1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JOHN R. FOUTS, et al., Case No. 24-cv-09325-AMO
8 Plaintiffs, ORDER TRANSFERRING ACTION TO 9 v. WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
10 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, et Re: Dkt. Nos. 1, 4 al., 11 Defendants.
12 13 Before the Court are pro se Plaintiff John R. Fouts and his minor child’s complaint, motion 14 for preliminary injunction, permanent restraining order, and permanent protective order 15 (“Motion”), and several other filings and requests.1 ECF 1, 4. Fouts and his child are residents of 16 Kentucky who suffer from multiple medical conditions. ECF 4 at 3. Fouts alleges dozens of 17 statutory and constitutional violations against myriad Kentucky and federal agencies apparently 18 arising from, among other things, alleged failure to receive social security checks and prescription 19 drugs by mail, exposure to mold and other hazardous conditions in Fouts’s dwelling and 20 subsequent inability to obtain adequate medical care, as well as being subject to an improper Child 21 Protective Services investigation, all in Kentucky. See id. at 8-35. Having read Fouts’s papers 22 and carefully considered the arguments therein, as well as the relevant legal authority, the Court 23 hereby TRANSFERS this action to the Western District of Kentucky pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 24 1406, or alternatively, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), for the following reasons.
25 1 Since initiating this lawsuit, Fouts has filed a series of additional documents, including a 26 “Motion to Compel Compliance with ADA Accommodations,” ECF 14, “Ophthalmological Records Highlighting Critical Unmet Medical Needs,” ECF 16, “HUD Correspondence 27 Highlighting Systemic Failures, Discrimination, ADA Violations, and Neglect,” ECF 17, and 1 On December 23, 2024, the Court issued an order to show cause why the complaint should 2 not be dismissed or transferred for improper venue, as no party or event described in Fouts’s 3 papers had any apparent connection to the Northern District of California. ECF 12. Venue is 4 proper in a judicial district in which (1) any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the 5 state in which the district is located; (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to 6 the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or 7 (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, 8 any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with 9 respect to such action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Similarly, where a defendant is an agency of the 10 United States, venue is proper “in any judicial district in which (A) a defendant in the action 11 resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a 12 substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if 13 no real property is involved in the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). 14 A district court, in its discretion, “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, 15 transfer” an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) if venue is improper. See King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 16 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1992). Courts may sua sponte raise improper venue if, as here, the defendant 17 has not filed a responsive pleading and the parties are provided with an opportunity to respond to 18 the issue. Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). Even where venue is proper 19 under § 1391, a district court may transfer the case to another district for the convenience of the 20 parties and witnesses. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in 21 the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division 22 where it might have been brought.”). The purpose of such transfer is to “prevent the waste of 23 ‘time, energy and money’ and to ‘protect litigants, witnesses, and the public against unnecessary 24 inconvenience and expense.’ ” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). Courts may also 25 transfer cases under § 1404(a) sua sponte. 26 // 27 // 1 Venue is not proper in this District. Fouts and his child reside in Louisville, Kentucky, as 2 do many Defendants.2 Moreover, as far as the Court can discern from Fouts’s submissions, all 3 relevant events and omissions occurred in Kentucky. See, e.g., ECF 4 at 14 (stating that Fouts and 4 his child suffered significant harm due to hazardous living conditions at an apartment with a 5 Louisville, Kentucky address); id. at 22-25 (describing inadequate care by medical care providers 6 at Baptist Health Louisville and University of Louisville). In his response to the Court’s Order, 7 Fouts does not assert that any Plaintiff or Kentucky agency or individual establishes proper venue 8 in this District, nor does he state that any events or omissions occurred in this District. To the 9 extent Fouts suggests that venue is proper here because some Defendants are federal agencies, that 10 is not so. “Venue does not lie in every judicial district where a federal agency has a regional 11 office,” Williams v. United States, No. C-01-0024 EDL, 2001 WL 1352885, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12 23, 2001) (citing Reuben H. Donnelly Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 580 F.2d 264, 267 (7th 13 Cir. 1978)), and courts in the Ninth Circuit have often found that federal agencies are deemed 14 residents of the District of Columbia, regardless of where any regional offices may be located. 15 See, e.g., Al Hada v. Pompeo, Case No. CV 18-8002-DMG (JPRx), 2018 WL 6264999, at *2 16 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2018) (denying motion for preliminary injunction where venue was improper 17 against federal agency defendants); Tsi Akim Maidu of Taylorsville Rancheria v. United States 18 Dep’t of Interior, Case No. 16-cv-07189-LB, 2017 WL 2289203, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 2017) 19 (explaining that “[g]enerally, all federal defendants reside in Washington, D.C.,” and “[v]enue 20 does not lie in every judicial district where a federal agency has a regional office” (citations and 21 internal quotation marks omitted)). While Fouts states that “[n]ationwide programs are directly 22 implicated, and their administration in California is relevant to this case,” ECF 15 at 1, Fouts’s 23 submissions do not allege any such relevance, and the Court cannot discern any. Fouts reiterates 24 the urgency of his situation and past experiences of discrimination in Kentucky, but such factors 25 2 Fouts filed a 22-page exhibit to his Motion listing dozens of Defendants. ECF 15-4. While the 26 residence of each Defendant is not expressly alleged in Fouts’s complaint or otherwise listed in Fouts’s submissions, Fouts lists Louisville, Kentucky addresses for many Defendants. See id. at 27 19-20. Indeed, every address listed for a Defendant is an address outside of California, and as to 1 do not establish proper venue here. Plaintiffs and many Defendants reside in Louisville, 2 Kentucky, which is also where the relevant events occurred.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JOHN R. FOUTS, et al., Case No. 24-cv-09325-AMO
8 Plaintiffs, ORDER TRANSFERRING ACTION TO 9 v. WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
10 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, et Re: Dkt. Nos. 1, 4 al., 11 Defendants.
12 13 Before the Court are pro se Plaintiff John R. Fouts and his minor child’s complaint, motion 14 for preliminary injunction, permanent restraining order, and permanent protective order 15 (“Motion”), and several other filings and requests.1 ECF 1, 4. Fouts and his child are residents of 16 Kentucky who suffer from multiple medical conditions. ECF 4 at 3. Fouts alleges dozens of 17 statutory and constitutional violations against myriad Kentucky and federal agencies apparently 18 arising from, among other things, alleged failure to receive social security checks and prescription 19 drugs by mail, exposure to mold and other hazardous conditions in Fouts’s dwelling and 20 subsequent inability to obtain adequate medical care, as well as being subject to an improper Child 21 Protective Services investigation, all in Kentucky. See id. at 8-35. Having read Fouts’s papers 22 and carefully considered the arguments therein, as well as the relevant legal authority, the Court 23 hereby TRANSFERS this action to the Western District of Kentucky pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 24 1406, or alternatively, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), for the following reasons.
25 1 Since initiating this lawsuit, Fouts has filed a series of additional documents, including a 26 “Motion to Compel Compliance with ADA Accommodations,” ECF 14, “Ophthalmological Records Highlighting Critical Unmet Medical Needs,” ECF 16, “HUD Correspondence 27 Highlighting Systemic Failures, Discrimination, ADA Violations, and Neglect,” ECF 17, and 1 On December 23, 2024, the Court issued an order to show cause why the complaint should 2 not be dismissed or transferred for improper venue, as no party or event described in Fouts’s 3 papers had any apparent connection to the Northern District of California. ECF 12. Venue is 4 proper in a judicial district in which (1) any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the 5 state in which the district is located; (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to 6 the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or 7 (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, 8 any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with 9 respect to such action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Similarly, where a defendant is an agency of the 10 United States, venue is proper “in any judicial district in which (A) a defendant in the action 11 resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a 12 substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if 13 no real property is involved in the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). 14 A district court, in its discretion, “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, 15 transfer” an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) if venue is improper. See King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 16 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1992). Courts may sua sponte raise improper venue if, as here, the defendant 17 has not filed a responsive pleading and the parties are provided with an opportunity to respond to 18 the issue. Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). Even where venue is proper 19 under § 1391, a district court may transfer the case to another district for the convenience of the 20 parties and witnesses. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in 21 the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division 22 where it might have been brought.”). The purpose of such transfer is to “prevent the waste of 23 ‘time, energy and money’ and to ‘protect litigants, witnesses, and the public against unnecessary 24 inconvenience and expense.’ ” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). Courts may also 25 transfer cases under § 1404(a) sua sponte. 26 // 27 // 1 Venue is not proper in this District. Fouts and his child reside in Louisville, Kentucky, as 2 do many Defendants.2 Moreover, as far as the Court can discern from Fouts’s submissions, all 3 relevant events and omissions occurred in Kentucky. See, e.g., ECF 4 at 14 (stating that Fouts and 4 his child suffered significant harm due to hazardous living conditions at an apartment with a 5 Louisville, Kentucky address); id. at 22-25 (describing inadequate care by medical care providers 6 at Baptist Health Louisville and University of Louisville). In his response to the Court’s Order, 7 Fouts does not assert that any Plaintiff or Kentucky agency or individual establishes proper venue 8 in this District, nor does he state that any events or omissions occurred in this District. To the 9 extent Fouts suggests that venue is proper here because some Defendants are federal agencies, that 10 is not so. “Venue does not lie in every judicial district where a federal agency has a regional 11 office,” Williams v. United States, No. C-01-0024 EDL, 2001 WL 1352885, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12 23, 2001) (citing Reuben H. Donnelly Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 580 F.2d 264, 267 (7th 13 Cir. 1978)), and courts in the Ninth Circuit have often found that federal agencies are deemed 14 residents of the District of Columbia, regardless of where any regional offices may be located. 15 See, e.g., Al Hada v. Pompeo, Case No. CV 18-8002-DMG (JPRx), 2018 WL 6264999, at *2 16 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2018) (denying motion for preliminary injunction where venue was improper 17 against federal agency defendants); Tsi Akim Maidu of Taylorsville Rancheria v. United States 18 Dep’t of Interior, Case No. 16-cv-07189-LB, 2017 WL 2289203, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 2017) 19 (explaining that “[g]enerally, all federal defendants reside in Washington, D.C.,” and “[v]enue 20 does not lie in every judicial district where a federal agency has a regional office” (citations and 21 internal quotation marks omitted)). While Fouts states that “[n]ationwide programs are directly 22 implicated, and their administration in California is relevant to this case,” ECF 15 at 1, Fouts’s 23 submissions do not allege any such relevance, and the Court cannot discern any. Fouts reiterates 24 the urgency of his situation and past experiences of discrimination in Kentucky, but such factors 25 2 Fouts filed a 22-page exhibit to his Motion listing dozens of Defendants. ECF 15-4. While the 26 residence of each Defendant is not expressly alleged in Fouts’s complaint or otherwise listed in Fouts’s submissions, Fouts lists Louisville, Kentucky addresses for many Defendants. See id. at 27 19-20. Indeed, every address listed for a Defendant is an address outside of California, and as to 1 do not establish proper venue here. Plaintiffs and many Defendants reside in Louisville, 2 Kentucky, which is also where the relevant events occurred. Because no party resides in this 3 || District, and because the events giving rise to Fouts’s claims did not occur here, the Court thus 4 determines that under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue is not proper. 5 The Court must next determine if it would be in the interest of justice to transfer the case. 6 || See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). “[T]ransfer will generally be in the interest of justice.” Amity 7 Rubberized Pen Co. v. Mkt. Quest Grp. Inc., 793 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations 8 || omitted) (noting the Ninth Circuit has “rarely found that transfer would not serve the interests of 9 || justice,” and that the determination of whether transfer is in the interest of justice is “a low bar” 10 || that “will usually involve a very limited inquiry by the transferring court”). The Court concludes 11 from its limited inquiry that transfer is in the interest of justice so that Fouts’s case may be 12 screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), the Court 13 TRANSFERS this action to the Western District of Kentucky, the proper venue for Louisville, 14 Kentucky. Even if venue were proper in this District, because most parties reside in the Western 3 15 District of Kentucky and the events at issue occurred there, it is clear that the Western District of 16 Kentucky is a more convenient forum under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: January 15, 2025 20 21 Qc ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN 22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28