Fortson v. Henness

District Court, S.D. Ohio·Decided June 15, 2023·No. 1:22-cv-00410·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

TIMOTHY FORTSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 1:22-cv-410 Judge Douglas R. Cole Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura LT. CHARLES HENNESS, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff, Timothy Fortson, an Ohio inmate who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several corrections officers employed at Warren Correctional Institution (“WCI”), alleging that Defendants employed excessive force and were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in violation of his constitutional rights. Defendants Henness, Anderson, Capella, and Mann have moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 22.) For the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff’s Verified Amended Complaint alleges two incidents of excessive force. Plaintiff first alleges that Defendant Charles Henness used excessive force by pinning Plaintiff against the side of a medical cart such that Plaintiff was hanging over the side of the moving cart and hit his head. Plaintiff could smell only exhaust fumes through his mask. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7– 8, ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff further alleges that in April 2022, Plaintiff called for medical assistance after falling from his bed and hitting his head. Several corrections officers responded. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Anderson and Capella used unnecessary force by tossing Plaintiff onto a medical cart, such that Plaintiff landed painfully on his cuffed hands. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Mann pushed Plaintiff’s leg over Plaintiff’s head while Plaintiff screamed. Plaintiff

then alleges that Defendant Henness ordered Defendants Knick, Anderson, and Capella to shackle Plaintiff, in the course of which Defendant Knick “[did] something to [Plaintiff’s] right lower shin,” which “may have left a hole in [Plaintiff’s] leg.” Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants ignored his serious head wound and concussion and left him in cuffs and shackles for more than fifteen minutes. (Id. ¶¶ 9–14.) Plaintiff also names Corrections Officer Starkey as a Defendant involved in the April 2022 incident, but Plaintiff does not allege any specific action by Starkey other than generally alleging he engaged in “the use of force.” (Id. ¶ 12.) On January 25, 2023, the undersigned screened Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A and recommended that the Court dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims

except for his excessive force claims against Defendant Henness in his individual capacity arising from the August 2020 incident and against Defendants Anderson, Capella, and Mann in their individual capacities arising from the April 2022 incident. (ECF No. 16.) That Report and Recommendation remains pending. On May 3, 2023, the deadline for filing dispositive motions, Defendants filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 22.) Defendants contend that the record evidence—namely, the Use of Force reports associated with the August 2020 and April 2022 incidents and associated medical records—preclude Plaintiff from succeeding on his claims of excessive force. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the court must draw all

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Stansberry v. Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (providing that if a party “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact” then the court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion”). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255 (citation omitted). “The nonmovant must, however, do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts; there must be evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party to create a

genuine dispute.” Lee v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 432 F. App’x 435, 441 (6th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (requiring a party maintaining that a fact is genuinely disputed to “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record”). “When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported and the nonmoving party fails to respond with a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of its case, summary judgment is appropriate.” Stansberry, 651 F.3d at 486 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)). III. ANALYSIS The Eighth Amendment prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain against prisoners. Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). To make out a claim under the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner must satisfy both an objective and a subjective component. Id. (citing Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697,

700 (6th Cir.1993)). The objective component requires the pain inflicted to be “sufficiently serious.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Yet the seriousness of the injuries is not by itself dispositive. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam). “When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated. This is true whether or not significant injury is evident.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (cleaned up). “Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.” Id. The subjective component focuses on the state of mind of the prison officials. Williams, 631 F.3d at 383.

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