Foster v. Foster

654 F. Supp. 2d 348, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80785, 2009 WL 2883036
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 4, 2009
DocketC.A. 09-93 Erie
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 654 F. Supp. 2d 348 (Foster v. Foster) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Foster v. Foster, 654 F. Supp. 2d 348, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80785, 2009 WL 2883036 (W.D. Pa. 2009).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SEAN J. McLAUGHLIN, District. Judge.

I. Introduction

Petitioner Timothy Foster (“Petitioner”) seeks the return of his son, Isaiah Foster, pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 19 I.L.M. 1501 (1980) (hereinafter the “Hague Convention”). The Hague Convention was codified by the United States Congress in the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq. Petitioner contends that Respondent, Holly R. Foster (“Respondent”), wrongfully removed Isaiah from Canada without his permission.

II. Legal Framework of the Hague Convention

The Hague Convention is a multilateral treaty on parental kidnapping to which the United States and Canada are signatories. See 53 Fed.Reg. 23 834 (listing signatory nations); see generally Tsai-Yi Yang v. Fur-Chiang Tsui, 499 F.3d 259 (3rd Cir.2007). The Convention provides a mechanism to ensure the prompt and safe return of children to their habitual residence after they have been wrongfully removed. The Convention also seeks to secure protection for the “rights of custody and of access under the law” of the habitual residence. See Hague Convention, Article 1. “The Convention’s procedures are not designed to settle international custody disputes, but rather to restore the status quo prior to any wrongful removal or retention, and to deter parents from engaging in international forum shopping in custody cases.” *350 See Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280, 287 (3rd Cir.2006).

In order to succeed in a petition seeking return of a child, a petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a wrongful removal or retention occurred. For a removal to be wrongful, a petitioner must establish that: (a) the respondent removed or retained the child from the child’s nation of habitual residence, and (b) under the law of the child’s nation of habitual residence, the petitioner was exercising parental custody rights over the child at the time of removal or retention, or that he would have exercised said rights but for the removal or retention. See Hague Convention, Article 3. See also In re: Application of Ariel Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 390 (3rd Cir.2006).

Once this standard has been satisfied, the burden shifts to the respondent to demonstrate that the wrongful removal was justified by proving one of the affirmative defenses set forth in Article 13 of the Hague Convention. Application of Adan, 437 F.3d at 389-90. If respondent fails to prove any affirmative defense by the requisite standard, the Court must order the prompt return of the child to the country of habitual residence. Id.

In this case, Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner has established the elements of wrongful removal under Article 3 of the Convention. The sole focus of this proceeding is whether the “grave risk of harm” defense set forth in Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention operates to prevent the return of Isaiah to Canada. 1

Under Article 13(b), a court “is not bound to order the return of the child if ... there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 373 (3rd Cir.2005). This exception is to be construed narrowly and requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. Application of Adan, 437 F.3d at 390; 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A).

The United States Department of State has offered the following guidance as to the applicability of this exception:

A review of deliberations on the Convention reveals that “intolerable situation” was not intended to encompass return to a home where money is in short supply, or where educational or other opportunities are more limited than in the requested State. An example of an “intolerable situation” is one in which a custodial parent sexually abuses a child. If the other parent removes or retains the child to safeguard it against further victimization, and the abusive parent then petitions for the child’s return under the Convention, the court may deny the petition. Such action would protect the child from being returned to an “intolerable situation” and subjected to a grave risk of psychological harm.

51 Fed.Reg. at 10,510. “[T]he meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.” United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369, 109 S.Ct. 1183, 103 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989).

The Second Circuit has characterized the exception as follows:

At one end of the spectrum are those situations where repatriation might cause inconvenience or hardship, elimi *351 nate certain educational or economic opportunities, or not comport with the child’s preferences; at the other end of the spectrum are those situations in which the child faces a real risk of being hurt, physically or psychologically, as a result of repatriation. The former do not constitute a grave risk of harm under Article 13(b); the latter do.

Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 162 (2nd Cir.2001). Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had addressed the quantum of proof required by stating:

To meet her burden under the article 13(b) exception, the respondent must establish that the alleged physical or psychological harm is “a great deal more than minimal.” Indeed, the harm must be “something greater than would normally be expected on taking a child away from one parent and passing him to another.” Courts are not to engage in a custody determination or to address such questions as who would be the better parent in the long run.

Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 459 (1st Cir.2000). Each of these formulations and examples was cited favorably by the Third Circuit in Baxter.

Where allegations are made concerning physical abuse, it is axiomatic that the purposes of the Hague Convention are not furthered “by forcing the return of children who were the direct or indirect victims of domestic violence.” Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 604 (6th Cir.2007).

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Bluebook (online)
654 F. Supp. 2d 348, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80785, 2009 WL 2883036, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foster-v-foster-pawd-2009.