Foster v. Woods

Michigan Court of Appeals

Foster v. Woods

246 N.W.2d 387, 71 Mich. App. 147, 1976 Mich. App. LEXIS 930

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedSeptember 7, 1976

DocketDocket 25009

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 246 N.W.2d 387 (Foster v. Woods) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Foster v. Woods, 246 N.W.2d 387, 71 Mich. App. 147, 1976 Mich. App. LEXIS 930 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).

Pincite

Opinions

J. H. Gillis, P. J.

Defendant Port Huron Area School District appeals a St. Clair County Circuit Court order denying its motions for accelerated and summary judgment.¹

Plaintiff was born on December 16, 1952. He was injured in an automobile accident in June of 1967 and commenced a civil action for damages against the defendants on December 11, 1974. Such action is properly barred by the statute of limitations.

[149]*149Plaintiff was 19 years old when the Age of Majority Act of 1971 became effective. See MCLA 722.51 et seq.; MSA 25.244(51) et seq. Thus, due to the passage of 1972 PA 87 (see MCLA 600.5851; MSA 27A.5851), the time within which plaintiff could bring his action expired January 1, 1973. Tyner v Fishman, 56 Mich App 240; 223 NW2d 651 (1974), see also Smith v Bordelove, 63 Mich App 384; 234 NW2d 535 (1975), lv den, 395 Mich 772 (1975). Hence, plaintiff commenced his action almost two years too late.

Plaintiff argues that the above cited statutes operate to unreasonably and retroactively shorten the period within which he previously would have been able to bring this action. Cf. Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655; 232 NW2d 636 (1975), Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich 96; 211 NW2d 24 (1973), Reich v State Highway Department, 386 Mich 617; 194 NW2d 700 (1972). These cases are inapposite. The Age of Majority Act of 1971, supra, and 1972 PA 87, supra, did not shorten a limitation period but only changed the age at which disability due to infancy was removed. Once disability was removed, a 1-year period remained during which an action could properly be brought.

Because we find that the motion for accelerated judgment must be granted, we need not discuss the defendant’s argument concerning the motion for summary judgment.

Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting the defendant’s motion for accelerated judgment with costs to the defendant.

W. Van Valkenburg, J., concurred.

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J. H. Gillis, P. J.

Defendant Port Huron Area School District appeals a St. Clair County Circuit Court order denying its motions for accelerated and summary judgment.¹

Plaintiff was born on December 16, 1952. He was injured in an automobile accident in June of 1967 and commenced a civil action for damages against the defendants on December 11, 1974. Such action is properly barred by the statute of limitations.

[149]*149Plaintiff was 19 years old when the Age of Majority Act of 1971 became effective. See MCLA 722.51 et seq.; MSA 25.244(51) et seq. Thus, due to the passage of 1972 PA 87 (see MCLA 600.5851; MSA 27A.5851), the time within which plaintiff could bring his action expired January 1, 1973. Tyner v Fishman, 56 Mich App 240; 223 NW2d 651 (1974), see also Smith v Bordelove, 63 Mich App 384; 234 NW2d 535 (1975), lv den, 395 Mich 772 (1975). Hence, plaintiff commenced his action almost two years too late.

Plaintiff argues that the above cited statutes operate to unreasonably and retroactively shorten the period within which he previously would have been able to bring this action. Cf. Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655; 232 NW2d 636 (1975), Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich 96; 211 NW2d 24 (1973), Reich v State Highway Department, 386 Mich 617; 194 NW2d 700 (1972). These cases are inapposite. The Age of Majority Act of 1971, supra, and 1972 PA 87, supra, did not shorten a limitation period but only changed the age at which disability due to infancy was removed. Once disability was removed, a 1-year period remained during which an action could properly be brought.

Because we find that the motion for accelerated judgment must be granted, we need not discuss the defendant’s argument concerning the motion for summary judgment.

Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting the defendant’s motion for accelerated judgment with costs to the defendant.

W. Van Valkenburg, J., concurred.

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Bluebook (online)

246 N.W.2d 387, 71 Mich. App. 147, 1976 Mich. App. LEXIS 930, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foster-v-woods-michctapp-1976.

Opinions

J. H. Gillis, P. J.

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