¶

22 (10th Dist.) ("Generally, appellate courts do not address issues which the

trial court declined to consider,” issue remanded to trial court for initial

consideration); Crestmont Cleveland Partnership v. Ohio Dept. of Health,

139 Ohio App.3d 928, 935 (10th Dist. 2000) ("Appellate courts also do not

address issues that the trial court declined to consider. . . . In such a

situation, the appellate court should reserve judgment until such time as the

undecided issues are considered by the trial court and that decision is appealed."). Accordingly, the proper course of action is for the trial court to

consider and resolve the issues raised in appellant's second assignment of

error upon remand.

{¶21} Klickovich v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 2026-Ohio-31, ¶ 5 (10th Dist.).

{¶22} Because the trial court based its decision on an erroneous factual finding

and did not appear to consider other evidence in determining whether the Dompiers were

bona fide purchasers for value, we find a remand for a redetermination of the issue is

appropriate in the instant case.

{¶23} The assignment of error is sustained.

{¶24} We next turn to the assignment of error raised by Fox on cross-appeal.

{¶25} Fox argues the trial court erred in finding in favor of the Dompiers on his

tortious interference with contract claim. He specifically argues the trial court erred in

finding he had not proven compensatory damages, and further argues the trial court

should have awarded punitive damages and attorney fees on his claim. We disagree.

{¶26} Although not set forth as such, Appellant essentially argues the trial court’s

judgment in favor of the Dompiers on his tortious interference with contract claim is

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶27} A judgment supported by some competent, credible evidence will not be

reversed by a reviewing court as against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris

Co. v. Foley Construction Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 280 (1978). A reviewing court must not

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court where there exists some competent and

credible evidence supporting the judgment rendered by the trial court. Myers v. Garson, 1993-Ohio-9. The underlying rationale for giving deference to the findings of the trial

court rests with the knowledge the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and

observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use these observations in

weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony. Seasons Coal Co. v. City of Cleveland,

10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984).

{¶28} The elements of tortious interference with contract are: (1) the existence of

a contract, (2) the wrongdoer's knowledge of the contract, (3) the wrongdoer's intentional

procurement of the contract's breach, (4) the lack of justification, and (5) resulting

damages. Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 85 Ohio St. 3d 171, 176.

{¶29} Fox argues the trial court erred in finding he suffered no damages as a result

of the Dompiers’ intentional interference with contract; however, it is apparent from the

trial court’s finding on this claim, the trial court found both: (1) Fox did not prove the

Dompiers engaged in tortious interference with contract, and (2) there are no resulting

damages on the claim:

The Court does not find that damages under this claim are

appropriate. The Court heard testimony regarding efforts undertaken by

Ryan Dompier to convince David Schwartz to not honor the terms of the

contract relating to the Subject Property. Plaintiff also argues that Ryan

Dompier asserted control over the course and strategy of the litigation in

such a way as to interfere with the wishes of the Schwartzes.

The Court finds the testimony related to these matters to be too

general and speculative. No concrete evidence has been presented to

warrant the award of damages relating to tortious interference with the contract. In addition, because the Court is enforcing the underlying

contract in the first instance, there are no resulting damages to award on

this claim.

{¶30} Judgment Entry, January 28, 2025, p. 16.

{¶31} We find the trial court’s finding the Dompiers did not engage in tortious

interference with contract is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. From the

trial court’s finding the evidence of interference was too speculative and general to

support the claim, it is apparent the trial court found Fox’s claim Ryan Dompier steered

David Schwartz into breaching the contract to not be credible. When questioned

concerning whether Schwartz allowed the Dompiers to steer the entire litigation on his

behalf, Schwartz testified it was still his farm, and he had decisions to make on what to

do. Tr. 196. Although the Dompiers were a part of the litigation process and shared an

attorney with Schwartz, David Schwartz testified he received a referral of the attorney

from another man in addition to the Dompiers. David Schwartz testified he did not

discuss the contract terms with Ryan Dompier. We find the trial court’s conclusion the

evidence regarding the claim for tortious interference with contract was too general and

speculative to warrant relief is not against the manifest weight of the evidence,

particularly in light of the trial court’s superior position to this Court in judging the

credibility of the witnesses.

{¶32} The assignment of error on cross-appeal is overruled.

{¶33} The judgment of the Fairfield County Common Pleas Court is reversed as to

its finding the Dompiers were not a bona fide purchaser for value, and remanded for redetermination of the issue consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the

judgment is affirmed.

{¶34} Costs to Appellee/Cross-Appellant David Fox.

By: Hoffman, J.

Montgomery, P.J. and

Baldwin, J. concur.