Foster v. City of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 7, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-02861
StatusUnknown

This text of Foster v. City of New York (Foster v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Foster v. City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SAMUEL B. FOSTER, JR. Plaintiff, 23-CV-2861 (PAE) -against- ORDER OF SERVICE D.O.C,, et al. Defendants. PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is a pretrial detainee currently confined in the West Facility on Rikers Island, brings this complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement, which includes receiving inadequate medical care while he was confined in the George R. Vierno Center (““GRVC”) on Rikers Island. By order dated April 12, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.! As set forth below, the Court: (1) dismisses all claims against the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”) and adds the City of New York as a defendant; (2) replaces “NLY.C. Health” with the NYC Health + Hospitals (“H+H”); (3) requests that the City of New York waive service; (4) directs service on H+H; and (6) directs the New York City Law Department and H+H to identify the John or Jane Doe defendants. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from

' Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C, § 1915(b)(1).

a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), L91SA(b); see Abbas pv, Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12()(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). DISCUSSION A. Claims against DOC and “N.Y.C. Health” Plaintiff’s claims against the DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York, such as the DOC, is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“{A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, A78 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson vy, City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). Plaintiff also brings claims against “N.Y.C. Health,” which the Count understands is a reference to H+H, which provides health services to individuals detained at Rikers Island, among others.” In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and clear intention to assert claims against the City of New York and H+H, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against the City of

? H+H is a public benefit corporation created under New York State law and has the capacity to be sued, N.Y. Unconsol. Laws §§ 7384(1), 7385(1).

New York and H+H, and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption of this action to replace the DOC and N.Y.C, Health with the City of New York and H+H, respectively, See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. This amendment is without prejudice to any defenses the City of New York and Ht+H may wish to assert. B. Waiver of Service for the City of New York The Clerk of Court is directed to notify the DOC and the New York City Law Department of this order. The Court requests that the City of New York waive service of summons. Cc. Service on H+H Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service.? Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d, 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process... in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP). To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendant H+H through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form (“USM-285 form”) for this defendant. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue a summons and deliver to the Marshals Service all the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon H+H. If the complaint is not served on H+H within 90 days after the date summons is issued, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63

3 Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that a summons be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served the summons and complaint until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that a summons be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date that a summons is issued.

(2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to request an extension of time for service). Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if his address changes, and the Court may dismiss the action if Plaintiff fails to do so. D. Valentin Order to Identify John or Jane Doe Defendants Under Valentin v. Dinkins, a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the district court in identifying a defendant. 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997), In the complaint, Plaintiff seeks to sue three John or Jane Doe defendants, including the correction officer who allegedly denied him assistance on the night of January 11, 2023, at GRVC, and medical staff members who allegedly provided inadequate medical care. Plaintiff also indicates that a Dr. Blackmore was involved in the alleged violations. Plaintiff may have supplied sufficient information to permit the government to identify Dr. Blackmore and the John or Jane Doe defendants he is suing. It is therefore ordered that the New York City Law Department, which is the attorney for and agent of the DOC, must ascertain the identity and badge number of each John or Jane Doe correction officer whom Piaintiff seeks to sue here and the address where each defendant may be served.‘ it is also ordered that H+H must ascertain the identities of Dr.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Emerson v. City of New York
740 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D. New York, 2010)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Foster v. City of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foster-v-city-of-new-york-nysd-2023.