Foss v. King County

Opinion

1 2 3

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 MAGDALENA K. FOSS, CASE NO. 2:22-cv-01728-JHC 8

Plaintiff, ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 9 v. 10 LAURA M. ALSPACH, PAUL 11 HENDERSON, JEREMY MUIR, MARK KONOSKE, SHAWN LEDFORD, and KING 12 COUNTY, WASHINGTON,

13 Defendants. 14

15 I 16 INTRODUCTION 17 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Laura M. Alpach, Mark Konoske, 18 Shawn Ledford, and King County’s (Defendants’1) Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. # 42. 19 The Court has considered: the materials filed in support of and in opposition to the motion; 20 pertinent portions of the record; and the applicable law. Being fully advised, the Court 21 GRANTS the motion and dismisses the Fourteenth Amendment claim under Section 1983, the 22 Section 1985 claim, and the Monell claim.2 23

1 Defendant Jeremy Muir has filed a separate motion to dismiss. Dkt. # 50. 24 2 There is currently no malicious prosecution claim pending in this matter. 1 II 2 DISCUSSION 3 A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standards.

4 When considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court construes the complaint in the 5 light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, 6 Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 7 contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 8 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 9 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 10 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 11 misconduct alleged.” Id. But legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and 12 “must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. A court may dismiss a complaint under

13 Rule 12(b)(6) that lacks a “cognizable legal theory” or fails to allege “sufficient facts” under a 14 cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 15 B. Section 1983 – Fourteenth Amendment. 16 The amended complaint does not make clear the factual basis for any Fourteenth 17 Amendment Claim under Section 1983. Dkt. # 34. Nor does Plaintiff’s briefing appear to 18 address this issue in a clearly discernible manner. Dkt. # 49. To the extent this claim depends on 19 the existence of a criminal prosecution of Plaintiff (e.g., if it is based on Garrity), it fails, as 20 Plaintiff has conceded that there was no such prosecution. Dkt. # 1 at 8. Thus, the Court must 21 dismiss this claim. 22 /

23 / 24 1 C. Section 1985(3) – Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights. 2 Defendants submit what appears to be a meritorious argument for dismissing the Section 3 1985 claim: Plaintiff’s failure to allege class-based animus. Plaintiff does not respond to this

4 argument. The Court dismisses this claim. 5 D. Monell Claim. 6 For the reasons argued by Defendants, the Court dismisses the Monell claim as well. 7 Mainly, it is unclear what policy or custom Plaintiff is alleging. The amended complaint alleges, 8 “[T]here is a custom or policy of the KSCO [sic] of allowing law enforcement personnel such as 9 Defendant, JEREMY MUIR to prey upon female co-workers and stalk and prey on female 10 members of the public at-large, without any significant consequences.” Dkt. # 34 at 13. Yet it 11 also alleges, “[T]here is a year’s long practice and policy of command-level KSCO [sic] 12 employees weaponizing the IIU system against the Plaintiff[.]” Id. at 14. It then says that King

13 County “has a history of policies and customs that empower the corrupt practices in its law 14 enforcement division.” Id. at 15. And Plaintiff’s briefing says, “King County has a policy and 15 custom of turning a blind eye to violations of policy and law by its employees[.]” Dkt. # 49 at 9. 16 Along with this lack of clarity, none of the claimed policies or customs appear to be alleged as 17 the type of “longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard operating 18 procedure’ of the local governmental entity.” See Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th 19 Cir. 1992) (quoting Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). 20 III 21 CONCLUSION 22 For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion and DISMISSES the Fourteenth 23 Amendment claim under Section 1983 and the Section 1985 claim with prejudice, and the 24 Monell claim without prejudice. l Dated this 17th day of October, 2023. 2 3 LJok. 4. Chu 4 John H. Chun United States District Judge 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24