1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 CHRISTINA FOREGGER, Case No. 24-cv-05701-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 45 10 REDFIN CORPORATION, 11 Defendant.
12 13 Pending before the Court is Defendant Redfin Corporation’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 14 45. The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matter is 15 deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 In July 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint against her former employer, Defendant Redfin 18 Corporation, alleging that several attorneys representing Redfin made false statements about her 19 during proceedings in California state court. See Dkt. No. 1-2. Redfin moved to dismiss the 20 complaint, Dkt. No. 8, and the Court granted the motion with leave to amend. See Dkt No. 36. 21 The Court held that Plaintiff’s complaint (1) “d[id] not adhere to Rule 8”; (2) “fail[ed] to set out a 22 short and plain statement of a defamation claim”; and (3) did not indicate the “cause of action 23 Plaintiff intends to assert against Defendant.” Foregger v. Redfin Corp., No. 24-CV-05701-HSG, 24 2025 WL 917103, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2025). 25 In May 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, asserting that Redfin “fraudulently 26 us[ed] the court system to silence a whistle blower.” Dkt. No. 41 (“Compl.”). The allegations in 27 the complaint are difficult to piece together, but the Court understands them as follows. After 1 the public.” Id. at 6. The parties ended up in a dispute regarding a workplace restraining order. 2 During restraining order proceedings before Judge Joscelyn Jones in Alameda County Superior 3 Court, Plaintiff alleges that “Taylor Neff . . . call[ed] herself my co-worker as opposed to an 4 attorney.” Id. According to Plaintiff, this alleged misrepresentation was “basically [a] lie[] to the 5 Court in order to shut someone up.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff broadly contends that she has “been harmed 6 because this workplace violence issue is affecting my real estate business.” Id. 7 Redfin now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint on the basis that 8 “fraudulently using the State Court to try and silence a whistleblower . . . is not a cognizable cause 9 of action.” Dkt. No. 45 (“Mot.”) at 12. In the alternative, Redfin asks the Court to order Plaintiff 10 to file a more definite statement, or to compel Plaintiff’s claims to arbitration. Plaintiff opposes 11 the motion, Dkt. Nos. 52–54. 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain 14 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A 15 defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be 16 granted under Rule 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the 17 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 18 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 19 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 20 on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible 21 when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 22 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 23 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the complaint as 24 true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. 25 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, courts do not 26 “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 27 unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) 1 “Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). “[A] pro se 2 complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 3 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation omitted). 4 Nevertheless, “pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure.” Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 5 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). Even a “liberal interpretation of a . . . complaint may not supply essential 6 elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 7 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 Plaintiff appears to assert one claim against Redfin: “fraudulently using the State Court to 10 try and silence a whistleblower.” Compl. at 9.1 No such cause of action exists. As the Court 11 explained in its order resolving Redfin’s first motion to dismiss, to the extent that Plaintiff intends 12 to bring a claim for “fraud on the court,” she must clearly identify “the who, what, when, where, 13 and how” of any alleged fraudulent conduct. See United States v. Est. of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 14 443–45 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining the elements of fraud on the court); Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 15 USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Averments of fraud must be accompanied by the 16 ‘who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct charged.”). Plaintiff’s amended complaint 17 alleges that “Taylor Neff was falsely in a state court calling herself my co-worker as opposed to an 18 attorney,” and that it is not “an ok practice for either a corporation or its attorneys to basically li[e] 19 in Court to try and shut someone up.” Compl. at 6, 9. These assertions are insufficient to meet the 20 heightened pleading standard to state a cognizable claim for fraud under Federal Rule of Civil 21 Procedure 9(b). Even construing Plaintiff’s complaint with the utmost leeway, the Court remains 22 unable to discern Plaintiff’s claim(s), the legal basis for them, or the factual matter on which they 23 stand. For example, while Plaintiff checked the box in the complaint indicating that the case 24 “involves a federal law or right,” the complaint does not actually name any federal statute or 25 constitutional provision, or explain how it applies here.2 See id. at 3. 26 1 Plaintiff does not reassert the apparent defamation claim the Court found to be inadequately pled 27 in the original complaint. 1 “[A] pro se litigant . . . must meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with 2 notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.” Brazil v. United States Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 3 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995).
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 CHRISTINA FOREGGER, Case No. 24-cv-05701-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 45 10 REDFIN CORPORATION, 11 Defendant.
12 13 Pending before the Court is Defendant Redfin Corporation’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 14 45. The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matter is 15 deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 In July 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint against her former employer, Defendant Redfin 18 Corporation, alleging that several attorneys representing Redfin made false statements about her 19 during proceedings in California state court. See Dkt. No. 1-2. Redfin moved to dismiss the 20 complaint, Dkt. No. 8, and the Court granted the motion with leave to amend. See Dkt No. 36. 21 The Court held that Plaintiff’s complaint (1) “d[id] not adhere to Rule 8”; (2) “fail[ed] to set out a 22 short and plain statement of a defamation claim”; and (3) did not indicate the “cause of action 23 Plaintiff intends to assert against Defendant.” Foregger v. Redfin Corp., No. 24-CV-05701-HSG, 24 2025 WL 917103, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2025). 25 In May 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, asserting that Redfin “fraudulently 26 us[ed] the court system to silence a whistle blower.” Dkt. No. 41 (“Compl.”). The allegations in 27 the complaint are difficult to piece together, but the Court understands them as follows. After 1 the public.” Id. at 6. The parties ended up in a dispute regarding a workplace restraining order. 2 During restraining order proceedings before Judge Joscelyn Jones in Alameda County Superior 3 Court, Plaintiff alleges that “Taylor Neff . . . call[ed] herself my co-worker as opposed to an 4 attorney.” Id. According to Plaintiff, this alleged misrepresentation was “basically [a] lie[] to the 5 Court in order to shut someone up.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff broadly contends that she has “been harmed 6 because this workplace violence issue is affecting my real estate business.” Id. 7 Redfin now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint on the basis that 8 “fraudulently using the State Court to try and silence a whistleblower . . . is not a cognizable cause 9 of action.” Dkt. No. 45 (“Mot.”) at 12. In the alternative, Redfin asks the Court to order Plaintiff 10 to file a more definite statement, or to compel Plaintiff’s claims to arbitration. Plaintiff opposes 11 the motion, Dkt. Nos. 52–54. 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain 14 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A 15 defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be 16 granted under Rule 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the 17 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 18 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 19 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 20 on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible 21 when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 22 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 23 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the complaint as 24 true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. 25 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, courts do not 26 “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 27 unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) 1 “Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). “[A] pro se 2 complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 3 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation omitted). 4 Nevertheless, “pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure.” Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 5 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). Even a “liberal interpretation of a . . . complaint may not supply essential 6 elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 7 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 Plaintiff appears to assert one claim against Redfin: “fraudulently using the State Court to 10 try and silence a whistleblower.” Compl. at 9.1 No such cause of action exists. As the Court 11 explained in its order resolving Redfin’s first motion to dismiss, to the extent that Plaintiff intends 12 to bring a claim for “fraud on the court,” she must clearly identify “the who, what, when, where, 13 and how” of any alleged fraudulent conduct. See United States v. Est. of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 14 443–45 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining the elements of fraud on the court); Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 15 USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Averments of fraud must be accompanied by the 16 ‘who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct charged.”). Plaintiff’s amended complaint 17 alleges that “Taylor Neff was falsely in a state court calling herself my co-worker as opposed to an 18 attorney,” and that it is not “an ok practice for either a corporation or its attorneys to basically li[e] 19 in Court to try and shut someone up.” Compl. at 6, 9. These assertions are insufficient to meet the 20 heightened pleading standard to state a cognizable claim for fraud under Federal Rule of Civil 21 Procedure 9(b). Even construing Plaintiff’s complaint with the utmost leeway, the Court remains 22 unable to discern Plaintiff’s claim(s), the legal basis for them, or the factual matter on which they 23 stand. For example, while Plaintiff checked the box in the complaint indicating that the case 24 “involves a federal law or right,” the complaint does not actually name any federal statute or 25 constitutional provision, or explain how it applies here.2 See id. at 3. 26 1 Plaintiff does not reassert the apparent defamation claim the Court found to be inadequately pled 27 in the original complaint. 1 “[A] pro se litigant . . . must meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with 2 notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.” Brazil v. United States Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 3 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). Despite the Court’s instructions to Plaintiff explaining what was needed 4 to remedy the deficiencies in the prior complaint, Plaintiff has not met this minimum threshold. 5 See Foregger, 2025 WL 917103, at *3. Accordingly, the Court grants Redfin’s motion to dismiss, 6 Dkt. No. 45.3 7 IV. LEAVE TO AMEND 8 “Dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to amend is proper only if it is ‘absolutely 9 clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Schucker v. 10 Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 11 (9th Cir. 1987)). The Court previously explained what Plaintiff would need to do to fix her 12 complaint and gave her an opportunity to do so. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 13 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an 14 opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”); Foregger v. Redfin Corp., 2025 WL 15 917103, at *3. The Court also warned Plaintiff that any future complaint “may be dismissed if she 16 does not correct the deficiencies the Court has identified.” Id. But Plaintiff’s amended complaint 17 repeats those deficiencies. Based on the nature of the defects in Plaintiff’s amended complaint and 18 Plaintiff’s failure to remedy the issues identified in the original complaint, the Court finds that 19 granting leave to amend would be futile. “Where the plaintiff has previously been granted leave to 20 amend and has subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, ‘[t]he district 21 court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.’” Zucco Partners, LLC v. 22 Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended (Feb. 10, 2009) (internal citation 23 omitted). The Court exercises that discretion here and denies leave to amend. 24 3010158, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2023); Compl. at 10. 25 3 The Court does not reach Redfin’s motion to compel arbitration. However, the Court notes that the parties’ arbitration agreement states that it covers “disputes arising out of or relating to the . . . 26 employment relationship, or the termination of that relationship (including post-employment defamation or retaliation) . . . discrimination . . . and all other federal or state legal claims . . . 27 arising out of or relating to your . . . employment, or the termination of employment.” Dkt. No. 8- 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 The Court GRANTS Redfin’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 45, WITHOUT LEAVE TO 3 AMEND. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and to close 4 the case. This Order TERMINATES as MOOT Dkt. Nos. 48, 57, and 62. 5 The Court recognizes, and respects, that Plaintiff Foregger may disagree with this ruling. 6 She is entitled to appeal this decision before the Ninth Circuit. To do so, Plaintiff must file a 7 notice of appeal within thirty days of the entry of judgment in this case. See Federal Rule of 8 || Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1). Plaintiff can refer to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and 9 the Ninth Circuit Rules for instructions on how to file an appeal. The Ninth Circuit, not this 10 || Court, is the proper forum for Plaintiff to raise any disagreement with this Order, and an appeal is 11 the required mechanism for doing so. 12 The Court recognizes that Plaintiff Foregger has repeatedly asked the Court to answer 5 13 certain questions, including (1) whether Taylor Neff may practice law in the state of California, 14 (2) whether certain attorney conduct was appropriate, and (3) whether Mr. Wojcik was required to 3 15 “turn in” Taylor Neff to the “correct authorities.” See, e.g., Dkt. No. 34 at 2 (“To the current a 16 || Judge I’m in a very disturbing situation where the California Bar Association is refusing to answer 3 17 || my questions about unethical behavior of Redfin attorneys so I’m hoping you can answer the 18 || questions.”). The Court recognizes Plaintiff's desire to get answers to these questions. However, 19 this Court can only decide claims and resolve questions that are appropriately presented to it and 20 || have a proper legal basis. As previously explained, see Dkt. No. 35, the Court cannot provide 21 legal advice or do legal research for any party. 22 No further filings will be considered in this closed case. If Plaintiff continues to file 23 motions or other documents, the Court may revoke her e-filing privileges, direct the Clerk not to 24 || accept any further filings, or take other appropriate action. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 || Dated: 7/2/2025 27 _Almipurrl 5, Sbl_). 28 HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. United States District Judge