Walker, J.,
after stating the facts: The correctness of the principles by which statutes should be construed, as stated with much clearness in the brief of the plaintiff’s counsel, may be readily conceded, and yet we are of opinion, if the statute in question is examined in the light of those principles, the plaintiff has not shown himself entitled to the relief which he
seeks. Some of the cardinal rules for the interpretation of a statute are that it should be construed with reference to its general scope and the intent of the Legislature in enacting it and, in order to ascertain what was the purpose, we must give effect to all of its clauses and provisions. Where the language used is ambiguous, or admits of more than one meaning, it is to be taken in such a sense as will conform to the scope of the act and effectuate its object. The use of inapt, inaccurate or improper terms or phrases will not invalidate the statute, provided the real meaning of the Legislature can be gathered from the context or from the general purpose and tenor of the enactment. Clerical errors or misprisions which, if not corrected, would render the statute unmeaning or incapable of reasonable construction or would defeat or impair its intended operation, will not necessarily vitiate the act, for they will be corrected, if practicable. Nor will mere inadvertences or omissions have that effect, provided they can be supplied by reference to the context or to other statutes, and the true reading of the statute made obvious and its real meaning apparent. These principles are fully set forth and aptly illustrated, by reference to decided cases, in Black on Interpretation of Laws, sections 30 to 39. Guided by them, we should be able-to ascertain and declare what was the intention of the Legislature with reference to the matter involved in this case, and whether it has been sufficiently expressed in the act under consideration. It seems that the leading purpose was to reduce expenses and to provide for the management of the affairs of the county in the future upon a more economical basis. At the same time, it was thought fair and just that a radical change from the fee system to the salary system should not take effect until the terms of those now in office should expire. In construing the act, we should give proper heed to this controlling idea and bring the different provisions of the statute into harmony with it, if this can reasonably be done. The office of auditor of the county was created, and at the same time filled.
by the appointment of Stokely, and it is expressly provided that his term shall begin on the first day of July, 1905. So far, there can be no misunderstanding. Section 12 prescribed the duties of the auditor and among others therein enumerated is the duty of making out a copy of the tax list of each township for the tax collector therein. He is further required to perform “all the duties required by section. 74 of the Public Laws of 1905, to be performed by the register of deeds, and to prepare for publication the annual statements required by law.” One difficulty in construing the act, and an insuperable obstacle as the plaintiff’s counsel contend, in the way of enforcing the provision which we have quoted, is that there is no reference therein to any particular chapter of the Acts of 1905. It is argued that this is a patent ambiguity which defeats the operation of that clause. “A misdescription or misnomer in a statute will not vitiate the enactment or render it inoperative, provided the means of identifying the person or thing intended, apart from the erroneous description, are clear, certain and convincing.” Black, Int. of Laws, sec. 58. Under this rule, we may call to our aid anything in the act itself or even in the alleged erroneous description, which sufficiently points to something else as furnishing certain evidence of what was meant, though the reference to the extraneous matter may not in itself be full and accurate. The rule, even when literally or strictly construed, does not require that the erroneous description shall be altogether rejected in making the search for the true meaning, but it may be used in connection with anything outside of the statute to which it refers and which itself, when examined, makes the meaning clear. The erroneous description may in this way be helped out by extraneous evidence. Black, supra, sec. 38. But ours is not so much an erroneous, as an inaccurate description, and the question is whether its words are adequate to express with sufficient certainty the intention, of the Legislature. It has been held that if a later act expressly refers to a designated
section of an earlier one, to wbicb it can have no application, but there is another section of the prior act to which, and to which alone, in view of the subject matter, the- later act can properly refer, it will be read according to the manifest purpose of the Legislature, and the misdescription will not prevent the reasonable construction that the Legislature intended to refer to the latter section.
School Directors v. School Directors,
73 Ill., 249;
Plank Road Co. v. Reynolds,
3 Wis., 258; Black,
supra,
see. 38.
, When we turn to chapter 590 of the Acts of 1905, commonly known as the “Machinery Act,” we find that section 74 prescribes the duties of the register of deeds with reference to computing the taxes and preparing the tax lists of the county, and this is the only chapter of those acts that contains as many as seventy-four sections, and it is the only one referring to such duties. It is true that chapter 590 was ratified two days later than chapter 703, but this should not have the effect of defeating the will of the Legislature otherwise sufficiently declared. Taking judicial notice of the course of legislation as affected by the requirements of the Constitution, Article II, section 14, that a law imposing taxes cannot pass unless a bill for the purpose has been read on three several days, we must assume that the bill which finally became chapter 590 was pending in one of the houses of the General Assembly at the time that chapter 703 became a law, and was nearing its completion, being in the last of the formative stages of legislation. It was not possible then, to indicate by number the chapter of the laws to which reference was made, as the arrangement of the acts into chapters had not then been effected, but it was possible to indicate the section. We have no doubt as to the intention, and conclude that the mere designation of the section was sufficient, under the circumstances, for us to identify with certainty the chapter and section to which the reference was made.
This brings us to the consideration of the other question,
whether it was intended that the act should have operation from July 1, 1905, as to the duties mentioned in that section. By section 12 of chapter 703 of the Acts of 1905, the auditor is required to perform various duties, the most, if not all of which, were the duties of other officers at that time. In the view we take of the case, it is not necessary that we should stop to inquire whether all of said duties appertained to other offices then existing, or whether some of them were newly created.
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Walker, J.,
after stating the facts: The correctness of the principles by which statutes should be construed, as stated with much clearness in the brief of the plaintiff’s counsel, may be readily conceded, and yet we are of opinion, if the statute in question is examined in the light of those principles, the plaintiff has not shown himself entitled to the relief which he
seeks. Some of the cardinal rules for the interpretation of a statute are that it should be construed with reference to its general scope and the intent of the Legislature in enacting it and, in order to ascertain what was the purpose, we must give effect to all of its clauses and provisions. Where the language used is ambiguous, or admits of more than one meaning, it is to be taken in such a sense as will conform to the scope of the act and effectuate its object. The use of inapt, inaccurate or improper terms or phrases will not invalidate the statute, provided the real meaning of the Legislature can be gathered from the context or from the general purpose and tenor of the enactment. Clerical errors or misprisions which, if not corrected, would render the statute unmeaning or incapable of reasonable construction or would defeat or impair its intended operation, will not necessarily vitiate the act, for they will be corrected, if practicable. Nor will mere inadvertences or omissions have that effect, provided they can be supplied by reference to the context or to other statutes, and the true reading of the statute made obvious and its real meaning apparent. These principles are fully set forth and aptly illustrated, by reference to decided cases, in Black on Interpretation of Laws, sections 30 to 39. Guided by them, we should be able-to ascertain and declare what was the intention of the Legislature with reference to the matter involved in this case, and whether it has been sufficiently expressed in the act under consideration. It seems that the leading purpose was to reduce expenses and to provide for the management of the affairs of the county in the future upon a more economical basis. At the same time, it was thought fair and just that a radical change from the fee system to the salary system should not take effect until the terms of those now in office should expire. In construing the act, we should give proper heed to this controlling idea and bring the different provisions of the statute into harmony with it, if this can reasonably be done. The office of auditor of the county was created, and at the same time filled.
by the appointment of Stokely, and it is expressly provided that his term shall begin on the first day of July, 1905. So far, there can be no misunderstanding. Section 12 prescribed the duties of the auditor and among others therein enumerated is the duty of making out a copy of the tax list of each township for the tax collector therein. He is further required to perform “all the duties required by section. 74 of the Public Laws of 1905, to be performed by the register of deeds, and to prepare for publication the annual statements required by law.” One difficulty in construing the act, and an insuperable obstacle as the plaintiff’s counsel contend, in the way of enforcing the provision which we have quoted, is that there is no reference therein to any particular chapter of the Acts of 1905. It is argued that this is a patent ambiguity which defeats the operation of that clause. “A misdescription or misnomer in a statute will not vitiate the enactment or render it inoperative, provided the means of identifying the person or thing intended, apart from the erroneous description, are clear, certain and convincing.” Black, Int. of Laws, sec. 58. Under this rule, we may call to our aid anything in the act itself or even in the alleged erroneous description, which sufficiently points to something else as furnishing certain evidence of what was meant, though the reference to the extraneous matter may not in itself be full and accurate. The rule, even when literally or strictly construed, does not require that the erroneous description shall be altogether rejected in making the search for the true meaning, but it may be used in connection with anything outside of the statute to which it refers and which itself, when examined, makes the meaning clear. The erroneous description may in this way be helped out by extraneous evidence. Black, supra, sec. 38. But ours is not so much an erroneous, as an inaccurate description, and the question is whether its words are adequate to express with sufficient certainty the intention, of the Legislature. It has been held that if a later act expressly refers to a designated
section of an earlier one, to wbicb it can have no application, but there is another section of the prior act to which, and to which alone, in view of the subject matter, the- later act can properly refer, it will be read according to the manifest purpose of the Legislature, and the misdescription will not prevent the reasonable construction that the Legislature intended to refer to the latter section.
School Directors v. School Directors,
73 Ill., 249;
Plank Road Co. v. Reynolds,
3 Wis., 258; Black,
supra,
see. 38.
, When we turn to chapter 590 of the Acts of 1905, commonly known as the “Machinery Act,” we find that section 74 prescribes the duties of the register of deeds with reference to computing the taxes and preparing the tax lists of the county, and this is the only chapter of those acts that contains as many as seventy-four sections, and it is the only one referring to such duties. It is true that chapter 590 was ratified two days later than chapter 703, but this should not have the effect of defeating the will of the Legislature otherwise sufficiently declared. Taking judicial notice of the course of legislation as affected by the requirements of the Constitution, Article II, section 14, that a law imposing taxes cannot pass unless a bill for the purpose has been read on three several days, we must assume that the bill which finally became chapter 590 was pending in one of the houses of the General Assembly at the time that chapter 703 became a law, and was nearing its completion, being in the last of the formative stages of legislation. It was not possible then, to indicate by number the chapter of the laws to which reference was made, as the arrangement of the acts into chapters had not then been effected, but it was possible to indicate the section. We have no doubt as to the intention, and conclude that the mere designation of the section was sufficient, under the circumstances, for us to identify with certainty the chapter and section to which the reference was made.
This brings us to the consideration of the other question,
whether it was intended that the act should have operation from July 1, 1905, as to the duties mentioned in that section. By section 12 of chapter 703 of the Acts of 1905, the auditor is required to perform various duties, the most, if not all of which, were the duties of other officers at that time. In the view we take of the case, it is not necessary that we should stop to inquire whether all of said duties appertained to other offices then existing, or whether some of them were newly created. It is sufficient for us to say that one of the duties, namely, the examination of all books and papers of the county officers, for the purpose of keeping a record of fees and commissions received by them, cannot be performed under the terms of the act until after the next election, as the liability of the said officers to account for fees and commissions received by them, cannot arise during their present terms of office — it being manifest that the change from the fee to the salary system was not intended to take'effect until after the present terms expire. But there is no reason why the act should not be allowed to have full operation as to all duties not within that category. The language is explicit, that the auditor shall prepare the tax lists and perform all other duties prescribed by section 74 of the Laws of 1905, and this provision must have effect from July 1, 1905, when the auditor’s term, of office commenced, unless by a subsequent section its operation is postponed. Section 22 provides as follows: “This act shall be in full force and effect from and after the expiration of the term of office of the officers elected for said county at the election in November, 1904.” The use of the adjective “full” implies that the act shall have some force and effect at once and its clear meaning is that it shall have such force and effect as to all official duties, except those which cannot be performed until after the expiration of the present terms of the county officers. This must be true, if we give to the word “full” its natural and ordinary meaning and then construe the act with due regard to the manifest intention of the Legisla
ture. "Wbeu an act creates an office to commence at a certain time and direct its incumbent to perform certain duties which, though formerly belonging to another office, are required to be preformed annually at a specified time, the officer must perform them, if at all, at the time specified. There is nothing in this act to restrict the plain, direct and positive requirement of the statute that he shall prepare the tax lists, to a particular period of time, and there is no good reason why the operation of the act in this respect should be deferred. The mere fact that the duty thus required of him had theretofore been annexed to another office and that the present incumbent of that office will be deprived of the compensation allowed for the service, is not sufficient to override the plain intent of the statute. Again the act refers to the duties of the register of deeds as prescribed in section 74 of the Laws of 1905. That section requires those duties to be performed in the years 1905 and 1906, and it must be the clear intendment that those duties shall be performed by the auditor in the same years. This is in accord with the spirit and intent of chapter 703 to reduce expenses as speedily as is consistent with a just regard for existing rights. The abolition of the fee system was postponed until the expiration of the present official terms, for reasons which appeared to the Legislature to be sound and just, but they do not apply to the mere transfer of some of the duties of one officer to another then created by the statute. Nor is there any constitutional objection to such transfer. The office is a constitutional one, it is true, but the duties 'are statutory. The Legislature may within reasonable limits change the duties and diminish the emoluments of the office if the public welfare requires it to be done, and to this the incumbent must submit.
Bunting v. Gales,
77 N. C., 283;
Mial v. Ellington,
134 N. C., 131;
Hoke v. Henderson,
15 N. C., at p. 20.
We have not adverted to the fact that the Legislature has not only created the office of auditor, but has filled it by direct
appointment, instead of waiting for its incumbent to be chosen at the next election, which shows that there was considered to be a pressing necessity for immediate change from the old system to the new, in respect -to the duties assigned to the auditor by the act. His salary is fixed at $1,200, and unless our construction be the correct one, he will have very little to give, in the way of public service, in return for what he will receive. His salary would seem to be out of all proportion to the work which would be left for him to do. This result is not consistent with the main purpose and the evident policy of the enactment.
The expression used in section 22, namely, “this act shall be in full force and effect,” cannot be found in any other statute and they must have been intended, by implication, to give the act immediate operation as .to those matters which pertained to the office of auditor, created by it, for the regulation of which there seemed to be urgent need. If this is not the meaning, we are unable to understand what it is. The provision in regard to the duty of preparing the tax lists, if put into immediate effect, will not conflict with the other provisions concerning the substitution of salaries for fees. This is not true as to some of the other duties imposed upon the auditor, and, as to the latter, the act will take effect only after the existing terms of the officers expire.
The statute must have some effect, for it was clearly so intended, and we can give it none unless we hold that the auditor is to perform the duties of the register of deeds in respect to the tax lists, this year and the next, and, of course, thereafter unless the Legislature should otherwise provide.
There was error in the ruling of the court upon the facts agreed. The judgment will be reversed and judgment entered for the defendant.
Eeversed.