Force v. Wood, County of

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: June 23, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02137
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Shawn H Force, No. CV-25-02137-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 County of Wood, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pro se Plaintiff Shawn Force (“Plaintiff”) has filed a Complaint against Defendants 16 Wood County, Wisconsin, and the Wood County Circuit Court in Wisconsin 17 (“Defendants”). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff appears to assert two claims against Defendants under 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 1– 19 2). Plaintiff has also filed an Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying 20 Fees or Costs. (Doc. 2). Upon review, Plaintiffs’ Application, signed under penalty of 21 perjury, indicates that he is financially unable to pay the filing fee. (See id). So, the Court 22 will grant Plaintiffs’ Application and allow him to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 23 However, screening Plaintiff’s IFP Application under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), as the Court 24 must, it finds that it does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendants. 25 I. Legal Standard 26 When a party has been granted IFP status, the Court must review the complaint to 27 determine whether the action: 28 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 1 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 2 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 3 4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1 In conducting this review, “section 1915(e) not only 5 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.” 6 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires complaints to make “a short and plain 8 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While Rule 8 does 9 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, ‘the 10 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me’ accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 11 (2009).2 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint “must contain sufficient factual 13 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting 14 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the 15 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 16 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 17 A complaint that provides “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 18 elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor will a complaint 19 suffice if it presents nothing more than “naked assertions” without “further factual 20 21 1 “While much of § 1915 outlines how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis, § 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners.” 22 Long v. Maricopa Cmty. Coll. Dist., 2012 WL 588965, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2012) 23 (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints[.]”); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 24 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”) (citation omitted). Therefore, section 1915 applies to this non-prisoner IFP Complaint. 25

26 2 “Although the Iqbal Court was addressing pleading standards in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court finds that those standards also apply in the initial screening of 27 a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A since Iqbal discusses the 28 general pleading standards of Rule 8, which apply in all civil actions.” McLemore v. Dennis Dillon Auto. Grp., Inc., 2013 WL 97767, at *2 n.1 (D. Idaho Jan. 8, 2013). 1 enhancement.” Id. at 557. 2 The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpret the 3 facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 4 435 (9th Cir. 2000). That rule does not apply, however, to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 5 U.S. at 678. The Court is mindful that it must “construe pro se filings liberally when 6 evaluating them under Iqbal.” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763–64 (9th Cir. 2014) 7 (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)). 8 II. Personal Jurisdiction 9 “When no federal statute governs personal jurisdiction, the district court applies the 10 law of the forum state.” Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 11 Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir.1998). “Federal courts may 12 raise a jurisdictional issue sua sponte.” Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. State of Hawaii Land 13 Use Comm’n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1059 (D. Haw. 2015), aff’d, 950 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 14 2020) (Bernhardt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002)). 15 Federal courts have personal jurisdiction over a defendant “who is subject to the 16 jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.” 17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Arizona courts may exercise personal jurisdiction “to the 18 maximum extent permitted by the Arizona Constitution and the United States 19 Constitution.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2. Due process requires “certain minimum contacts” such 20 that the lawsuit “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 21 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. Since International Shoe, courts separate personal jurisdiction 22 into “general” and “specific” jurisdiction. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 23 Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). A defendant is subject to a court’s general jurisdiction 24 where its activities in the forum state are “so continuous and systematic as to render [it] 25 essentially at home in the forum State.” Id. Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, exists 26 when the lawsuit “aris[es] out of or [is] related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” 27 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984) (“Hall”). 28 The plaintiff “need only demonstrate facts that[,] if true[,] would support 1 jurisdiction over the defendant.” Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). 2 “Although the plaintiff cannot simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint, 3 uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true.” Schwarzenegger, 374 4 F.3d at 800 (citations omitted). If neither general nor specific jurisdiction is present, then 5 the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. See Total Seal, Inc. v. Performance 6 Motorsports, Inc., 2009 WL 2762046, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 28, 2009) (dismissing the action 7 for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant). 8 A. General Jurisdiction 9 General jurisdiction exists where the nonresident defendant’s activities within a 10 state are “substantial” or “continuous and systematic.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 11 117, 126–27 (2014). A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant 12 consistent with due process only if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts” with the 13 relevant forum “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of 14 fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 15 Plaintiff has not pled facts that allow the Court to assert general jurisdiction over 16 Defendants—as is his burden. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800. Plaintiff merely 17 alleges that he is a resident of Arizona (Doc. 1 at ¶ 19) and that two previous cases filed in 18 this district, Force v. Wood County, 2:24-cv-01247-SMM & Force v. Brazeau, 2:24-cv- 19 00037-DDG, “offered no remedy or no way to stop these people from abusing Mr. Force 20 using lawfare in both Wisconsin and in New York.” (Id. at ¶¶ 18–19). These allegations 21 focus on Plaintiff’s contacts with Arizona and Defendants’ actions in Wisconsin and New 22 York—not Defendants actions in this State. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants acted 23 within the state of Arizona at all, much less that its actions within this state were 24 “substantial” or “continuous and systematic.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 126-27. Thus, the 25 Court concludes that it does not have general jurisdiction over Defendant. 26 B. Specific Jurisdiction 27 Specific jurisdiction arises when a defendant’s contacts with the forum give rise or 28 relate to the claim in question. Hall, 466 U.S. at 414–16. “A court exercises specific 1 jurisdiction where the cause of action arises out of or has a substantial connection to the 2 defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Glencore Grain Rotterdam BV v. Shivnath Rai 3 Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002). Specific jurisdiction requires a 4 defendant to have taken “some act by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege 5 of conduct activities within the forum State.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. 6 Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359 (2021) (citation omitted). The contacts “must be the defendant’s 7 own choice” and “must show that the defendant deliberately reached out beyond its home.” 8 Id. (citations omitted). 9 Again, although Plaintiff states he is a resident of Arizona, Plaintiff does not allege 10 any facts establishing that Defendants have contacts with the state of Arizona, much less a 11 “substantial connection.” See Glencore, 284 F.3d at 1123. Thus, the Court finds that it 12 does not have specific jurisdiction over Defendants either. 13 III. Conclusion 14 Because the Court does not have general or specific jurisdiction over Defendants, 15 the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to prove that the Court has 16 personal jurisdiction over Defendant.3 Therefore, it must dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended 17 Complaint under Rule 12(b)(2). See In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 18 715 F.3d 716, 742 (9th Cir. 2013) (“jurisdiction in [this] forum would deprive the 19 defendant[s] of due process of law.”). 20 Accordingly, 21 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without 22 Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 2) is GRANTED. 23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED. 24 3 The Court also notes that Defendants may be non-jural entities who are immune from 25 being sued. See Williams v. City of Mesa Police Dep’t, 2009 WL 2568640, at *2 (D. Ariz. 26 Aug. 18, 2009) (“An action cannot be brought against a state or county agency that lacks the authority to sue and be sued.”) (citation omitted); see also Munoz v. Superior Court of 27 Los Angeles Cty., 91 F.4th 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2024) (recognizing that federal courts “have 28 no power to resolve claims brought against state courts or state court judges acting in a judicial capacity.”). 1 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment || accordingly and close this case. 3 Dated this 23rd day of June, 2025. 4 5 ZL ee 6 norable'Diang/4. Huretewa 7 United States District Fudge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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