Forex Capital Markets, Llc v. Kelly M. Crawford, Receiver
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Opinion
FILED 15-0131 2/17/2015 1:27:24 PM tex-4174474 SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, CLERK
NO. _________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS
FOREX CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC, Petitioner, v. KELLY M. CRAWFORD, RECEIVER, Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW
OF COUNSEL: Christopher H. Rentzel (Application for admission Texas Bar No. 16785500 pro hac vice forthcoming) Kevin T. Schutte Texas Bar No. 24033050 Lloyd A. Kadish BRACEWELL & GIULIANI LLP Illinois Bar No. 01378767 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3800 LLOYD KADISH & ASSOCIATES, LTD. Dallas, Texas 75202 345 North Canal Street, Suite 901 Telephone: (214) 468-3800 Chicago, Illinois 60606 Facsimile: (800) 404-3970 Telephone: (312) 559-9181 christopher.rentzel@bgllp.com Facsimile: (312) 264-0470 lkadish@aol.com Yvonne Y. Ho Texas Bar No. 45055673 BRACEWELL & GIULIANI LLP 711 Louisiana Street, Suite 2300 Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (713) 223-2300 Facsimile: (800) 404-3970
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER FOREX CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL Petitioner: Forex Capital Markets, LLC
Counsel for Petitioner: Christopher H. Rentzel Kevin T. Schutte BRACEWELL & GIULIANI LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3800 Dallas, Texas 75202-2711 Telephone: (214) 468-3800 Facsimile: (800) 404-3970
Yvonne Y. Ho BRACEWELL & GIULIANI LLP 711 Louisiana Street, Suite 2300 Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (713) 223-2300 Facsimile: (800) 404-3970
Lloyd A. Kadish Of counsel (application for admission pro hac vice forthcoming) LLOYD KADISH & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 345 North Canal Street, Suite 901 Chicago, Illinois 60606 Telephone: (312) 559-9181 Facsimile: (312) 264-0470
Respondent: Kelly Crawford, Receiver, as Assignee
Counsel for Respondent: Charlene C. Koonce J. Mitchell Little SCHEEF & STONE, L.L.P. 2601 Network Blvd., Suite 102 Frisco, Texas 75034 Telephone: (214) 472-2100 Facsimile: (214) 472-2150 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ........................................................ i INDEX OF AUTHORITIES................................................................................... iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................................. vii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..................................................................... viii ISSUE PRESENTED ................................................................................................x
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................2 A. The Investors authorized Revelation to engage a broker on their behalf. ...................................................................................................2
B. Revelation and its successors agreed to arbitrate disputes with FXCM. ..................................................................................................2 C. As Revelation’s representative and successor, the Receiver sued FXCM, asserting claims assigned by Revelation’s Investors that had become property of his estate. .......................................................4
D. The trial court and the court of appeals refused to enforce the arbitration clause against the Receiver. ................................................5 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .......................................................................6 ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................7
I. Whether The Receiver Is Bound To Arbitrate Presents A Question Of Law That This Court Reviews De Novo. .......................................................7 II. The Court Of Appeals Erred By Refusing To Enforce The Arbitration Clause..............................................................................................................8 A. Legal constraints on the Receiver’s authority bind him to the arbitration clause, regardless of whether he acquired these claims by assignment. ..........................................................................9
-ii- Page B. The Receiver’s obligation to arbitrate these claims predates the assignments and is thus binding on the Receiver. ..............................14
PRAYER .................................................................................................................17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...............................................................................19
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ......................................................................20
APPENDIX .............................................................................................................21
-iii- INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s) Cases Akin Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. E-Court, Inc., No. 03-02-00714-CV, 2003 WL 21025030 (Tex. App.—Austin May 8, 2003, no pet.) ................. viii, 9
Cotten v. Republic Nat’l Bank, 395 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ..................... viii, 10
In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) .................................................. 7 Finova Capital Corp. v. Lawrence, No. 399CV2552-M, 2000 WL 1808276 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2000) ....................................................................................10 Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51 (Tex. 2008)...................................................................................7 Forex Capital Mkts., LLC v. Crawford, No. 05-14-00341-CV, 2014 WL 7498051 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 31, 2014) ................................................................... vii
Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam) .........................................................12 Global Drywall Sys., Inc. v. Coronado Paint Co., 104 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2003) ..............................................................................14 Hayes and Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1989) .......................................................................12, 13 J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. 2003) ................................................................................ 8 Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., Inc., 712 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2013) ........................................................................10, 16
-iv- Page(s) In re L&L Kempwood Assocs., L.P., 9 S.W.3d 125 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam)................................................................ 7
Logan v. JKV Real Estate Servs. (In re Bogdan), 414 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 2005) ..................................................................10, 11, 16
MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475 (Tex. 2010) ..............................................................................12
Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Wood, 438 F.3d 1008 (10th Cir. 2006) ..........................................................................15 Oakes v.
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FILED 15-0131 2/17/2015 1:27:24 PM tex-4174474 SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, CLERK
NO. _________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS
FOREX CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC, Petitioner, v. KELLY M. CRAWFORD, RECEIVER, Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW
OF COUNSEL: Christopher H. Rentzel (Application for admission Texas Bar No. 16785500 pro hac vice forthcoming) Kevin T. Schutte Texas Bar No. 24033050 Lloyd A. Kadish BRACEWELL & GIULIANI LLP Illinois Bar No. 01378767 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3800 LLOYD KADISH & ASSOCIATES, LTD. Dallas, Texas 75202 345 North Canal Street, Suite 901 Telephone: (214) 468-3800 Chicago, Illinois 60606 Facsimile: (800) 404-3970 Telephone: (312) 559-9181 christopher.rentzel@bgllp.com Facsimile: (312) 264-0470 lkadish@aol.com Yvonne Y. Ho Texas Bar No. 45055673 BRACEWELL & GIULIANI LLP 711 Louisiana Street, Suite 2300 Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (713) 223-2300 Facsimile: (800) 404-3970
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER FOREX CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL Petitioner: Forex Capital Markets, LLC
Counsel for Petitioner: Christopher H. Rentzel Kevin T. Schutte BRACEWELL & GIULIANI LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3800 Dallas, Texas 75202-2711 Telephone: (214) 468-3800 Facsimile: (800) 404-3970
Yvonne Y. Ho BRACEWELL & GIULIANI LLP 711 Louisiana Street, Suite 2300 Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (713) 223-2300 Facsimile: (800) 404-3970
Lloyd A. Kadish Of counsel (application for admission pro hac vice forthcoming) LLOYD KADISH & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 345 North Canal Street, Suite 901 Chicago, Illinois 60606 Telephone: (312) 559-9181 Facsimile: (312) 264-0470
Respondent: Kelly Crawford, Receiver, as Assignee
Counsel for Respondent: Charlene C. Koonce J. Mitchell Little SCHEEF & STONE, L.L.P. 2601 Network Blvd., Suite 102 Frisco, Texas 75034 Telephone: (214) 472-2100 Facsimile: (214) 472-2150 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ........................................................ i INDEX OF AUTHORITIES................................................................................... iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................................. vii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..................................................................... viii ISSUE PRESENTED ................................................................................................x
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................2 A. The Investors authorized Revelation to engage a broker on their behalf. ...................................................................................................2
B. Revelation and its successors agreed to arbitrate disputes with FXCM. ..................................................................................................2 C. As Revelation’s representative and successor, the Receiver sued FXCM, asserting claims assigned by Revelation’s Investors that had become property of his estate. .......................................................4
D. The trial court and the court of appeals refused to enforce the arbitration clause against the Receiver. ................................................5 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .......................................................................6 ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................7
I. Whether The Receiver Is Bound To Arbitrate Presents A Question Of Law That This Court Reviews De Novo. .......................................................7 II. The Court Of Appeals Erred By Refusing To Enforce The Arbitration Clause..............................................................................................................8 A. Legal constraints on the Receiver’s authority bind him to the arbitration clause, regardless of whether he acquired these claims by assignment. ..........................................................................9
-ii- Page B. The Receiver’s obligation to arbitrate these claims predates the assignments and is thus binding on the Receiver. ..............................14
PRAYER .................................................................................................................17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...............................................................................19
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ......................................................................20
APPENDIX .............................................................................................................21
-iii- INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s) Cases Akin Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. E-Court, Inc., No. 03-02-00714-CV, 2003 WL 21025030 (Tex. App.—Austin May 8, 2003, no pet.) ................. viii, 9
Cotten v. Republic Nat’l Bank, 395 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ..................... viii, 10
In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) .................................................. 7 Finova Capital Corp. v. Lawrence, No. 399CV2552-M, 2000 WL 1808276 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2000) ....................................................................................10 Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51 (Tex. 2008)...................................................................................7 Forex Capital Mkts., LLC v. Crawford, No. 05-14-00341-CV, 2014 WL 7498051 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 31, 2014) ................................................................... vii
Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam) .........................................................12 Global Drywall Sys., Inc. v. Coronado Paint Co., 104 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2003) ..............................................................................14 Hayes and Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1989) .......................................................................12, 13 J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. 2003) ................................................................................ 8 Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., Inc., 712 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2013) ........................................................................10, 16
-iv- Page(s) In re L&L Kempwood Assocs., L.P., 9 S.W.3d 125 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam)................................................................ 7
Logan v. JKV Real Estate Servs. (In re Bogdan), 414 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 2005) ..................................................................10, 11, 16
MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475 (Tex. 2010) ..............................................................................12
Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Wood, 438 F.3d 1008 (10th Cir. 2006) ..........................................................................15 Oakes v. Lake, 290 U.S. 59 (1933) ..............................................................................................16
Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012) ..................................................... 8 Prudential Secs., Inc. v. Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. 1995) ................................................................................ 7 Reneker v. Offill, 3:08-CV-1394-D, 2012 WL 2158733 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2012) ............................................................................10, 12 Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................10 Scholes v. Stone, McGuire & Benjamin, 821 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Ill. 1993) .......................................................................10 Seagull Energy E&P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. 2006) ..............................................................................14
Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. White Civil Action No. 4:13-cv-383 (E.D. Tex. July 9, 2013) .................................4, 12 State v. Hogg, 535 A.2d 923 (Md. 1988), abrogated on other grounds, Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 827 A.2d 115 (Md. 2003) ...................................................................................15
-v- Page(s) United States Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. RFF GP, LLC, Civil Action No. 4:13-cv-382 (E.D. Tex. July 9, 2013) .................................4, 12
United States Small Bus. Admin. v. Coqui Capital Mgmt., LLC, No. 08 Civ. 0978, 2008 WL 4735234 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2008) ...............................................12, 16
Statutes 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.....................................................................................................7 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 22.225(c) ............................................................................ix TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.001(a)(2) ....................................................................ix
Rules TEX. R. EVID. 201(d) ................................................................................................12
Treatises COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 323.02[4] ....................................................................13 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 51.2 (2014) .....................................................................15
Other Authorities Details for Forex Capital Markets LLC (NFA ID: 0308179), National Futures Association, available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/ basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=uy8vi7mVysc%3d&rn =Y.................................. 2
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 336(4) (1981) ..........................14, 15, 16
-vi- STATEMENT OF THE CASE Nature of the This dispute pertains to the enforcement of an arbitration Case: agreement against the receiver for an investment partnership. Respondent Kelly Crawford, a court-appointed receiver (“Receiver”) for Revelation Forex Fund, LP (“Revelation”), sued Petitioner Forex Capital Markets, LLC (“FXCM”), a futures commission merchant, in a Texas state district court. (CR.11, 301- 02). The Receiver’s claims were allegedly obtained by assignment from third-party investors who were limited partners of Revelation. (CR.13). By agreement, Revelation and its “estate, . . . administrators, legal representatives, [and] successors” must arbitrate all disputes against FXCM. (App. A at 4 ¶ 23; CR.825 ¶ 23; CR.826-27). That same agreement also requires all judicial proceedings in connection with these transactions to be held in New York. (CR.826 ¶ 30).
Trial Court: Hon. Jill Willis, 429th Judicial District Court of Collin County, Texas
Trial Court’s FXCM filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration, pursuant to an Action: enforceable arbitration agreement. (CR.161-267). In the alternative, FXCM filed a motion to dismiss based on a mandatory forum selection clause in the same agreement. (CR.161-267). The trial court denied both motions on March 7, 2014. (App. B; CR.1070-71).
Court of Fifth District of Texas at Dallas; Justices O’Neill, Lang-Miers, and Appeals: Brown
Court of On March 18, 2014, FXCM filed a notice of interlocutory appeal Appeals from the denial of its motion to compel arbitration. (CR.1102-04). Disposition: On April 16, 2014, FXCM filed a petition for writ of mandamus from the denial of its motion to dismiss based on the forum- selection clause. The court of appeals consolidated both proceedings. On December 31, 2014, the court of appeals issued an opinion denying mandamus relief and affirming the order denying FXCM’s motion to compel arbitration. Forex Capital Mkts., LLC v. Crawford, No. 05-14-00341-CV, 2014 WL 7498051 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 31, 2014); (App. C, slip op).
-vii- STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION This petition for review presents the same legal question involving the same
contractual agreement for which Petitioner Forex Capital Markets, LLC (“FXCM”)
has also sought mandamus relief in this Court. See In re Forex Capital Markets,
LLC, No. 15-0128 (Tex. Feb. 16, 2015). Whereas this petition requests that the
Court enforce an arbitration clause in the agreement, FXCM’s petition for writ of
mandamus requests enforcement of a forum selection clause in that agreement.
Yet in both proceedings, the issue is whether an equity receiver can escape the
contractual obligations of the receivership entity he represents, merely because he
purports to be asserting claims assigned to him by third parties.
By allowing Respondent Kelly Crawford (the “Receiver”) to avoid his
contractual obligation to arbitrate, the court of appeals created a conflict with
decisions by Texas courts recognizing that receivers cannot bring claims unless
they are property of the receivership estate. See Akin Gump, Strauss, Hauer &
Feld, L.L.P. v. E-Court, Inc., No. 03-02-00714-CV, 2003 WL 21025030, at *5
(Tex. App.—Austin May 8, 2003, no pet.) (“[A] receiver does not have an
unfettered right to represent creditors and shareholders of a corporation. A
receiver may represent creditors and shareholders only to the extent that the cause
of action seeks to preserve or recover corporate assets.”); Cotten v. Republic Nat’l
Bank, 395 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (same
-viii- principle). If the Receiver can only bring assigned claims that are property of the
receivership estate, then he is subject to the contractual obligations of the
receivership entity he represents when asserting these claims—here, the arbitration
(and forum selection) clause. This conflict warrants review. See TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. §§ 22.001(a)(2); 22.225(c).
Even if the Court declines to find a direct conflict with prior Texas opinions,
the Court should exercise its equitable power to hold this petition for review until
FXCM’s related petition for writ of mandamus has been decided. Because the
reasons for enforcing the arbitration clause are identical to those raised in FXCM’s
mandamus petition, a hold is warranted to avoid the potential for creating a conflict
in this case regarding the enforceability of interrelated provisions of the same
agreement. Under these unique circumstances, the petition for review should, at
minimum, be held until FXCM’s petition for writ of mandamus is resolved.
-ix- ISSUE PRESENTED Whether an equity receiver is required to arbitrate claims procured by assignment from third parties, when:
a. the assignments made the claims property of the receiver’s estate and the estate is bound to the arbitration clause; and
b. the receiver’s obligation to arbitrate this dispute accrued before he received the assignments.
-x- INTRODUCTION The lower courts incorrectly allowed an equity receiver to circumvent his
contractual obligation to arbitrate these claims, merely because he purports to be
asserting claims assigned by third parties. It does not matter that the receiver
purports to bring these claims as assignee because the claims are now the property
of his estate. The receiver is bound to the arbitration clause because he “stands in
the shoes” of the receivership entity which is indisputably bound by it. The
receiver is also bound to the clause under the plain language of the contract.
Established receivership law dictates that a receiver only has the standing to
bring assigned claims if they belong to his estate. Because the claims must now
belong to his estate, the receiver is subject to the contractual obligations of that
estate—including the arbitration clause. Moreover, the contract explicitly provides
that the receiver, as the legal representative or successor of the receivership entity,
is bound to the arbitration clause regardless of how the estate obtained these
claims. This Court should prevent the Receiver from using an “assignment”
strategy to evade his contractual obligations, reverse the court of appeals’
judgment, and enforce the arbitration clause. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. The Investors authorized Revelation to engage a broker on their behalf. Revelation Forex Fund, L.P. (“Revelation”) is an investment fund that
solicited investors (“Investors”) to purchase limited partnership interests.
(CR.841-74). Revelation’s general partner was RFF GP, LLC, which, in turn, was
solely owned by Kevin G. White (“White”). (CR.835-37, 841).
Before making their investments, the Investors expressly authorized RFF to
make decisions and conduct business on Revelation’s behalf, (CR.854; CR.891-92
§ 10.01; CR.900 ¶ 18), and allowed Revelation to invest on their behalf in accounts
maintained in Revelation’s name. (CR.880 § 2.01(b); CR.900 ¶ 18(b)). Revelation
also advised the Investors it intended to trade foreign currencies (“Forex”), and that
RFF would have exclusive control over that trading. (CR.845, 852-53).
B. Revelation and its successors agreed to arbitrate disputes with FXCM. Acting on Revelation’s behalf, White opened an account with Forex Capital
Markets, LLC (“FXCM”), a futures commission merchant that provides online
platforms for Forex trading worldwide. (See CR.822). FXCM is registered with
the National Futures Association and is headquartered in New York City. (CR.826
¶ 28); see also Details for Forex Capital Markets LLC (NFA ID: 0308179),
National Futures Association, available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/
basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=uy8vi7mVysc%3d&rn =Y.
-2- To open the account, White executed a Client Agreement in Revelation’s
name (the “Client Agreement” or “Agreement”). (CR.821-38). Pursuant to that
Agreement, Revelation agreed to arbitrate all disputes in connection with its
transactions through FXCM:
[Revelation] agrees and, by opening one or more accounts for [Revelation], FXCM also agrees, that any and all disputes, controversies, or claims arising out of this Client Agreement, or the relationships or activities contemplated thereby, including whether or not any such dispute, controversy, or claim is arbitrable, shall be resolved by an Arbitration Panel selected by the National Futures Association (“NFA”), pursuant to the NFA’s Code of Arbitration. The award of the NFA Arbitrators, or of the majority of them, shall be final, and judgment upon the award may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction.
(App. A at 6; CR.827 (emphasis added)). Revelation also agreed that its estate,
legal representatives, and successors are to be bound to the terms of the Client
Agreement, including the arbitration clause:
This Client Agreement including all authorizations, shall inure to the benefit of FXCM and its successors and assigns, whether by merger, consolidation or otherwise, and shall be binding upon Trader and/or the estate, executor, trustees, administrators, legal representatives, successors and assigns of [Revelation] . . . .
(App. A at 4, ¶ 23; CR.825 ¶ 23 (emphasis added)). The Client Agreement also
includes a forum selection clause specifying that any dispute in connection with
the trading transactions must be resolved in New York. (App. A at 5, ¶ 30; CR.826
-3- ¶ 30). Revelation, through White, “acknowledge[d] [its] agreement [with] and
understanding of” these provisions. (CR.834).
C. As Revelation’s representative and successor, the Receiver sued FXCM, asserting claims assigned by Revelation’s Investors that had become property of his estate. As a result of two lawsuits,1 the Receiver was appointed for White, RFF,
KGM Capital Management, LLC, and Revelation. (CR.12, 48, 53, 66). The
Receiver was given the authority to pursue claims and bring actions in connection
with the property of his estate. (CR.45-64; CR.65-81). The Receiver then devised
a plan to obtain assignments from the Investors in order to pursue certain causes of
action in Texas state court. (2RR.21:5-8; CR.452-559).
The Receiver filed this suit against FXCM, (CR.11), purporting to act
“solely” as assignee of all Investors in Revelation. (CR.301-02). The Receiver
alleges that Revelation operated as a fraud, using FXCM as its broker and FXCM’s
employee, Brian Hinman, as its trader. (CR.14). According to the Receiver,
FXCM did not properly supervise Hinman in his efforts to solicit funds and trade
for Revelation. (CR.24-25, 37-38). The Receiver claims that FXCM is liable for
the loss of the funds that the Investors deposited into Revelation. (CR.35-38, 42).
1 Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. White (“SEC Action”), Civil Action No. 4:13-cv- 383 (E.D. Tex.) (filed July 9, 2013); United States Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. RFF GP, LLC (“CFTC Action”), Civil Action No. 4:13-cv-382 (E.D. Tex.) (filed July 9, 2013).
-4- D. The trial court and the court of appeals refused to enforce the arbitration clause against the Receiver. FXCM filed a timely Motion to Compel Arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act (the “FAA”). (CR.168-71). In the alternative, FXCM filed a
motion to dismiss the Receiver’s suit based on the forum selection clause in the
same Client Agreement. (CR.165-68). The trial court denied both motions on
March 7, 2014. (CR.1070-71). FXCM filed an interlocutory appeal from the
denial of its motion to compel arbitration, and filed a petition for writ of mandamus
from the denial of its motion to dismiss. The court of appeals granted FXCM’s
motion to consolidate these two proceedings.
On December 31, 2014, the court of appeals affirmed the order denying
FXCM’s motion to compel arbitration. (App. C, slip op. at 1, 7). The court held
that the Receiver is not bound to arbitrate the assigned claims because the Investors
were not parties to the Client Agreement containing the arbitration clause. (App.
C, slip op. at 4-5, 7). While the court agreed that receivers generally are bound to
the contractual obligations of their receivership entities, it found that this Receiver
could avoid such obligations simply by asserting claims assigned to him by the
Investors. (App. C, slip op. at 5-6). Applying the same reasoning, the court of
appeals also denied mandamus relief from the order refusing to enforce the forum
selection clause. (See App. C, slip op. 6-7).
-5- FXCM filed this petition for review based on the arbitration clause in the
Client Agreement. Relatedly, FXCM also filed a petition for writ of mandamus
based on the forum selection clause in the same Agreement. See In re Forex
Capital Markets, LLC, No. 15-0128 (Tex. Feb. 16, 2015).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT There is no dispute that the arbitration clause covers the subject matter of the
Receiver’s claims, or that the clause is otherwise valid and enforceable. The only
issue is whether the Receiver is bound to the arbitration clause when he asserts
claims assigned to him by third parties. The answer to that question is “yes.”
First, legal constraints on the Receiver’s authority dictate that the arbitration
clause applies to the Receiver’s claims. Under settled law, a receiver can only
bring assigned claims that belong to, and are property of, his receivership estate—
here, the estate of Revelation, which executed the Client Agreement. Because the
claims are now part of the Receiver’s estate, he is subject to all the same
obligations that applied to Revelation, including the arbitration clause. As the case
law makes clear, the Receiver “stands in the shoes” of his estate.
Second, the arbitration clause applies to the Receiver under general
principles of contract law. An assignee, like the Receiver, remains subject to any
defenses that FXCM could have asserted against him before the assignments
occurred. Here, both the Client Agreement and settled principles of receivership
-6- law bound the Receiver to the arbitration clause when he was appointed
Revelation’s receiver—before he solicited the assignments of the Investors’
claims. Because the obligation stemming from the arbitration clause pre-dates the
assignments, the Receiver is bound to the clause as a matter of law. This Court
should reverse and direct that all claims be dismissed.
ARGUMENT
I. Whether The Receiver Is Bound To Arbitrate Presents A Question Of Law That This Court Reviews De Novo. Because this Agreement involves interstate commerce, it is governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). See 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.; In re L&L Kempwood
Assocs., L.P., 9 S.W.3d 125, 127 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam). The FAA embodies a
strong presumption in favor of arbitration, such that any doubts regarding
arbitrability must be resolved in favor of arbitration. Prudential Secs., Inc. v.
Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. 1995).
To compel arbitration, a party must satisfy two requirements: (a) the
existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate; and (b) that the claims fall within the
scope of the agreement. See In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 781
(Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding). When, as here, the facts relating to the existence of
a valid arbitration agreement are undisputed, this Court’s review is de novo. See
Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 55 n.9 (Tex. 2008) (“The trial court’s
determination of the arbitration agreement’s validity is a legal question subject to
-7- de novo review.”) (quoting J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 227
(Tex. 2003)).
The second requirement, whether the claims are covered by an arbitration
agreement, is undisputed, and, in any event, is not a determination for the Court.
Under the Agreement, disputes regarding arbitrability are for the arbitrators to
resolve. (CR.827); see Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations
Co., 687 F.3d 671, 674-75 (5th Cir. 2012).
II. The Court Of Appeals Erred By Refusing To Enforce The Arbitration Clause. In upholding the denial of FXCM’s motion to compel arbitration, the court
of appeals failed to correctly apply the legal principles that constrain the
Receiver’s authority. By accepting the position as a receiver, the only “shoes” the
Receiver may now wear are those of his estate. He cannot bring claims in any
other capacity. And because the estate, through Revelation, is bound to the
arbitration clause, so is the Receiver. Moreover, because the Receiver’s
obligations under the arbitration clause arose before he ever accepted the
assignments, he is also subject to the clause under applicable principles of contract
law. This Court should reverse.
-8- A. Legal constraints on the Receiver’s authority bind him to the arbitration clause, regardless of whether he acquired these claims by assignment. Because there is no dispute that the Receiver’s claims fall within the scope
of the arbitration clause, the sole issue is whether the Receiver is bound to it. On
that issue, the court of appeals found that the source of the claims was dispositive.
According to the court of appeals, the only defenses that may apply to the
Receiver’s claims are those which FXCM had against the Investors, as assignors.
(App. C, slip. op. at 4-6). But that analysis ignores receivership law, which forbids
the Receiver from asserting claims assigned by third parties unless they first have
become property of his estate. Once those claims became property of the
Receiver’s estate, it did not matter how the estate acquired them; Revelation’s
obligation to arbitrate this suit applied equally to the Receiver.
The Receiver can only represent his receivership estate; he lacks standing to
bring claims on behalf of third parties like the Investors. Texas courts have
acknowledged this principle, consistent with a long line of authority from the
federal courts. See Akin Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. E-Court, Inc.,
No. 03-02-00714-CV, 2003 WL 21025030, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin May 8,
2003, no pet.) (“[A] receiver does not have an unfettered right to represent
creditors and shareholders of a corporation. A receiver may represent creditors and
shareholders only to the extent that the cause of action seeks to preserve or recover
-9- corporate assets.”); see also Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm.,
Inc., 712 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[A] federal equity receiver has standing
to assert only the claims of the entities in receivership, and not the claims of the
entities’ investor-creditors . . . .”). 2
Thus, the only way a receiver can bring third-party claims, such as those of
the Investors, is if those claims have become the property of his estate. See Cotten
v. Republic Nat’l Bank, 395 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1965, writ ref’d
n.r.e.) (a receiver may only bring third-party claims “to the extent that his cause of
action seeks to preserve or recover the assets” of the entity in receivership). This is
also true in the analogous context of bankruptcy, where courts permit trustees to
assert claims assigned by third parties only if those assignors have effectively
“abandon[ed] their claims,” caused the assigned claims to become “property of the
estate,” and “allow[ed] the trustee to seek recovery . . . on behalf of the estate.”
Logan v. JKV Real Estate Servs. (In re Bogdan), 414 F.3d 507, 512-13 (4th Cir.
2005); see also Finova Capital Corp. v. Lawrence, No. 399CV2552-M, 2000 WL
1808276, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2000) (same principle). In this case, the
2 See also, e.g., Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Like a trustee in bankruptcy . . . an equity receiver may sue only to redress injuries to the entity in receivership . . . .”); Reneker v. Offill, 3:08-CV-1394-D, 2012 WL 2158733, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2012) (“‘It is a well-known legal principle that a receiver can bring only those claims belonging to the entity it represents and cannot bring claims on behalf of third parties.’”) (quoting Scholes v. Stone, McGuire & Benjamin, 821 F. Supp. 533, 535 (N.D. Ill. 1993)).
-10- assignments must—and did—make the Investors’ claims property of the
Receiver’s estate. As a result, the Receiver’s estate has become the real party in
interest, rather than the third-party Investors who assigned the claims. See In re
Bogdan, 414 F.3d at 513.
While the court of appeals acknowledged these limitations on the Receiver’s
authority, it failed to appreciate their ramifications with respect to the Receiver’s
obligations to arbitrate these claims. (See, e.g., App. C, slip op. at 5-6 & n.5).
Thus, the court of appeals erred in finding that the Receiver stood in the shoes of
the Investors. Id. at 4, 6.
The Receiver cannot elect to assert standing based solely on the “investors’
unconditional assignments” and ignore “his capacity as a receiver,” as the court of
appeals believed. (App. C, slip op. at 6). These claims against FXCM now belong
to the Receiver’s estate, and he is prosecuting them as its representative and as the
successor to Revelation. Any recovery from FXCM will become the property of
his estate and will be distributed in accordance with the estate’s guidelines, not
merely to the Investors. (CR.454-55; 2RR.28). Thus, by any measure, Mr.
Crawford is functioning as an equity receiver, not solely as an assignee, in
prosecuting these claims.
The court of appeals erred when it found that ownership of these claims was
“not pertinent to [its] resolution of this appeal.” (App. C, slip op. at 5 n.4). To the
-11- contrary, the estate’s ownership of these claims is crucial; otherwise, the Receiver
would not have standing to bring them in the first instance. See Reneker v. Offill,
3:08-CV-1394-D, 2012 WL 2158733, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2012) (to have
standing, a receiver must allege “injury in fact” arising from claims belonging to
his estate).3 Had it fully considered these facts, the court of appeals would have
concluded that the Receiver stood in the shoes of his estate, not in those of the
Investors. As a result, the Receiver is bound to Revelation’s Client Agreement and
the arbitration clause in it. See United States Small Bus. Admin. v. Coqui Capital
Mgmt., LLC, No. 08 Civ. 0978, 2008 WL 4735234, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2008).
The court of appeals also failed to apply the relevant rule in Hayes and Co.
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1989).
(App. C, slip op. at 5). In Hays, the court required the bankruptcy trustee to
3 The court of appeals also erred in concluding that the Receiver “does not concede the claims themselves are receivership property.” (App. C, slip op. at 5 n.4). In fact, the Receiver admitted that these claims belong to his estate. (2RR.19-20 (admitting these are “claims of the receivership estate” that the Receiver has standing to assert)); see also SEC Action, Civil Action No. 4:13-cv- 383, Dkt. 74 at 6 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2014); CFTC Action, Civil Action No. 4:13-cv- 382, Dkt. 70 at 5 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2014) (characterizing these as “claims held by the receivership estate”) (capitalization removed). This Court should take judicial notice of these pleadings on file in the SEC and CFTC Actions, which are included in Tabs D and E of the Appendix, pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 201(d). See Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam) (“Under [Rule 201(d)], a court will take judicial notice of another court’s records if a party provides proof of the records.”) (citing MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 497 n.21 (Tex. 2010)).
-12- arbitrate all claims that, like those at issue here, were property of his estate. 885
F.2d at 1154. The Hays court found that, in prosecuting such claims, the trustee
was “successor to the debtor’s interest” and thus “‘subject to the same defenses as
could have been asserted by the defendant had the action been instituted by the
debtor.’” Id. (quoting COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 323.02[4]). The only claims
not subject to arbitration were certain “avoidance” claims that belong directly to
the trustee, rather than the debtor, and that the Bankruptcy Code confers express
standing for the trustee to bring. Id.
Under Hays, Revelation is subject to the arbitration because that clause
could have been asserted by FXCM “had the action been instituted by” Revelation.
Id. And unlike the avoidance claims addressed in Hays, the Receiver does not
acquire standing under the Bankruptcy Code, but rather, is asserting these claims
while acting as Revelation’s successor. As a result, the Receiver is subject to the
same arbitration clause that applies to Revelation.
In short, Revelation expressly agreed that its “estate,” “legal
representatives,” and “successors” must arbitrate all suits in connection with its
transactions through FXCM. (CR.825 ¶ 23). Once these assigned claims became
the property of the Receiver’s estate, all defenses against the Receiver apply when
he prosecutes them on the estate’s behalf. Because receivership principles bind the
-13- Receiver to the arbitration clause, the court of appeals erred by refusing to direct
the dismissal of this case.
B. The Receiver’s obligation to arbitrate these claims predates the assignments and is thus binding on the Receiver. The court of appeals’ exclusive focus on the origin of the assigned claims is
also misplaced because the Receiver was already bound to the arbitration clause
before the assignments occurred. Because the Receiver’s obligation to arbitrate
predates the assignments, FXCM is entitled to enforce it against the Receiver.
Basic contract principles dictate that the Receiver, as an assignee, is subject
to any defenses that FXCM could have asserted against him before the assignments
were made. For these principles, this Court need only look to the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, as it has done in many cases. See, e.g., Seagull Energy
E&P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342, 347 (Tex. 2006) (adopting
Restatement’s approach regarding the effect of an assignment); Global Drywall
Sys., Inc. v. Coronado Paint Co., 104 S.W.3d 538, 538 n.2 (Tex. 2003) (citing
Restatement’s approach regarding limitations on the right to assign claims).
The Restatement makes clear that assignees are subject to any defenses that
the defendant had against them before the assignments occurred:
An assignee’s right against the obligor is subject to any defense or claim arising from his conduct or to which he was subject as a party or a prior assignee because he had notice.
-14- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 336(4) (1981); cf. CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 51.2 (2014) (“A counterclaim, set-off, or recoupment, arising out of
the same transaction as that by which the claim of the assignee was itself created,
is usable [by the defendant] against the assignee in precisely the same cases that it
would be so usable if it were operative as a complete defense.”). Such preexisting
defenses are unaffected by the assignments. Cf. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Wood,
438 F.3d 1008, 1016-17 & n.7 (10th Cir. 2006); State v. Hogg, 535 A.2d 923, 933-
35 (Md. 1988), abrogated on other grounds, Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police
Dep’t, 827 A.2d 115 (Md. 2003).
Under these Restatement principles, the Receiver’s rights against FXCM are
subject to the arbitration clause for two reasons. First, the Client Agreement
obligated the Receiver to arbitrate all disputes against FXCM, well before the
claims were assigned to him:
This Client Agreement . . . shall be binding upon [Revelation] and/or the estate, executor, trustees, administrators, legal representatives, successors and assigns of [Revelation].
(CR.825 ¶ 23 (emphasis added)). There is no question that the Receiver falls
within the scope of this clause as Revelation’s “legal representative” or
“successor” acting on behalf of Revelation’s “estate.” Additionally, there is no
dispute that the subject matter of this suit is covered by the arbitration clause.
Since the Client Agreement contains no exception for claims acquired by
-15- assignment, those claims were subject to the Client Agreement once they became
part of the Receiver’s estate. As a result, the Receiver’s rights, even as an
assignee, are subject to FXCM’s arbitration-clause defense under the Client
Agreement that Revelation executed well before the Receiver was assigned these
claims. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 336(4).
Second, in addition to the Client Agreement’s express language, the
Receiver also was bound to the arbitration clause because of limitations on his
capacity as receiver. As soon as he accepted that position, the Receiver could only
prosecute claims on behalf of his estate, whether derived from Revelation or by
assignment. See Janvey, 712 F.3d at 190; In re Bogdan, 414 F.3d at 512-13; see
also supra 9-14. Thus, the Receiver immediately succeeded to defenses that apply
to his estate, such as the arbitration clause. 4 See Coqui Capital Mgmt., LLC, 2008
WL 4735234, at *2.
In short, under applicable contract and receivership principles, the Receiver
is bound by the arbitration clause in the Revelation-FXCM Client Agreement.
4 Nor is this principle inconsistent with Oakes v. Lake, 290 U.S. 59, 62-63 (1933), on which the court of appeals mistakenly relied. (App. C, slip op. at 6). In Oakes, the receiver acquired additional authority by the assignment of claims—just as the Receiver here has acquired standing to bring the Investors’ claims. Nowhere does Oakes suggest that an assignment negates any pre-existing defense against the Receiver. Instead, the common-law contract principles discussed above make clear that preexisting defenses can be asserted against the Receiver, as assignee.
-16- This Court should reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and order that this case
be dismissed.
PRAYER For these reasons, Petitioner Forex Capital Markets, LLC prays that this
Court grant review, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, and order that this suit
be dismissed, or alternatively, to hold this petition until the related petition for writ
of mandamus on the enforceability of the forum selection clause is resolved.
Respectfully submitted,
BRACEWELL & GIULIANI LLP
By: /s/ Christopher H. Rentzel Christopher H. Rentzel Texas Bar No. 16785500 Chris.Rentzel@bgllp.com Kevin T. Schutte Texas Bar No. 24033050 Kevin.Schutte@bgllp.com
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3800 Dallas, Texas 75202 Telephone: (214) 468-3800 Facsimile: (800) 404-3970
Yvonne Y. Ho Texas Bar No. 45055673 yvonne.ho@bgllp.com
711 Louisiana Street, Suite 2300 Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (713) 223-2300 Facsimile: (800) 404-3970
-17- OF COUNSEL:
LLOYD KADISH & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
Lloyd A. Kadish Illinois Bar No. 01378767 LKadish@aol.com
345 North Canal Street, Suite 901 Chicago, Illinois 60606 Telephone: (312) 559-9181 Facsimile: (312) 264-0470
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER FOREX CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC
-18- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a true and correct copy of this Petition for Review was served on the following counsel of record by the Electronic Filing Service provider on the 17th day of February, 2015, addressed as follows:
J. Mitchell Little mitch.little@solidcounsel.com Charlene C. Koonce charlene.koonce@solidcounsel.com SCHEEF & STONE, L.L.P. 2601 Network Blvd., Suite 102 Frisco, Texas 75034 Counsel for the Receiver
Robert Coleman Robert.Coleman@WilsonElser.com WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKET, LLP Bank of America Plaza 901 Main Street, Suite 4800 Dallas, Texas 75202 Counsel for Weaver & Tidwell, L.L.P.
Scott Palmer scott@scottpalmerlaw.com SCOTT H. PALMER, P.C. 15455 North Dallas Parkway, Suite 540 Addison, Texas 75001 Counsel for Brian Hinman
/s/ Yvonne Y. Ho Yvonne Y. Ho
-19- CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This petition complies with the length limitations of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4 because this petition consists of 3,974 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(l).
-20- NO. _________
FOREX CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC, Petitioner, v. KELLY M. CRAWFORD, RECEIVER, Respondent.
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR REVIEW
OF COUNSEL: Christopher H. Rentzel (Application for admission Texas Bar No. 16785500 pro hac vice forthcoming) Kevin T. Schutte Texas Bar No. 24033050 Lloyd A. Kadish BRACEWELL & GIULIANI LLP Illinois Bar No. 01378767 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3800 LLOYD KADISH & ASSOCIATES, LTD. Dallas, Texas 75202 345 North Canal Street, Suite 901 Telephone: (214) 468-3800 Chicago, Illinois 60606 Facsimile: (800) 404-3970 Telephone: (312) 559-9181 christopher.rentzel@bgllp.com Facsimile: (312) 264-0470 lkadish@aol.com Yvonne Y. Ho Texas Bar No. 45055673 BRACEWELL & GIULIANI LLP 711 Louisiana Street, Suite 2300 Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (713) 223-2300 Facsimile: (800) 404-3970
-21- APPENDIX
Tab
Client Agreement between Forex Capital Markets, LLC and Revelation Forex Fund, L.P. (R.821-38) .................................................................. A
Trial Court’s Order denying Forex Capital Markets, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue and Lack of Jurisdiction, and in the Alternative, Motion to Compel Arbitration, signed on March 7, 2014 (R.1070-71) ................... B
Court of Appeal’s Opinion and Judgment, issued on December 31, 2014 .............. C
Status Report, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. White, Civil Action No. 4:13-cv-0383, Dkt. 74 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2014) ...................... D
Status Report, United States Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. RFF GP, LLC, Civil Action No. 4:13-cv-382, Dkt. 70 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2014) ........................ E
-22- #4799720.7 Tab A %FXCm CLIENT AGREEMENT
© FOREX CAPITAL MARKETS LLC
For Individual Accounts, please complete pages 7-8 & 11-13 For Corporate Accounts, please complete pages 7-8 & 11-15 For Limited Liability Company (LLC) Accounts, please complete pages 7-8, 11-13 & 16-17 For Partnership Accounts, please complete pages 7-8, 11-13 & 18-19 For Trust Accounts, please complete pages 7-8, 11-13 & 20 For ALL Managed Accounts, please additionally complete page 21 Along with a copy of identification & proof of address
And return to:
Forex Capital Markets Financial Square 32 Old Slip, 1Oth Floor New York, NY 10005 United States Fax: (212) 897-7669
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Forex Capital Markets, Llc v. Kelly M. Crawford, Receiver, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/forex-capital-markets-llc-v-kelly-m-crawford-receiver-texapp-2015.