2026 IL App (1st) 250313-U SIXTH DIVISION
March 20, 2026
No. 1-25-0313
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ JAMES FOSTER, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ) v. ) No. 24 L 7568 ) CHICAGO TRIBUNE COMPANY, LLC, ) Honorable ) Stephanie D. Saltouros, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE C.A. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Pucinski and Hyman concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of appellant’s claims for defamation and false light because the complained-of statements were not defamatory per se, and plaintiff failed to plead special damages. No. 1-25-0313
¶2 Plaintiff James Foster, the former head baseball coach at Northwestern University, sued the
defendant Chicago Tribune Company, LLC (Tribune), for defamation and false light invasion of
privacy (false light) following the Tribune’s publication of a story reporting that Foster had been
terminated from his position at Northwestern. The Tribune moved to dismiss, which the circuit
court granted. As explained below, we affirm because the Tribune was not legally liable for
defamation or false light, as the complained-of the statements were true, privileged, or protected
opinions. In doing so, however, we acknowledge that the Tribune’s article stretched editorial limits
and may have caused unwarranted harm to Foster’s reputation.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Foster filed his complaint on July 9, 2024, in which he alleged that Northwestern University
hired him as head baseball coach in the summer of 2022. On July 14, 2023, the Tribune published
a story reporting that Northwestern had fired Foster following an internal investigation initiated
by player complaints. Foster claimed the following statements from the article (hereinafter “the
Northwestern Statements”) were untrue and defamatory per se:
“Other times, they (anonymous sources including former and current players and
individuals close to the program) claimed [Foster] discouraged players from seeing the
team trainer, or pressured injured players to speed up their timeline for returning from
injury in fear they’d lose their spot on the team.”
Foster denied he engaged in the alleged conduct, and contended the passage suggested he lacked
“integrity in the performance of his job.”
¶5 For his false light claim, Foster, who had previously been the head baseball coach at the
University of Rhode Island, isolated the following passage (hereinafter “the Rhode Island
Statement”):
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“In 2011, during Foster’s time at Rhode Island, 20-year-old pitcher Joseph Ciancola
collapsed while running during an outdoor strength and conditioning session with the team
and died three days later at a hospital. Ciancola’s family sued the University eventually
settling for 1.45 million according to the Providence Journal.”
Foster alleged that he had no involvement in the workout precipitating Ciancola’s death, but the
inclusion of the Rhode Island Statement alongside the allegations of player mistreatment at
Northwestern created the opposite impression, constituting false light invasion of privacy. He
further alleged that the Tribune’s article was the proximate cause of his firing and caused him to
suffer injury to his “reputation” and “professional aspirations,” and to generally lose income.
¶6 The Tribune filed a joint motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Illinois Code
of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2022)), arguing in relevant part that (1) the
defamation claim failed because the statements were capable of an innocent construction and
constituted nonactionable opinion; and (2) the false light claim failed because Foster did not
identify an underlying false statement and failed to plead special damages. It noted that the article
was published after Northwestern terminated Foster.
¶7 In its supporting memorandum, the Tribune argued on defamation that the Northwestern
Statements were capable of innocent constructions because they could be “reasonably understood
to mean that Plaintiff was not particularly warm or coddling of student-athletes” and instead was
akin to “the proverbial ‘hard-nosed’ coach often lauded in sports culture.” It also supported the
interpretation that Foster “wanted his players to toughen up.” Neither of these interpretations
constituted defamation per se, even if they were not “complimentary.” Additionally, the Tribune
contended the statements were nonactionable opinion because whether someone felt discouraged
or pressured was subjective and too general to be objectively verified.
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¶8 On false light, the Tribune argued that Illinois law required a plaintiff to plead a specific
false statement to state a claim, but Foster failed to identify a false statement related to the Rhode
Island incident. The Tribune further argued the Rhode Island Statement was capable of an innocent
construction as merely relaying an incident in Foster’s employment history, not that he was
responsible for Ciancola’s death. Finally, the Tribune argued the false light claim was not properly
based on any statements that were defamatory per se, meaning to state a claim Foster had to include
allegations of special damages in his complaint, which he failed to do.
¶9 The Tribune attached the article to its motion. The full article, as it appears in the record,
reads as follows:
Northwestern dismisses Jim Foster as head baseball coach amid controversy By JONATHAN BULLINGTON I jbullington@chicagotribune.com I Chicago Tribune
UPDATED: July 14, 2023 at 1 :12 PM CST
Northwestern University has removed Jim Foster as head baseball coach days after news surfaced of controversy surrounding him.
Foster's dismissal as coach one year into the job was announced to players on a video call Thursday afternoon with Northwestern University President Michael Schill and athletic director Derrick Gragg, sources told the Tribune. Assistant coach Brian Anderson, a former player for the Chicago White Sox who was part of the 2005 World Series winning team, will lead the program "during this time of transition," the university said in a statement.
Foster could not be immediately reached for comment. University officials sent a statement from Gragg saying Foster had been "relieved of his duties effective immediately."
"Nothing will ever be more important to Northwestern than providing its students a place that allows them to develop in the classroom, in the community, and in competition at the absolute highest level, and building a culture which allows our staff to thrive," Gragg said in the statement. "This has been an ongoing situation and many factors were considered
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before reaching this resolution. As the Director of Athletics, I take ownership of our head coaching hires and we will share our next steps as they unfold."
In a message to parents obtained by the Tribune, Gragg said the decision was "weighted on multiple factors, including but not limited to, the authentic feedback we received from your student-athletes in postseason surveys."
Foster's departure comes days after the university let head football coach Pat Fitzgerald go amid a hazing scandal that Schill said caused significant damage to students and the university.
Current and former players, alumni and people close to the baseball program previously told the Tribune that they alerted university administration - including Schill and Gragg - of problematic behavior from Foster starting last fall before the team kicked off its 2023 season. At least some of those complaints spurred a human resources investigation.
The university's investigation found "sufficient evidence" that Foster "engaged in bullying and abusive behavior," according to an internal HR document obtained by the Tribune. The probe went on to conclude that Foster "made an inappropriate comment regarding a female staff member, and spoke negatively about his staff to other staff members."
The HR document says that the results of the investigation were shared with leaders in the Department of Athletics and Recreation "to take appropriate remedial action." It's unclear what action the university took against Foster. who joined Northwestern after six years at Army West Point.
The HR document does not go into great detail about the complaints against Foster. But current and former players and people close to the program who spoke to the Tribune anonymously for fear of retaliation said Foster's interactions with players and staff could be cold at times, and at other times, combative.
There were incidents, they said, when Foster would launch into expletive laced tirades directed at staff. Other times, they claim, he discouraged players from seeing the team trainer. or pressured injured players to speed up their timeline for returning from injury in fear they'd lose their spot on the team.
While these allegations were not made public, signs of trouble were visible. In February, hitting coach and recruiting coordinator Dusty Napoleon, who had been with the team since 2015, left before the first
5 No. 1-25-0313
game of the season. By the time the team returned from that opening road trip, pitching coach Jon Strauss and operations director Chris Beacom had also left the team.
A month later, growing concerns over Foster's leadership began to spread outside the team's inner circle. In March, Northwestern graduate and longtime professional sports broadcaster Glenn Geffner emailed Gragg.
In that email, which Geffner later shared with the Tribune, he wrote: "Eight months after Jim Foster arrived in Evanston, the Northwestern baseball program is in shambles, both on - and more urgently - off the field ."
The email went on to summarize issues Geffner wrote were relayed to him by "current and former members of the Northwestern baseball family spanning decades."
"If the truth about what is happening at Northwestern under Jim Foster becomes widely known, the black eye on the program and the university will be severe," he wrote.
After the team's 10-40 season concluded, 16 players entered the transfer portal, sources told the Tribune, and at least a half-dozen players individually met with Gragg or other athletic department leaders to voice their concerns over Foster.
"The season was a disaster in every way. And the fallout is even worse," Geffner wrote to Gragg in another email, sent in June and shared with the Tribune. "The number of young men entering the transfer portal because of Jim Foster is simultaneously frightening, embarrassing and sad. This is unprecedented in the history of our university. Northwestern has let these student-athletes down."
Foster's previous coaching stints included six years as head coach at Army West Point, two seasons as associate head coach at Boston College, and nine seasons as head coach with the University of Rhode Island.
Former Rhode Island players who spoke to the Tribune called Foster a great leader and a mentor- a teacher, tough, but fair, who cared deeply about his teams.
"He was by far the best coach I've ever had," said Josh Nestor, 39, who played for Foster in 2005 and 2006.
In 2011, during Foster's time at Rhode Island, 20-year-old pitcher Joseph Ciancola collapsed while running during an outdoor strength and conditioning session with the team and died three days later at a hospital.
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Ciancola's family sued the university, eventually settling for $1.45 million, according to the Providence Journal.
¶ 10 Foster responded, arguing, on defamation per se, that the Northwestern Statements had only
one reasonable, defamatory interpretation—that he “compromised the physical health and safety
of his players.” Any other interpretation was unreasonable and thus did not invoke the innocent
construction rule. He stated, “It is nonsensical for any reader to believe that a college coach was
fired because he encouraged his players to be tough and work hard.” Foster further argued that the
Tribune demonstrated its defamatory intent by including the Rhode Island Statement at the end of
the article, which could only have the “sole reasonable interpretation” that “Foster dangerously
disregards the safety of his players, and this is a pattern with his coaching.” Respecting whether
the Northwestern Statements constituted nonactionable opinion, Foster argued the Tribune
presented the Northwestern Statements as factual assertions which could be proven true or false.
¶ 11 On false light, Foster contended that a plaintiff could maintain a false light claim without
also establishing defamation, and in any event, Foster’s claim was predicated on defamatory per
se false statements—the Northwestern Statements—and their inclusion alongside the Rhode Island
Statement. Additionally, Foster argued the innocent construction rule did not apply because there
was no reasonable innocent interpretation of the Rhode Island Statement when considered in the
full context of the article. Finally, Foster argued that because the Northwestern Statements were
defamatory per se, he did not need to allege special damages to state a claim for false light.
¶ 12 The Tribune replied on December 24, 2024, emphasizing that the article never claimed
Foster forced a player “to return to play with an injury,” and contained positive opinions about
Foster’s coaching alongside the Northwestern Statements and Rhode Island Statement.
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¶ 13 On January 24, 2025, the circuit court granted the Tribune’s motion. In its written order, the
court found the Northwestern Statements were capable of a reasonable innocent construction, as
“it cannot be said that the only interpretation of the statements is that [Foster] compromised the
health or safety of his players” because they could also be interpreted “as indicating that some
people considered [Foster’s] coaching style abrasive or harsh.” Moreover, the Northwestern
Statements were nonactionable opinion, as “the words ‘discouraged’ and ‘pressured’ are not
objectively verifiable.” On false light, the court found the innocent construction rule barred the
claim because the Rhode Island Statement could be interpreted as merely relaying Foster’s
employment history. The claim also failed because, based on the findings that the Northwestern
Statements were not defamatory per se, Foster needed to plead special damages to sustain a false
light claim, which he failed to do. Finally, the court specified that it dismissed the entire complaint
pursuant to section 2-619, and the false light claim specifically under section 2-615, as well. This
appeal followed.
¶ 14 JURISDICTION
¶ 15 The circuit court granted the Tribune’s motion for summary judgment on January 24, 2025,
and Foster filed his notice of appeal on February 19, 2025, giving this court jurisdiction pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6) and Illinois
Supreme Court Rules 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and 303 (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 16 ANALYSIS
¶ 17 On appeal, Foster argues each of his claims was valid and should not have been dismissed.
We begin with defamation.
¶ 18 I. Defamation
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¶ 19 The circuit court dismissed Foster’s defamation claim under section 2-619 of the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2022)). A motion to dismiss under section 2-
619 is based upon a legal defect that prevents the plaintiff from pursuing their claim, including, as
relevant here, that one or more affirmative defenses bar the claim. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West
2022).
¶ 20 To successfully state a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must allege facts as to three
elements: (1) the defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff, which the defendant then
(2) published to a third party without the privilege to do so, resulting in (3) the plaintiff suffering
damages. project44, Inc. v. FourKites, Inc., 2024 IL 129227, ¶ 20. There are two types of
defamatory statements—defamation per se and defamation per quod. Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d
490, 501 (2006). Foster limits his defamation claim to the argument that the Northwestern
Statements constituted defamation per se.
¶ 21 A defamatory statement constitutes defamation per se if it fits one of five categories:
“(1) words that impute the commission of a criminal offense; (2) words that impute infection
with a loathsome communicable disease; (3) words that impute an inability to perform or
want of integrity in the discharge of duties of office or employment; (4) words that prejudice
a party, or impute a lack of ability, in his or her trade, profession or business;” and (5) words
that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication. Bryson v. News America
Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 88 (1996) (noting the first four categories derive from
common law, while the fifth was a statutory creation).
Foster argues that the Northwestern Statements implicated both categories (3) and (4). A
defamatory per se statement is so inherently offensive that actual damage to reputation is presumed
and damages need not be specifically alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at 87-88.
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¶ 22 Not all statements that fit the defamation per se categories will be actionable as defamation.
One such exception is for statements of opinion. Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing
Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 581 (2006). “[A] defamatory statement is constitutionally protected [as
opinion] only if it cannot be reasonably construed as stating actual facts.” Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 508.
Guiding considerations for this analysis include “whether the statement has a precise and readily
understood meaning; whether the statement is verifiable; and whether the statement’s literary or
social context signals that it has factual content.” Solaia, 221 Ill. 2d at 581. “[T]he question of
whether a statement of opinion is actionable as defamation is one of degree; the vaguer and more
generalized the opinion, the more likely the opinion is nonactionable as a matter of law.” Wynne
v. Loyola University of Chicago, 318 Ill. App. 3d 443, 452 (2000).
¶ 23 Another defense is the innocent construction rule, under which “even if an alleged statement
falls into one of the categories of words that are defamatory per se, it will not be actionable per
se if it is reasonably capable of an innocent construction.” Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill. 2d 478, 499
(2009). If a statement is reasonably capable of both innocent and defamatory constructions, the
circuit court must give it the innocent construction. Id. at 500. “The preliminary construction of an
allegedly defamatory statement is a question of law, and our review therefore is de novo.” Id. at
492. We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Eberhardt v. Village of Tinley Park,
2024 IL App (1st) 230139, ¶ 20.
¶ 24 We find the Northwestern Statements were not reasonably understood as communicating
facts, and instead constituted statements of opinion, and were thus nonactionable. We affirm on
this basis alone, and do not comment on the lower court’s analysis of whether the Northwestern
Statements were capable of a reasonable innocent construction.
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¶ 25 First, we must clarify what the article did and did not say. The Tribune did not report that
Foster in fact “pressured” his players to return early from injuries, or “discouraged” his players
from seeking medical care from the trainer. The statements in the article were that sources close
to the program “claimed” Foster engaged in that conduct in comments they made to the Tribune.
Thus, the actual statements in the article are simply that certain sources made certain comments to
the Tribune, and the truth of whether those sources in fact made those comments to the Tribune is
not challenged in Foster’s complaint. As such, facially, there is no claim that the Northwestern
Statements are false and thus cannot form the basis of a defamation claim. See Andrews v. At
World Properties, LLC, 2023 IL App (1st) 220950, ¶ 16 (“truth is an absolute defense to
defamation”); project44, 2024 IL 129227, ¶ 20 (The first element of a defamation claim is that the
defendant made a false statement.).
¶ 26 For Foster to clear this initial hurdle, we would have to accept his characterization of the
Northwestern Statements as an attempt to hide defamatory statements in the deceptive form of
reporting what a third party stated. Under Illinois law, one is not shielded from liability for
defamation simply because they republished a third party’s defamatory comments, or by
obfuscating a defamatory comment using thinly veiled opinion language. Snitowsky v. NBC
Subsidiary (WMAQ-TV), Inc., 297 Ill. App. 3d 304, 310-11 (1998); see also Solaia, 221 Ill. 2d at
581 (“a false assertion of fact can be defamatory even when couched within apparent opinion or
rhetorical hyperbole”). Even accepting that the Northwestern Statements can be understood as
covered by these aspects of defamation law, however, Foster’s claim still fails because no
reasonable reader would understand the Northwestern Statements as conveying facts.
¶ 27 Each of the factors Illinois courts use to analyze whether a statement is one of fact or opinion
weighs in the Tribune’s favor. Respecting precision versus generality, the Tribune took pains to
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generalize—it did not use any player’s name, identify dates, time frames, or incidents, and did not
describe anything about the nature of any particular injury. Such statements would have
represented concrete details with precise meanings, but the Northwestern Statements use
abstraction to prevent the appearance of attempting to convey facts with precise meanings, making
this factor weigh in favor of opinion. Schivarelli v. CBS Inc., 333 Ill. App. 3d 755, 762 (2002) (A
statement was opinion when it was made without “any specific factual context.”)
¶ 28 On verifiability, the Tribune did not reprint anything that was objectively verifiable, but
instead the mental impressions of individuals about amorphous events given no definite time or
place. Id.; see also Hopewell v. Vitullo, 299 Ill. App. 3d 513, 520 (1998) (The statement that the
plaintiff Hopewell, who was fired as treasurer and CFO of the Carol Mosely Braun for U.S. Senate
Committee, was “incompetent” was one of opinion because it was “too broad, conclusory, and
subjective to be objectively verifiable,” as verification would “entail an endless analysis of each
and every fact connected with the execution of Hopewell’s duties.”). A report that someone felt
“pressured” or “discouraged” is facially only relaying an individual’s subjective viewpoint and is
only reasonably understood as such. Brennan v. Kadner, 351 Ill. App. 3d 963, 969 (2004) (citing
Moriarty v. Greene, 351 Ill. App. 3d 225, 235 (2000. Whether Foster’s conduct constituted
pressuring or discouragement cannot be objectively verified through witness interviews or other
means to show Foster engaged in any course of wrongful conduct, as the conclusion would be
dependent on each witness’ subjective experience of what constitutes pressure or discouragement.
The use of such vague terms again suggests to the reader that the Tribune is not making specific
allegations of fact.
¶ 29 Finally, regarding the literary or social context, the Tribune’s framing of the Northwestern
Statements as the summations of third party complaints about how some players felt takes the
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Northwestern Statements out of the category of statements that could be reasonably be understood
as conveying facts. Foster suggests our outcome should be impacted by the fact the Tribune did
not publish its comments in the “Opinion” section of its newspaper, but that is not the standard for
determining whether a statement constitutes nonactionable opinion, and Foster presents no caselaw
to the contrary. While it is true that the Northwestern Statements appeared in an article containing
factual reporting, the Tribune specifically prefaced the Northwestern Statements themselves as the
accounts of anonymous sources who were either current or former players, or individuals close to
the program, distinguishing the statements from those other portions of the article purporting to
relate specific facts. Immediately, then, the literary context for the reader is that this portion of the
article is meant to relay the subjective accounts of third parties in the context of an internal
investigation into whether Foster should maintain his employment, not objective facts. See Quinn
v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 276 Ill. App. 3d 861, 867 (1995) (“In the social context of employment
interviews, evaluations of an employee may include comments which communicate subjective
opinions.”).
¶ 30 In so finding, we acknowledge Foster’s argument that the bare fact of reporting statements
from a third party does not in and of itself shield a defendant from liability for defamation. See
Snitowsky, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 311 (A “republisher remains liable for damages caused by the
republication of defamatory material.”). This argument cannot save Foster, however, because his
defamation claim fails due to the Northwestern Statements not being defamatory, not on any issue
of republisher liability.
¶ 31 Similarly, Foster’s lengthy discussion of Owen v. Carr, 113 Ill. 2d 273 (1986), does nothing
to aid his position. In Owen, the defendant Carr, an attorney, gave a quote to the National Law
Journal regarding a case the plaintiff Owen had brought against Carr’s client, Judge William B.
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Starnes. Owen, 113 Ill. 2d at 276. Carr’s comments intimated that Own brought the suit against
Judge Starnes for improper purposes. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court found, in relevant part, that
there was a general constitutional protection for expressions of opinion per the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S 323 (1974), and that Carr’s
comment fell under this protection because, “the statements may reasonably be viewed as an
expression of Carr’s opinion regarding his client’s allegations against Owen.” Id. at 280-81. Foster
argues, Owen was decided before the United States Supreme Court limited the conception of what
is protected opinion in defamation cases in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990)
(rejecting an “artificial dichotomy between ‘opinion’ and fact and finding only statements “that
cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts” are nonactionable).
¶ 32 Owen does not alter our conclusion. Foster is correct that the standard for what constitutes
opinion as established in Milkovich is the proper standard, but our finding is based on that standard.
As explained above, the Tribune took multiple steps to remove the Northwestern Statements from
statements of fact, and it is these levels of abstraction that pushed the Statements from specific and
verifiable to general and subjective, and thus not reasonably understood as an attempt to state
actual facts, satisfying Milkovich. Id.; see Wynne, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 452. The Tribune’s failure to
present the Northwestern Statements as opposing sides of a disputed issue does not affect whether
the statements were opinions, fully obviating Foster’s discussion of Owen.
¶ 33 II. False Light
¶ 34 The circuit court dismissed Foster’s false light claim pursuant to section 2-615. 735 ILCS
5/2-615 (West 2022). “A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 challenges the legal sufficiency
of the complaint, so our review of such a dismissal is de novo.” Rice v. Marathon Petroleum Corp.,
2024 IL 129628, ¶ 22. In considering a section 2-615 motion to dismiss, a court will accept all
14 No. 1-25-0313
well-pleaded facts as true and construe the complaint’s allegations in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff to determine if the allegations are sufficient to state a claim upon which the court may
grant relief. Id.
¶ 35 To establish a claim for false light, a plaintiff must allege he was “(i) being placed in a false
light before the public due to the defendant’s actions, (ii) the false light would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person, and (iii) the defendant acted with actual malice, that is, with knowledge
the statements were false or reckless disregard for their truthfulness.” Rosenbaum v. Samler, 2025
IL App (1st) 240039, ¶ 35. If a false light claim is not predicated on statements that are defamatory
per se, allegations of special damages are mandatory to state a claim. Chang Hyun Moon v. Kang
Jun Liu, 2015 IL App (1st) 143606, ¶ 17. The innocent construction rule applies to false light
claims. Benton v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 2020 IL App (1st) 190549, ¶ 87.
¶ 36 Foster’s false light theory is a unique attempt at bootstrapping the true-on-its-face Rhode
Island Statement into becoming actionable for false light when considered in combination with the
Northwestern Statements. Specially, because he claims that by printing the Rhode Island Statement
in the same article with the defamatory per se Northwestern Statements, the Tribune created the
offensive and inaccurate impression that because Foster was a coach who overworked his players,
he must have been at fault for Ciancola’s death.
¶ 37 We find that Foster cannot sustain his false light claim because he did not include allegations
describing his special damages in his complaint. Foster’s false light claim is predicated on the
characterization of the Northwestern Statements as defamatory per se, a characterization we reject.
This leaves Foster with no defamatory per se comments underlying his false light claim, meaning
that, under Illinois law, it was incumbent upon him to include allegations of special damages in
his complaint to state a claim. Chang Hyun Moon, 2015 IL App (1st) 143606, ¶¶ 17-18. He did
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not, and indeed, does not even claim to have done so, as the complaint only lists the most
generalized categories of damages to his reputation, aspirations and income, along with the
paradoxical proposition that an article reporting he had been fired in the past somehow caused that
firing. Such allegations, of course, fall far short of the particularity needed to properly plead special
damages. See Rivera v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2021 IL App (1st) 200735, ¶ 49. Foster protests
that he was not involved in the events leading to Ciancola’s death, and we have no reason on this
record to doubt this representation. But the article did not state that he was, meaning that to
successfully state a claim, Foster needed to include certain allegations which are simply absent
from his complaint.
¶ 38 Before concluding, we note that the parties debate at length whether, under Illinois law, a
plaintiff may sustain a false light claim without specifying a particular false statement on which
the claim is based. Foster contends a plaintiff need not do so. We do not resolve whether Foster’s
proposition is correct, as his argument does not properly raise this issue; Foster’s false light theory,
instead, attempts to bootstrap a true statement into being actionable by combining it with the
allegedly false statements of fact in the Northwestern Statements.
¶ 39 CONCLUSION
¶ 40 The Northwestern Statements were statements of opinion and thus nonactionable, meaning
Foster failed to sufficiently plead the elements of false light by not including allegations regarding
special damages. In so holding, we note that the Tribune’s reporting on Foster’s time at Rhode
Island included extraneous details that bore little connection to Foster. While such editorial choices
may fairly be criticized as lacking sound journalistic judgment, the First Amendment protects even
reporting that may be viewed as imprudent or lacking editorial restraint. Because the publication
is legally protected, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Foster’s complaint.
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¶ 41 Affirmed.